Using and coming to own : a left-proprietarian treatment of the just use and appropration of common resources by Roark, Eric
USING AND COMING TO OWN: A LEFT-PROPRIETARIAN TREATMENT OF 
THE JUST USE AND APPROPRITION OF COMMON RESOURCES 
_______________________________________ 
A Dissertation 
presented to 
the Faculty of the Graduate School 
at the University of Missouri-Columbia 
_______________________________________________________ 
In Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree 
Doctor of Philosophy 
_____________________________________________________ 
by 
ERIC ROARK 
Dr. Peter Vallentyne, Dissertation Supervisor 
MAY 2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
The undersigned, appointed by the dean of the Graduate School, have examined the 
dissertation entitled 
USING AND COMING TO OWN: A LEFT-PROPRIETARIAN ACCOUNT OF THE 
JUST USE AND APPROPRIATION OF COMMON RESOURCES 
presented by Eric Roark, 
a candidate for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
and hereby certify that, in their opinion, it is worthy of acceptance. 
Professor Peter Vallentyne 
Professor Brian Kierland 
Professor Paul Weirich 
Professor Joseph Bien 
Professor Robert Johnson 
Professor John Howe 
ii 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would first like to thank my academic advisor Peter Vallentyne for the help, 
guidance, and patience which he gratefully exhibited both before I began work on the 
dissertation and during the long and time-staking dissertation process itself.  Special 
thanks go out to all members of my dissertation including Brian Kierland, Paul Weirich, 
Joseph Bien, Robert Johnson, John Howe, and Michael Otsuka.  Each of my committee 
members contributed in ways which served to significantly increase the quality of my 
dissertation.  I would also like to thank Professor Bina Gupta who without her guidance 
and caring early in my time in the program this dissertation would likely never have been 
written. 
I also owe a debt of gratitude to the many interesting stimulating conversations I 
had with my graduate student colleagues.  In particular discussions with Alan Tomhave 
served an important role in the development of my ideas both with this dissertation and 
other academic projects.     
 
  
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS................................................................................................ ii 
Chapter 
1. INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................1 
 
2. BACKGROUND AND UNPACKING…………………………………………..10 
 
3. APPROPRIATION PART II: IN DEFENSE OF LEFT-
PROPRIETARIANISM……………………………………………………….30 
 
4. APPROPRIATION PART II: IN DEFENSE OF EQUAL INITIAL 
OPPORTUNITY FOR WELFARE GEORGISM…………………………….68 
 
5. JUSTLY USING COMMON RESOURCES…………………………………...111 
 
6. CONCLUSION…………………………………………………………………138 
 
APPENDIX 
1. ROBUST SELF OWNERSHIP…………………………………………….......144 
2. FAIR BIDDING POWER……………………………………………………....154 
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………………………...158 
VITA…………………………………………………………………………………...161 
 
1  
 
 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
This dissertation will examine the conditions governing the appropriation and just use of 
common resources (privately1 unowned resources) within the purview of a property-
rights based theory of justice.  Later I will clarify exactly what a common resource is but 
for now it will help to think of such resources as privately unowned natural resources 
such as a tract of land or a fresh water spring.  This research topic can be broken up into 
two distinct questions.  First, according to the most plausible version of a property-rights 
based theory of justice, under what conditions can agents appropriate common 
resources?  And second, according to the most plausible version of a property-rights 
based theory of justice, under what conditions can agents justly use common resources? 
In the next chapter I will carefully unpack and clarify these two questions, but in this 
brief introductory chapter my goal is merely to say a few words motivating the 
importance of these two questions as well as engage in some stage-setting. 
Proprietarian theories of justice consider just actions to be those actions which 
respect the property rights of others.  Property may include both property in one’s body 
or property in things external to the body (this essentially allows anything in the world to 
potentially count as an object of property).  Further, property rights can be construed in a 
broad fashion to include rights that agents have to use commonly owned things such as 
public park benches, or such rights can be understood more narrowly to address 
                                                 
1
 The reader might ask why I invoke the qualifier of privately.  As will become clearer in later chapters I 
invoke this qualifier because it is plausible that common resources are initially commonly owned by 
everyone and if this is the case then it would be overly limiting to discuss unowned common resources per 
se as such a discussion would rule out considering the just use and appropriation of commonly owned 
common resources. 
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appropriation (a way of coming to privately own).  As I will later discuss, having 
ownership in some thing is to say that one has a bundle of rights in respect to the thing in 
question.  This bundle of rights might be very robust, including for instance a right to 
transfer the thing to others, or the bundle of rights that an owner has over her property 
might be very limited to include only the right to use the object of property in some 
fashion.   
An example of a very minimal set of property rights that include only the right to 
use would be the rights of squatters.2  Squatters, typically, occupy a dwelling that has 
been effectively abandoned or neglected by its original “owner” and, in certain legal 
jurisdictions, are afforded very minimal property rights to use the property that they 
occupy.3  The rudimentary point here is simply that property rights might be very robust 
or rather weak and this in turn allows for a broad treatment of what having property rights 
in some thing amounts to.  
Many proponents of proprietarianism have focused their attention exclusively 
toward generally robust conceptions of private property-rights.  For instance, Robert 
Nozick couches his influential proprietarian theory of justice as a theory concerned with 
the appropriation, transfer, and rectification of private property.4  As this project 
develops, however, it will become clear that offering an adequate account of the 
                                                 
2
 For an account of squatter’s rights, particularly in England, see Peter Vincent Jones, “Private Property and 
Public Order: The Hippy Convoy and Criminal Trespass”, Journal of Law and Society, 13(3) (1986), pp. 
343-370. 
 
3
 Typically, in order to be afforded any protection of legally recognized property rights, a squatter must 
establish that she has permanently lived at a residence for some long period of time (sometimes many 
years).    
 
4
 Nozick, Robert (1974) Anarchy, State, and Utopia. New York: Basic Books.  For an insightful and critical 
discussion of Robert Nozick’s proprietarian theory of justice and proprietarianism generally see: Miller, 
David (1989) Market, State, and Community. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 47-72. 
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conditions governing the just use of common resources is every bit as formidable and 
important a task, for a plausible proprietarianism, as offering an account concerning the 
appropriation of such resources. 
I will have more to say about proprietarianism in the next chapter, but for now I 
merely gesture toward a sketch of what a proprietarian theory of justice amounts to and 
how proprietarianism can address the property rights that agents have to use (as opposed 
to appropriate) common resources.5   
Proprietarian theories of justice (such as libertarianism) have tended to focus on 
the conditions under which an agent can appropriate common resources.  One of the 
central claims of this dissertation is that more attention needs to be given to the just use 
of common resources that are still “in the commons” and have not yet been privately 
appropriated.  To see why the use of common resources is important, as a concern 
independent from the appropriation of such resources, consider the example of a desert 
community in which no one appropriates anything and nothing is privately owned.  
Would it be just for an agent “simply for the fun of it” to destroy, through her destructive 
use, the sole water hole (a common resource) in this desert community?  In such a case it 
strikes me that an agent could unjustly use the water hole by depriving others of fair 
opportunities to use the resource.  Later, I will consider a number of cases to better 
motivate this worry of unjust use.  At this point, however, I merely wish to illustrate that 
merely using a common resource may well invoke concerns of justice.   
                                                 
5
 Admittedly, it will sound very strange to some readers that a property-rights based theory of justice is 
utilized to address the issue of just use.  In this project, as will be explored in greater detail shortly, I 
understand property rights to encompass a broad array of moral considerations which include the using of 
an object.  Thus, while it might initially sound odd, a property-rights based theory of justice is well-suited 
to address concerns of just use.    
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Now, I will briefly discuss why the issues of the just use and appropriation of 
common resources are such important topics: they have important ramifications for the 
survivability, autonomy, and well-being of agents.  I assume that survivability, autonomy, 
and well-being, are all important enough normative considerations to be taken seriously 
by any plausible theory of justice.6   
Agents need to use common resources in order to survive.  For instance, an agent 
might use a cave shelter to survive by protecting himself from the elements.  In the most 
straightforward sense, without the use (consumption) of common resources, breathable 
air, for instance, an agent would perish.  Here it is worth asking whether the consumption 
of common resources, e.g., eating an apple, constitutes a using or an appropriation.  The 
answer to this question is a point of contention among political philosophers and I leave it 
open at this stage. 
We need not, however, go so far as the survivability of agents to see the 
importance and far-reaching implications concerning the use and appropriation of 
common resources.  The use or appropriation of, land, fresh air, food, and so forth, is 
undoubtedly an important element to the well-being of most all agents.  For instance, our 
lives go well, or have a much better chance of going well, when we can use or 
appropriate the common resources (or things derivable from common resources) which 
we desire to use or privately own.  If, for instance, an agent enjoys sailing then her life 
goes better when she has access to use (or privately own) a nice spot of a lake on which 
she can sail.  Often times it will be the things derivable from common resources such as 
                                                 
6
 Here one could ask whether survivability, well-being, and autonomy are important because agents treat 
them as important or because they just are important in some objective sense.  While I don’t have any set 
views on the question, I tend to think that such considerations are important, generally, independently from 
whether agents treat them as important.  For instance, acting in a free and autonomous fashion is, plausibly, 
important even if the autonomous actor cares nothing about her autonomy. 
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houses as opposed to common resources per se such as pieces of wood that most 
contribute to an agent’s life going better.  I will discuss this issue further in the next 
chapter but here it suffices to say that discussing common resources per se is the best 
approach since all things derivable from common resources ultimately have a common 
resource base and hence discussing common resources as such breaches a more 
fundamental concern.   
In some cases we can imagine that the mere use of some thing is adequate for a 
significant boost in well-being, but in other cases appropriating some thing might be 
needed for one to experience a significant boost in well-being.  For example, using the 
trail at the public park might offer a significant increase in well-being (one might not 
have any desire at all to privately own the trail); while the private ownership of a 
toothbrush, plausibly, offers an agent much more well-being than merely using a 
communal toothbrush.7         
The ability of an agent to use or appropriate the common resources (and things 
derivable from common resources) that she desires also contributes, in addition to 
contributing to well-being, to her autonomy or self-determination.8  Another way that we 
can put this point is to say that the ability to use or appropriate common resources (or 
things derivable thereof) allows an agent to better realize her plans and projects.  
Imagine, for example, that it is extremely important to Sarah that she sails for at least a 
                                                 
7
 Of course, one could be the only user of a toothbrush, as opposed to merely being a user, without actually 
being the private owner of the toothbrush.  For instance, an agent could be very good at hiding the 
toothbrush and as a matter of fact is, because of her stealth, the only user of the toothbrush.  Having private 
ownership of the toothbrush, however, serves as a (moral) guarantee that one is the only user of the 
toothbrush.  
 
8
 Here one might suggest that one component of an agent’s well-being just is autonomy and as such my 
separation of the two as discrete concerns is misguided.  At this stage I don’t want to become entangled in 
the debate over whether autonomy is a separate concern from well-being generally.  I simply assume for 
simplicity here that the two are separable concerns.   
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few hours per month.  In order for Sarah to bring this plan to fruition, by exercising her 
autonomous choice, she must have certain access to common resources.  Sarah, however, 
is too poor to sail.  There are many other activities that Sarah could choose to pursue, but 
Sarah doesn’t want to engage in these activities at all.  The reason why autonomy is 
valuable, to some extent, is not for the mere sake of “having many options.”  The ability 
to act in an autonomous fashion matters in so much as this ability allows an agent to act 
on her desires to engage in the plans and projects of her design and choosing.  Access to 
use or appropriate common resources plays an important role in determining the extent to 
which we can live the life of our choosing.9 
Given that the use or appropriation of common resources (and things derivable 
thereof) has important implications for the survivability, well-being, and the autonomy of 
agents, any robust theory of justice, be it utilitarian, egalitarian, Marxist, proprietarian, or 
some alternative theory, must both address this wide-ranging concern and advance 
plausible implications about its resolution.  I will now turn toward a case to begin 
illustrating the view of appropriation which I shall defend as this project proceeds.   
Imagine that a sizable number of agents would like to each appropriate a 
privately unowned lake.  Each agent desires to be the private owner of the lake so that 
they may use the lake unencumbered by the plans or projects that others might have for 
the lake.  (I assume for simplicity here that privately owning the lake would allow the 
owner to justly exclude others from using the lake, this assumption will be discussed 
further in the next chapter.)  What rule(s) or principle(s) should govern the appropriation 
of the lake? 
                                                 
9
 It is worth adding here that issues of use and appropriation also have important implications concerning 
the exploitation or oppression of agents.  An agent might need access to a certain minimum of common 
resources so that she can avoid being oppressed or exploited by others.    
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Should the just principle governing the appropriation of the lake simply be that 
the first agent to claim private ownership of the lake may appropriate the lake, a type of 
“first come, first served,” principle governing appropriation?  That is, should competing 
claims of appropriation simply be adjudicated by assessing who first staked a claim for 
the lake?  As we will later explore this is precisely the principle of appropriation that 
some influential right-proprietarians favor, e.g., Israel Kirzner and Jan Narveson.  The 
first agent to stake claim to the lake, that is, may appropriate it all for herself. 
I will, after an expanded examination in chapters three and four, reject this right-
proprietarian treatment of just appropriation because I agree with John Locke’s 
suggestion that appropriators of common resources are morally required, in a strict sense, 
to “leave enough and as good” for others.  The position I will defend, consistent with an 
endorsement of the Lockean proviso, is left-proprietarian in character.  As will become 
clear in the next chapter, left-proprietarianism is similar to left-libertarianism but with the 
important difference that left-proprietarianism does not assume (full) self-ownership.10  
Broadly speaking, left-proprietarianism holds that a necessary condition governing the 
appropriation of common resources is that the appropriator must, in a fashion that takes 
egalitarian worries seriously, leave enough and as good for others.  It would be unjust for 
an agent, contra the position endorsed by the right-libertarians noted above, to 
appropriate the entire lake simply because she was first to arrive and stake a claim to the 
lake.   
                                                 
10
 For a collection of modern essays discussing left-libertarianism see; Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics: 
The Contemporary Debate, eds. Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner (Palgrave, 2000); and for a collection 
of essays examining the historical roots of left-libertarianism see; The Origins of Left-Libertarianism: An 
Anthology of Historical Writings, eds. Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner (Palgrave, 2000). 
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Of course, there is a lot of work to be done in making clear exactly what it means 
to “leave enough and as good” for others when we appropriate.  I leave this tough work 
for chapters three and four. 
And what should we say about the use, as opposed to the appropriation, of the 
lake?  Let us assume that it is impossible for everyone to use the lake in the fashion they 
most desire.  Should agents who use the lake be required, as a matter of justice, to share 
part of the lake (or the value of the lake) with others, in some equal fashion, or does the 
mere use of the lake fail to place any demands of justice on the part of the user?  While 
the above mentioned right-proprietarians do not discuss the conditions governing the just 
use of common resources, it is a fair assumption to suspect that they would say similar 
things about the just use of the lake as they would about the appropriation of the lake, for 
instance a “first come, first served” principle of just use.   
I suggest here, once again in broadly left-proprietarian fashion, that the demand of 
justice to leave others “enough and as good” which is placed on an agent when she 
appropriates a common resource(s), is also placed on her when she merely uses a 
common resource(s).  Agents, I will argue, are bound by the same duty of justice to 
“leave enough and as good” for others irrespective of whether they use or appropriate 
common resources. 
Enough with the introduction and stage-setting. I shall now proceed in the next 
chapter to cover some important background material and unpack the dual research 
questions which drive this project.  In the third chapter I will offer a general defense of a 
left-proprietarian account governing the appropriation of common resources.  This 
general defense of left-proprietarianism is further developed in the fourth chapter and a 
9  
 
 
specific left-proprietarian account of appropriation is defended.  In the fifth chapter, then, 
I build upon the proposed account of appropriation defended in the fourth chapter and 
develop a left-proprietarian account of justly using common resources.  I conclude, and 
offer a few remarks on related applied issues, in chapter six. 
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CHAPTER TWO: BACKGROUND AND UNPACKING 
 
 
 
My primary goal in this chapter is to unpack and clarify the concepts in my two research 
questions.  Again those questions are, (i) according to the most plausible version of 
proprietarianism, under what conditions can agents appropriate common resources? And 
(ii) according to the most plausible version of proprietarianism, under what conditions 
can agents justly use common resources?  Like most important philosophical questions, 
these questions do not arrive nicely delivered ready, on their face, to be considered.  They 
must be unpacked and clarified in order to make substantial philosophical progress.  In 
what follows I unpack the following concepts: justice, proprietarianism, common 
resources, appropriation, and use. 
I shall be addressing the conditions under which individuals may appropriate or 
justly use common resources.  Thus, the notion of justice clearly plays a central role in 
this project.  But what is justice?   
Political philosophers invoke several different notions of justice, each notion 
having its own meaning.  Peter Vallentyne, for instance, identifies five ways in which 
political philosophers commonly invoke the notion of justice.  These ways, according to 
Vallentyne, include understanding justice as: moral permissibility of legal structures, 
legitimacy in the sense of the impermissibility of forcible interference by others, 
comparative fairness, fairness, and the duties that we owe each other.11  Vallentyne ends 
his list here but no doubt he could have continued.  There is simply no uniform treatment 
of justice to be found amongst political philosophers. 
                                                 
11
 “Distributive Justice”, in Companion to Contemporary Political Philosophy edited by Robert Goodin, 
Philip Pettit, and Thomas Pogge (Blackwell Publishers, forthcoming, 2008). 
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When I invoke the notion of justice I have in mind the last of Vallentyne’s 
proposed meanings.  I take justice to mean the duties that we morally owe each other.  
Further, I will understand the duties that we owe each other to be a matter of respecting 
the rights of others.  Thus, an agent acts justly when she respects the rights of others, and 
unjustly when she violates the rights of others.  Our duties of justice, that is, are directly 
correlated with the rights of others.   
I should caution that there are substantive views of justice that address justice in a 
sense different than I understand justice, e.g., any of Vallentyne’s four alternative 
accounts of justice mentioned above.  In what follows, I stipulate my use of ‘justice’ to 
mean the duties that we morally owe each other, where these duties owed are a matter of 
respecting the rights of others. 
Justice then is a matter of respecting rights, but what are rights?  A right is a 
constraint on the actions of others that morally protects the holder of the right.  For 
instance, if an agent has the right that others (everyone) not kill her, then this right 
morally constrains others (everyone) from killing her.  Others, that is, would have a duty 
not to kill the holder of such a right.  Rights are moral protections that specify the 
constraints upon the ways we may treat others and the ways others may treat us.   
Duties of justice are correlated with the rights of others and are owed specifically 
to the rights-holder, as opposed to being an impersonal constraint, (and thus can depend 
on the choices or interests of the holder of the right).  Our duties of justice are inter-
personal in nature.  They are actions owed to other agents, and hence not actions owed to 
either ourselves or to no one at all in some impersonal fashion.  An agent is derivatively 
just based upon the actions that she has performed or does not perform toward others.  In 
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a world with only one agent, no just or unjust action can occur, as justice, in the fashion I 
will be employing the concept, is owed to others.  Duties of justice are not impersonal 
constraints.  When an agent is charged with acting unjustly this is a charge that ought to 
include a “list” of other agent(s) who were acted unjustly toward. 
At least two important questions crop up here.  First, what is it that rights protect?  
And, second, how stringent are the moral protections offered by rights?  I will now 
address these questions in turn. 
There are a number of plausible answers that have been offered to the question of 
what it is that rights protect.  For instance, rights could protect choices, interests, desires, 
some combination of these possibilities, or perhaps nothing at all.  At this juncture I leave 
open what it is that rights protect.  The concept of “rights” is open to any of the above 
suggestions and any answer to the question of “what is it that rights protect” must be 
argued for and not merely settled by examining the concept of rights.12  For simplicity, 
when discussing rights, I will typically speak of rights in a permission-giving or 
permission-receiving fashion which will, normally, imply that rights are choice-
protecting as giving or receiving permission is often associated with one’s will or 
choices.13  When this language slips in note that I still remain neutral, until otherwise 
                                                 
12
 Note here that addressing what it is that rights protect is a different question than addressing what the 
purpose or ground of rights are.  Rights are owed to agents and as such the fully specified content of a right 
will specify the conditions with which rights are no longer owed.  For instance, when considering the 
content of a choice-protecting right we might say that, Jack has a right against Jill that she not kill him 
unless he gives Jill permission to kill him.  Or understood as an interest-protecting right we can say that, 
Jack has a right against Jill that she not kill him unless her killing him would be in his best interest.  The 
fully formalized content of a right makes clear what it is that rights protect, but again this is a separate 
question from considering the purpose or ground of rights.        
 
13
 Admittedly, permission-giving can be treated as an interest-protecting concern.  For instance, permission-
giving might be a key feature of an agent’s interests. 
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argued, as to whether rights protect choices or interests.  It is just easiest, I find, to 
typically talk of rights as if they protect choices. 
Noting that rights serve as constraints on the actions of others tells us nothing 
regarding the stringency of these constraints.  For instance, rights could serve as merely 
weak pro-tanto constraints that are easily, very easily, morally outweighed by other 
considerations or, alternatively rights could serve as absolute constraints that can never 
be over-ridden by other (moral) considerations.  Or alternatively, rights may be subject to 
thresholds so that they have no moral force when the benefits to others are sufficiently 
great.  Still further, it could be that rights can be outweighed by competing moral 
considerations but still carry some moral force (it is just that this moral force is 
outweighed by other moral considerations).  Much like the above treatment of what it is 
that rights protect, I leave open the stringency of the constraints offered by rights.  I do 
not think that such an answer can be found by examining the concept of a right, and as 
such I will deal with the question of stringency as it presents itself. 
It is worth noting that my above treatment of rights is quite broad in scope and 
thus is capable of being incorporated into many different theories of justice.  In fact, my 
rights-based treatment of justice is capable of capturing all inter-personal morality.  We 
have duties to act, or refrain from acting, toward other agents in certain ways and these 
duties correlate with the rights of other agents.  The sense of justice I employ, however, 
does not include impersonal duties we might have, e.g., a general duty to promote the 
“good,” or intrapersonal duties we might have, e.g., the duty to one’s self not to commit 
suicide.   The important point to stress here is that the rights-based treatment of justice on 
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the table is broad enough in construal to be rendered consistent with all accounts of inter-
personal morality. 
Further, I am concerned exclusively with the justice of actions.  When some 
political philosophers, for instance John Rawls in his A Theory of Justice, discuss justice, 
they have in mind the justice of institutions or socio-political structures, where this is 
primarily concerned with procedural justice concerning a set of institutional rules.  This is 
not the sense of justice which I mean to explore.  I limit my evaluations of justice (unless 
stated otherwise) to the actions of agents.  My own view regarding the justice of 
institutions is that an institution is just if and only if the institution’s agents (those 
representatives of the institution, e.g., the Prime Minister) act in a manner which respects 
the rights of both citizens and non-citizens alike.  As noted above, however, this project is 
concerned only with the justice of actions and not of procedural rules or socio-political 
structures generally. 
I shall be addressing the conditions under which an agent can appropriate or justly 
use common resources according to the most plausible proprietarian theory of justice.  
But what is a proprietarian theory of justice? 
As was briefly addressed in the introduction, a proprietarian theory of justice 
holds that an agent acts justly if and only if her actions respect the property rights of 
others.  Property rights cover a broad array of moral considerations and can take many 
different forms.  For instance, they can include: liberties to use things in certain ways, 
claim rights that others not use things in certain ways, moral powers to alter the 
normative status of some thing, compensation rights, enforcement rights, transfer rights, 
and immunities to loss.  Whenever an agent has any of these rights, powers, or 
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immunities in respect to a thing she has, to some degree, a property right in respect to the 
thing. 
Here it will be helpful to formalize the Hohfeldian treatment of liberties and claim 
rights invoked above. 
Liberty Rights – A has, with respect to B, a liberty right to X if and only if A has 
no duty to B not to X.  For example, A has a liberty right to walk along a public 
trail because A has no duty owed to anyone not to walk to along the public trail.   
 
Claim-Rights – A has a claim right that B not do X if and only if B has a duty to 
A not to X.  For example, A has a claim right that B not kill her because B has a 
duty not to kill her.14 
 
An agent has a property right in a thing, to some degree, if she has a liberty right to use 
the thing in certain ways or a claim right that others not use the thing in certain ways.15  
Here it is worth stressing, as was noted in the introductory chapter, that a property right, 
given the above description, might be quite minimal or rather robust.  For instance, an 
agent might have a very limited property right to use a spot of land in some designated 
fashion for a very short period of time.  An agent’s possessing a liberty righty to use X 
merely means that she is at liberty to use X in some fashion, that is there is some fashion 
in which she can use X which doesn’t violate a duty she owes another.   Alternatively, an 
agent could have full ownership over a spot of land and hence be able to do anything 
(including destroy the land) with respect to the land as such. 
 The above treatment of property rights is broad in scope.  For instance, it allows 
an agent to have a property right, to at least some degree, in a public trail that she has a 
                                                 
14
 The above formulation of claim rights treats them as negative rights, but we can also formulate the 
definition of claim right to exemplify positive rights.  We could say for instance that, A has a claim right 
that B do X if and only B has a duty to A to X.  For example, A has a claim right that B feed her when she 
is starving to death because B has a duty to feed A when she is starving to death.   
 
15
 I mean ‘or’ in the inclusive sense here. 
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liberty right to walk along.  This allowance of a property right to walk along a public trail 
is albeit much more minimal than a full property right in respect to the trail, but it is a 
property right nonetheless.  In the section addressing appropriation later in this chapter I 
will discuss the notion of (private) ownership in greater detail, but here it is worth 
pointing out that I hold property rights generally to be a understood broadly, ranging in 
scope from minimal to very robust.       
 Additionally, a Hohfeldian treatment of second-order powers to alter first-order 
normative conditions will become important as this project continues.  A power, simply 
put, is one’s moral ability to alter an existing normative situation.16  Powers can play an 
important role within a proprietarian theory of justice.  For example, Sally might promise 
Bill that she will no longer use a car which they both previously shared together.  This 
promise could, plausibly, alter the first-order normative situation which Sally and Bill 
initially had with respect to property rights over the car.  Later in the chapter we will 
examine how appropriation is the exercise of a moral power.   
 Some political philosophers, for instance Hillel Steiner, have argued that all rights 
are property rights.  Steiner, for instance, notes that: 
the traditional Lockean view – that all rights are essentially property rights – far  
from being merely a piece of bourgeois ideology, actually embodies an important 
conceptual truth.17 
 
Steiner reasons that all rights are property rights because if all rights constitute claims 
that agents use, or not use, their bodies in certain ways, then all rights turn out to be a 
                                                 
16
 For simplicity I am treating these “existing normative situations” as first-order normative situations and 
powers as second-order alterations to these first-order conditions.  However, it is worth point out that moral 
powers need not be second-order alterations.  For instance, one could have a third-order moral power to 
alter a second-order normative situation, a power to alter a power. 
 
17
 Steiner, Hillel (1994) An Essay on Rights. Oxford: Blackwell, pp.93. 
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type of property (use) right that agents have in the body of other agents.  Is Steiner 
correct?  Are all rights, strictly speaking, property rights?18 
 Here, I want to avoid taking any strong position toward Steiner’s claim that all 
rights are, strictly speaking, property rights (although the idea is plausible).  The claim is 
interesting and has important ramifications for the breadth of proprietarianism generally; 
nonetheless its systematic evaluation is beyond the purview of this project.  Further, the 
rights under consideration in this project are the rights that agents have to justly use or 
appropriate common resources and these are rights are, uncontroversially, properly 
classified as property rights.               
Given that very few political philosophers invoke a theory of justice under the 
label proprietarianism it will be helpful to discuss a type of proprietarianism  
-libertarianism- to get a better understanding of the view.  As I understand it 
libertarianism is simply a type of proprietarianism.  Libertarianism is a theory of justice 
that endorses full, or something sufficiently close to full, self-ownership.  The right of full 
self-ownership is the claim that agents fully own their selves.  There are a number of 
different things that might be implied by the claim that an agent fully owns her self, but 
for my purposes here, I take the right of full self-ownership to imply that an agent owns 
(in the fullest sense of ownership possible) her body and labor.19  As I referenced earlier 
in respect to the full ownership of a spot of land, full ownership of the body (full self-
                                                 
18
 The best candidate of a non-property right would be the right that a certain states of affairs obtain.  I 
doubt that this is a good candidate, but it is probably the best possible candidate of a non-property right.  
For instance, an agent might have a right that it rain, or not rain, tomorrow  Such a right need not 
correspond with the duties or actions of any agent.  One could try to make the case that a farmer has the 
right that it rain because he deserves a good rain after the work he has put into the field.  Such a right is not 
a property right.  I thank Peter Vallentyne for bringing this example to my attention.   
 
19
 The content, and grounding, of the right of self-ownership is highly debated within libertarian theory. 
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ownership) would roughly mean that an agent is able to do anything (including destroy 
her body) with respect to her body as such.   
Libertarianism is a type of proprietarianism – a proprietarianism which endorses 
the full self-ownership of agents.  I will not be assuming that agents are (full) self-
owners.  Thus, I do not assume a libertarian theory of justice.  It is plausible that agents 
have property rights, at least of some limited form, in their bodies.  But such plausibility 
aside, this project’s focus is geared toward the use and appropriation of common 
resources, not the bodies of agents.  As such an endorsement of self-ownership (and with 
it libertarianism) seems, at least at this stage, disconnected from the present project.  The 
proprietarian theory of justice I grant is open, at least at this juncture, on the question of 
self-ownership (bodily property rights), but assumes that agents have certain property 
rights in respect to the use and appropriation of common resources.20 
          I shall be addressing the conditions by which an agent can justly use or appropriate 
common resources within the most plausible proprietarian theory of justice.  But what are 
common resources? 
                                                 
20
 Some political philosophers, certain libertarians for instance, would find the proprietarianism offered 
above fundamentally flawed.  They would suggest that an agent’s property rights to use or appropriate 
common resources are derived, somehow, from her property rights over her body.  And as such we must 
first endorse self-ownership before discussing property rights over common resources.  I reject this thought.  
First, there is no logical, or (plausible) conceptual, connection between property rights in one’s body and 
property rights to use or appropriate common resources.  That is, an agent could, at least as an option in 
logical space, have no property rights in her body, but possess property rights in respect to other things, i.e., 
common resources.  But what about a substantive moral connection between property in one’s self (body) 
and property in common resources?  Michael Otsuka suggests that, “One might plausibly maintain that 
having the right to act at all is a precondition of having a right to make use of natural resources, and, 
moreover, that one cannot have a right to act if one has no right to make use of one’s body (which includes 
one’s brain).”  This point is well-taken and I have maintained it is plausible that agents have property 
rights, at least of some limited form, in their bodies.  My primary points in this note are that (i) the property 
right agents might have in respect to common resources need not be associated with the property rights 
agents might have in respect to their self (body) and (ii) one may endorse, in proprietatrian fashion, 
property rights that agents have with respect to common resources without also endorsing a notion of self-
ownership strong enough to be classified as libertarian.    
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In order to better understand what common resources are and their place in the 
broader context of other things in the world, I offer a trichotomy in which every material 
thing in the world can be placed.  Every material thing in our world can be placed within 
three categories21: (i) beings with moral standing, which I assume for simplicity to be 
autonomous beings, e.g., agents (ii) natural resources, or (iii) artifacts.22  This project is 
only concerned with how agents (which I assume to be autonomous beings) go about 
appropriating and justly using privately unowned things of the type that fall into the 
second, and in some cases third, category.  This project is not directly concerned with 
how agents come to appropriate or justly use things in the first category.23  Common 
resources, as we will see, will be things belonging to the second, and in some cases third, 
category.   
 Let us then begin by considering what natural resources are.  Very simply, a 
natural resource is a non-agent resource in the world that was not created by any (non-
divine) agent and exists in its non-improved form.  Notice that natural resources are non-
improved as opposed to non-altered.  Consider for instance a case in which an agent 
walks upon a wooded path and alters the path but does not improve the path.  In such a 
case the wooded path remains a natural resource even though it was altered in some 
                                                 
21
 Here it is well worth pointing out that there are non-material things in our world that this trichotomy does 
not deal with.  For instance, abstract objects such as ideas and propositions are not dealt with in this 
(material) analysis.    
 
22
 For the purposes of this project I put aside considerations of animals, children, and the mentally retarded.  
The address of such beings in any account of justice is a worthwhile pursuit, but in order to avoid 
complexity into an already complex issue I put aside their consideration here. 
 
23
 One might think that it is never permissible to appropriate an agent.  Appropriating an agent sounds like 
slavery, and slavery, at least of the involuntary type, is plausibly morally impossible.  But what about 
“voluntary slavery”?  Can I appropriate an agent if he voluntarily sells himself to me?  I suspect the answer 
is that, under certain conditions, voluntary slavery is morally permissible and as such an agent can 
appropriate another agent.  But as this interesting issue is not directly related with my research question it 
will not be explored further here.         
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fashion.  Examples of natural resources include: land, air, minerals, a running spring of 
water, a cave shelter, and wild berries.  It is worth pointing out that an agent, even in her 
non-improved form, is still not a natural resource. 
Artifacts, things in the third category, can be understood as resources that have 
undergone improvements (of a value-additive nature) by agents.24  When agents, by their 
labor, ingenuity, or other means, improve natural resources, then they create artifacts.25  
Thus, when an agent cuts down a tree (a natural resource) and builds a log cabin from the 
tree, then the log cabin is an artifact as opposed to a natural resource.  The original tree 
used to build the cabin was a natural resource but the cabin is an artifact.  Interestingly, if 
lightning had struck the tree in precisely the “right way” and a qualitatively identical “log 
cabin” were produced, then this lightning-created-log-cabin would be a natural resource 
as opposed to an artifact.  Artifacts are created by agents who take action to improve 
natural resources and are never simply given by nature or God.26 
Where, then, do common resources fit into the discussion?  They are, after all, the 
objects of property which are the focus of this project.  Generally speaking a common 
resource is a non-agent resource which no agent has any greater moral claim to than any 
                                                 
24
 Brian Kierland offers the following counterexample to the above definition of an artifact.  Consider that 
an agent makes a statue in a way that devalues the clay (say it is very valuable clay before it has hardened).  
Is the statue not an artifact?  Admittedly, this is a good challenge to the above definition of an artifact.  
Intuitions might vary on the matter but I am not inclined to call the statue an artifact.  But aside from this 
clash of intuition concerning what counts as an artifact Kierland’s example might suggest that we should 
have two categories of artifacts, (i) value-added artifacts, and (ii) non-value added artifacts.  I am inclined 
not to recognize the second set of things as artifacts, but if one is compelled by Kierland’s example the 
above typology would be worth considering.     
 
25
 An interesting notion here would be the idea of an accidentally created artifact.  Here I am thinking of 
cases in which an agent unintentionally adds some value to natural resource and thereby unwittingly creates 
an artifact.   
 
26
 Note that the value-added to a natural resource need not be done intentionally by an agent in order for an 
artifact to be created.  For instance, note that a sleep-walking agent might create a log-cabin without 
intending to do so and yet he has nonetheless still created an artifact.  
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other agent.  Defining common resources in this fashion is important because it makes 
clear that all agents start out initially on some type of equal moral par in respect to rights 
they have over common resources.  That is, all agents initially begin from a position of 
equal moral property rights in respect to common resources.  They are resources, in 
Lockean language, that can best be described as existing in some type of initial state of 
the commons. 
Natural resources are clearly a good candidate of things that are common 
resources.  No agent seems to have any greater moral claim to a non-improved non-agent 
resource than any other agent.  For instance, there seems to be no good reason to think 
that any agent have a greater moral claim (more property rights) over a non-improved 
spring of fresh water than any other agent.  No one, after all, took any action to create or 
improve the spring.  We would be at a complete loss, I suspect, to offer any good reason 
to think that any agent has a greater set of property rights in respect to the spring than any 
other agent.27  The spring is a clear example of a common resource. 
Are, at least certain, artifacts, along with natural resources, also common 
resources?  Yes, it seems they are.  Consider an artifact, for example, that was abandoned 
by its original owner.  It is plausible that abandoned artifacts are common resources.  If 
the artifact is abandoned it seems as if no one has any greater claim, disproportionate 
property rights, over the abandoned artifact than anyone else.  Abandoned artifacts are 
very plausibly common resources.                                
                                                 
27
 G.A. Cohen also expresses his acceptance of the intuitive appeal of thinking that initially no agent has 
any greater claim to common resources than any other agent in his, “Self-Ownership, World-Ownership, 
and Equality Part I” in Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, eds. Peter 
Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner (Palgrave, 2000), p. 250.  
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Here one might wonder why this project’s focus is geared toward common 
resources to the exclusion of artifacts generally.  After all, most of the things that we hold 
dear are artifacts as opposed to natural resources or artifactual common resources.  In 
almost all cases the clothes we wear, the books we own, the houses we live in, and even 
the food we eat are artifacts as opposed to common resources.  So why care about 
common resources per se?  They do not seem to be all that important to us (or at least not 
as important as the artifacts they constitute). 
The focus of my inquiries is directed toward common resources as opposed to 
artifacts generally because common resources are more fundamentally important to a 
theory of justice than are artifacts.  This is because all material artifacts have a common 
resource base (more specifically a natural resource base).  That is, all artifacts are 
composed by, or derived from, common resources.  For instance, the artifactual log cabin 
from the above examples was composed from common (natural) resources (for example, 
wood).  And as such to examine the conditions governing the appropriation or just use of 
artifacts (such as a log cabin) will only push the question back to one of how (whether in 
a just fashion or not) the common resources that constitute the artifact were either 
appropriated or used in a just fashion.  Hence, the examination of the conditions 
governing the appropriation or use of common resources is a more fundamentally 
important task than the examination of the appropriation or use of artifacts created by 
such resources. 
I shall be addressing the just use of common resources within the most plausible 
version of a proprietarian theory of justice.  But what does it mean to use a common 
resource?  Answering this question is especially pressing for this project because property 
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rights (liberty rights to use objects in certain ways, and claim rights that others not use 
objects in certain ways) are at base use rights.  Thus, a critical element of a proprietarian 
theory of justice must include a clear treatment of what it means to use a common 
resource. 
At first glance, the concept of use seems intuitive and easy to grasp.  Jimmy uses 
his little league bat when he steps up to the plate in hopes of hitting a home run.  And, no 
doubt, examples like this could be given ad naseum to illustrate the notion of using 
something.  But if possible we should strive to go beyond a pre-theoretical treatment of 
use given its importance for a plausible proprietarian theory of justice. 
In what follows I shall not discuss a general concept of use (as I am highly 
skeptical that plausible necessary and sufficient conditions for the definition of use 
simplicitor can be offered).  Instead, I shall only be considering the use qua the use of 
common resources.  Consider the following two accounts of using a common resource. 
(1) An agent uses a common resource X if and only if she physically impinges on 
X. 
(2) An agent uses a common resource X if and only if she makes X part of her 
plans and projects. 
 
Note that the physical impingement account of use can address clear cases of use where 
on sends a physical signal in order to use an object at a far distance.  For instance, when 
an agent fires a bullet into the head of another, the shooter uses the head of his victim as 
he sent a physical signal impending on another’s head.  The plans and projects view can 
also account for how the shooter uses the head of another by suggesting that by firing the 
bullet at the head of another the shooter makes the head of another part of her plans and 
projects. 
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Initially both accounts of using a common resource have plausibility.  Consider 
that both of these definitions will often yield a plausible treatment of cases.  Imagine an 
agent walking along a trail in the woods.  The agent is using the trail.  The agent 
physically impinges on the trail.  The agent has, also, made the trail part of her plans and 
projects.  I suspect that a more comprehensive evaluation of cases will yield the result 
that both the physical impingement view and the plans and projects view of use are 
plausible.  But we should still press forward to ascertain whether one account is clearly 
preferable. 
Consider the following case as a counterexample to the physical impingement 
view of using common resources. 
Jon lives in a house with a rather high roof, fifteen feet from the floor.  The roof 
offers Jon protection from the storm, but he doesn’t physically impinge on the 
roof.  Does Jon use the roof as the rain pelts his house?       
 
The above case, as well as many other similar cases that we could contrive, challenge the 
thought that an agent uses a common resource X only if she physically impinges on X. 
Granting that one finds intuitive appeal in the above case (or a similarly 
constructed case), can anything be said to rescue the physical impingement necessary 
condition of use?  Can we say anything to temper the intuition that Jon uses his roof 
despite not physically impinging on the roof?   Here is an attempt.  When we think that 
Jon uses his roof we confuse the notion of “getting a benefit from X” or “enjoying X” 
with “using X”.  Jon, without doubt, receives a benefit from the roof.  But does merely 
receiving a benefit from the roof imply that Jon uses the roof? 
 The plans and projects account of use is no by means immune from criticism.  Let 
us assume for a moment (and I will discuss this further in the next section) that when an 
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agent appropriates a common resource X they gain a right that others not use at all X 
without the appropriator’s permission.  If this is the case then the plans and projects 
account of use could be charged with offering implausible implications.  For instance, a 
plans and projects account of use would hold that I use my neighbor’s house every time I 
gaze at it (from my own house) and enjoy the beautifully manicured lawn.  If this is the 
case then I would be infringing a property right held by my neighbor (assuming she has 
the right that I not use her lawn at all) unless I obtained his permission to gaze at his 
lawn.  A consequence of endorsing the plans and projects account of use is that it 
potentially “explodes” instances of property right infringements.28 
More could be said both in defense of, and challenge to, both the physical 
impingement account of using common resources and the plans and projects account of 
using such resources.  While both accounts are plausible, each also is open to challenge.  
In what follows I shall leave open what it means to use a common resource, although I 
suspect that the correct answer can be found in one, or a blending, of the accounts of 
using common resources explored above. 
 One closing point about using common resources is in order.  Irrespective of 
which account of using common resources we employ any plausible account will define 
such use in a non-normative fashion.  Of course, the use of common resources can have 
normative implications as we can distinguish between the just and unjust use of common 
resources.  I justly use a sword when I give a swordsmanship exhibition to friends; I 
unjustly use the sword when I use it to sever the head of an innocent agent. 
                                                 
28
 One reply that could be made to this charge by the defender of the plans and projects account is to 
maintain that not all uses of another’s property without her permission are infringements of her property 
rights.  That is, perhaps my “viewing use” of the lawn is not an infringement of property rights.  Such a 
defense of the plans and projects account, of course, would have to provide a principled way in which to 
distinguish rights-infringing-use from the non-rights-infringing-use of another agent’s property.    
26  
 
 
One of the main questions of this project is this: within the most plausible version 
of proprietarianism, under what conditions can agents appropriate common resources?   
To make progress on this question we must unpack the concept of appropriation.  What 
then is appropriation? 
I take appropriation to mean coming to privately own.  In the literature, 
appropriation is generally reserved to mean “original acquisition,” e.g. coming to 
privately own something that was previously part of the commons or some other 
privately unowned state.  Thus, I won’t be addressing how agents come to privately own 
common resources through: transfer, rectification, or means other than original 
acquisition.  For the most part I shall be continuing this traditional treatment of 
appropriation.  However, it is important to keep in mind that not all common resources, 
for example abandoned artifacts, will have been privately unowned at every point in their 
history.  Thus, there will be some cases, e.g., appropriating an abandoned common 
resource, in which appropriating a common resource does not refer to the original 
acquisition of the resource.    
Also, note that the appropriation of a common resource will involve a moral 
power to alter the normative status of the appropriated common resource.  This is 
because initially common resources are privately unowned, thus in order for an agent to 
appropriate (come to privately own) a common resource she must exercise a moral power 
to alter the initial normative status of a common resource.         
Ownership, in general, is best thought of as a “bundle of rights.”29  Thus when an 
agent exercises a moral power and appropriates a common resource she comes to have a 
                                                 
29
 For the seminal discussion of ownership as a “bundle of rights” see Honoré, A. M.  “Ownership.”  In 
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, A. G. Guest, ed.  Oxford University Press, London: 1961; pp. 107-147. 
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bundle of rights in respect to the appropriated resource.  Earlier I offered a broad account 
of property rights, and proposed that one could have a property right, of some sort, in a 
public park even when this meant only the liberty right to walk along a public trail in the 
park during some short designated time.  Appropriation, however, as I make use of the 
term, will pick out a set of private ownership rights over a thing.  The rights of ownership 
that come via an appropriation, where X is the thing appropriated, are at minimum: 
(1) The liberty right of the owner to use X in some fashion (i.e., the owner does 
not need anyone’s permission to use X).30 
(2) The claim right that others not use X without the owner’s permission.    
The above two rights of private ownership, referenced above, can be labeled, to use a 
term coined by John Christman, control-ownership.  When an agent has private control-
ownership of her car, for instance, she may use the car without getting the permission of 
others and she may exclude others from using the car unless they first obtain her 
permission.31  The central idea behind control-ownership, Christman explains, is that, 
“the owner maintains primary say over what is to be done with the thing insofar as this 
                                                 
30
 Of course, this does not mean to suggest that private ownership allows any use of the object privately 
owned.  For instance, one cannot use a gun they own to shoot innocent agents.  One’s liberty to use objects 
which they privately own will be limited by, or balanced against, the rights of others.  
 
31
 Christman makes a helpful distinction between control property rights and income property rights.  
Control property rights, as noted above, are rights that allow an owner to use an object without the 
permission of others and require others to get the owner’s permission before anyone but the control owner 
may use the object.  Income rights, on the hand, are rights to derive income from property.  Christman 
argues that control rights are more central to autonomy of agents because as he puts it, “income rights are 
essentially tied to the distribution of goods.  And more crucially, they cannot be said to be a manifestation 
of individual’s liberty or autonomy, since income is a product of things over which an agent can claim no 
independent sovergnity.” John Cristman, “Self-Ownership, Equality, and the Structure of Property Rights” 
in Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, eds. Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner 
(Palgrave, 2000), p. 352.    
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affects only the owner.”32  When referencing appropriation I will be taking the associated 
bundle of rights to include, minimally, the two rights of control-ownership noted above.   
Private ownership can, of course, be understood to include more rights than the 
rights of control-ownership.  For instance, property rights can also include the: right to 
destroy one’s privately owned property, right to transfer private property, right to 
compensation if one’s private property rights are infringed, or perhaps other property 
rights.  Full private ownership includes a larger bundle of rights that those of control-
ownership.   
Appropriators gain property rights over the things they appropriate, which at 
minimum include the rights of control-ownership noted above.  But can we be more 
specific about the property rights gained by an appropriation than simply saying that an 
appropriator gains property rights ranging somewhere between control and full 
ownership?  One way to address this specificity concern (which I shall explore at greater 
depth in the next chapter) is to maintain that the specific property rights that an 
appropriator gains, after meeting certain other conditions, are simply the property rights 
that she claims in respect to the thing that she appropriates.  For example, if an 
appropriator claims, and meets other conditions that I shall discuss later, the rights of 
control ownership and the right to transfer a common resource to others via sell or gift, 
then these are the property rights that our appropriator gains with respect to the 
appropriated common resource.               
                                                 
32
   John Cristman, “Self-Ownership, Equality, and the Structure of Property Rights” in Left-Libertarianism 
and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, eds. Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner (Palgrave, 2000), p. 
346-7.  Christman develops the idea of control-ownership in his The Myth of Property: Toward an 
Egalitarian Theory of Ownership. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994. 
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Notice that appropriation, unlike use, is a normative concept.  To appropriate a 
common resource is to exercise a moral power and come to have certain property rights 
with respect to the resource.  For this reason it is superfluous and mistaken to talk of “just 
appropriation,” because all appropriation is by definition just. The tyrant, for example, 
who steals everyone’s land, has unjustly taken the land but he has not appropriated it 
because he has not come to have rights over the land.33                                    
After having motivated the importance of the project, I will continue onward in 
the next chapter by beginning to address the question: under what conditions can agents 
appropriate common resources?  In the next chapter I shall offer a general defense of a 
left-proprietarian answer to the question, then in chapter four I will build upon this effort 
by offering and defending a specific left-proprietarian account of appropriation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 Here it is helpful to consider the distinction between legal and moral rights.  In this project I am 
specifically concerned with moral rights.  To appropriate a common resource simply means to come to 
have a certain set of moral rights over the appropriated resource.  Legal rights, unlike moral rights, are a 
matter of legal, as opposed to moral, claims.  A person might have a legal right to ‘legally appropriate’ a 
common resource that they have no moral right to appropriate.  The tyrant, for example, might have the 
legal right to steal everyone’s land.  After all, the tyrant may have written the law.  But the tyrant has no 
moral right to steal the land and hence cannot appropriate the land in the moral sense which I am concerned 
with.   
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CHAPTER THREE:  APPROPRIATION PART I: IN DEFENSE OF LEFT-
PROPRIETARIANISM 
 
 
 
This chapter addresses the question: According to the most plausible version of a 
proprietarian theory of justice, under what conditions can an agent come to have private 
property in formerly common resources?     
A fruitful and unassuming place to begin addressing this question can be found in 
a puzzle posed by John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government (1690).34  Locke, in 
§ 25 of his Second Treatise, presents the following worry: 
It is very clear that God, as King David says (Psalm cxv. 16), “has given the earth 
to the children of men,” given it to mankind in common.  But this being supposed, 
it seems to some a very great difficulty how any one should ever come to have 
property in anything.  I will not content myself to answer that if it be difficult to 
make out property upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam and his 
posterity in common, it is impossible that any man but one universal monarch 
should have any property upon a supposition that God gave the world to Adam 
and his heirs in succession, exclusive of all the rest of his posterity. 
 
Locke’s worry is that, if the world initially belongs to everyone (is shared) in some 
common fashion, then it is either mysterious or simply wrong to suggest that an agent can 
appropriate any part(s) of the world all for herself.  (I shall say more about the best way 
in which to interpret Locke’s claim that the world belonged to everyone in some shared 
sense.)  In other words, if the initial normative status of the world is that it belongs to 
everyone in some common fashion, then how can anyone exercise a moral power and 
alter this initial situation and thereby come to appropriate parts of the world?  Before 
delving deeper into Locke’s worry a few points of specification and clarification are in 
order. 
                                                 
34
 John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government (1690), ed. Thomas Peardon (Macmillan, 1986). 
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 First, this chapter is specifically concerned with the appropriation of common 
resources, and as such I shall apply Locke’s general worry concerning the initial 
normative situation of the world specifically toward the initial normative situation of 
common resources.  Thus, when I reference Locke’s worry concerning the move from the 
first-order “common-belonging” of the world to second-order appropriation, I will do so 
as a worry that applies specifically to common resources.  This specification is not an 
important deviation from Locke’s worry.  The world, initially, consists of two types of 
material things, agents and natural resources and recall that all natural resources are 
common resources (there are no artifacts initially as artifacts only appear on the scene 
after agents improve natural resources).  Locke, plausibly, didn’t think that agents were 
the types of things that could be appropriated, and this leaves us with only the 
appropriation of common resources to consider.  Thus, Locke’s worry was a concern 
primarily directed toward the appropriation of common resources.         
Further, Locke’s thought that common resources belonged originally to everyone 
in a shared common fashion is unclear; hence we need to offer some clarification in order 
to assess the idea’s plausibility.  I take Locke to have meant that initially everyone had 
the liberty right, within certain parameters of normal use, to use any common resources.  
This view was also held by Grotius and Pufendorf, and more contemporarily by Allan 
Gibbard and Baruch Brody.35  As Gibbard puts the point, “(initially) everyone has equal 
rights to use all things (common resources).”36  No agent, or group of agents, initially had 
                                                 
35
 Gibbard endorses this view as a plausible assumption in his, “Natural Property Rights”, Nous, 10 (1976), 
pp. 77-86.  Brody argues for the view as true in his, “Redistribution without Egalitarianism”, Social 
Philosophy and Policy, 1(1) (1983), pp.71-87.   
 
36
 Allen Gibbard “Natural Property Rights,” In Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary 
Debate, eds. Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner (Palgrave, 2000), p. 24. 
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a dominion over common resources that afforded them private property in common 
resources. 
Noting that no agent initially had dominion over common resources has important 
ramifications for considerations of fairness and equality.  Endorsing the view that 
everyone initially had equal property rights with respect to common resources is a clear 
way of affirming the importance of equality within a Lockean picture of common use and 
a proprietarian theory of justice.  Fairness demands, in its most straightforward treatment, 
that we treat, ‘like cases alike.’  Given that no agent is initially on any better moral 
footing than any other agent with respect to common resources it stands to reason that 
one important way of treating ‘like cases alike’ is to affirm the equal property rights that 
all persons initially have in respect to common resources.  An analysis of equality and 
fairness can become a complicated matter and later I shall discuss equality at much 
greater length, but here I simply want to make explicit the point that the initial Lockean 
picture of the commons is very friendly to considerations of equality and fairness.     
Henceforth, I will refer to Locke’s treatment of the initial first-order normative 
status of common resources as a condition or situation of equal common use.  A public 
park can be used to loosely illustrate the situation of equal common use.  Everyone is at 
liberty to use, within certain parameters, the park.  It is worth noting that the liberty right 
to use common resources is a weak property right in that it affords little protection to the 
rights-holder.  For example, one’s liberty right to use a shade tree doesn’t prevent ten 
other agents from also using the same tree and creating a very crowded situation.  Later, 
in the next chapter, I shall reconsider and modify this simple treatment of equal common 
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use.  But for our purposes here of assessing Locke’s worry the above treatment will 
suffice. 
Now we are in a better position to phrase how Locke’s worry applies specifically 
toward the appropriation of common resources.  Here we can ask: If initially everyone 
has a liberty right to use common resources, then how can any agent acquire the claim 
right that others not use (certain) common resources without her permission?  How is it 
possible for an agent to gain a right to exclude others (or gain other property rights over 
common resources) from a common resource which was initially in a state of equal 
common use?  When an agent appropriates a common resource she acquires, minimally, 
(through the exercise of a moral power) a claim right which allows her to exclude others 
from the appropriated resource, but this newly acquired claim right (assuming that an 
agent can acquire such a right) is inconsistent with the liberty right that all agents initially 
have to use common resources.  Somewhere along the way, if we are to find a way to 
justify appropriation, we must explain how it is that agents lose their initial liberty right 
to use common resources. 
 In order to best assess the implications of Locke’s worry it is first worth 
addressing whether Locke’s claim that, common resources were initially in a state of 
equal common use is more plausible than competing alternative accounts of the initial 
normative status of common resources.  After all, if common resources were not initially 
in a state of equal common use, then Locke’s worry concerning appropriation losses its 
force.  I shall now proceed by examining a number of alternative possibilities to equal 
common use. 
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It could be maintained that, initially, agents lack even the liberty right to use 
common resources.  We could label this the no-initial-property-rights-whatsoever 
alternative to Locke’s suggestion of equal common use.  According to this position no 
one has a liberty right to use common resources.  This position, while possible, is wildly 
implausible.   
Imagine, for instance, that two normal human agents, Mark and Bill, share a 
world with the same common resource base as our actual world.  I can think of no 
plausible reason(s) to suggest that either Mark or Bill do something unjust when either 
uses common resources, e.g., when Mark occupies a privately unowned cave shelter for 
warmth.  This is because, plausibly, agents have a liberty right to use (in at least some 
fashion) common resources.  For example, Mark and Bill plausibly have the liberty right 
to use the ground by walking upon a path to a nearby spring.  Mark does not violate the 
(property) rights of Bill, or vice versa, by walking along a privately unowned path in the 
forest.  After all, no one owns the path and neither Mark nor Bill seem to have any 
greater claim to the path than the other.  What plausible reason(s) could exist that would 
generally justly preclude an agent from using the path?  I doubt any such reasons exist.  
Neither has a duty not to use the path in some normal fashion because neither has a right 
that the other not use the path in some normal fashion.  The no-initial-property-rights-
whatsoever alternative is simply not plausible.    
 Another alternative to equal common use is where a special agent, group of 
agents, or class of agents, initially privately owns some or all common resources.  This 
alternative could be labeled the initial-special-status-private-owner alternative to equal 
common use.  For example, Bill might be ordained from God, due to his morally superior 
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status, to enter the world with the claim right that all other agents get his permission 
before they use any common resources.  That is, Bill could enter the world with rights of 
private ownership over all common resources.  Such a state of affairs would be 
inconsistent with equal common use as a certain agent, group, or class, would initially 
have rights over the world that precluded a liberty right of everyone to use common 
resources.  In fact, a defender of this position would likely deny the very notion of 
common resources altogether.  Recall that a common resource is a non-agent resource 
which no agent has any greater moral claim to than any other agent.  If some agents 
initially have a greater claim to the world’s resources than others, then to even talk of 
common resources is mistaken.  
 This alternative to equal common use is also wildly implausible.  I take it as a 
promising hallmark of the Western ethical tradition that all agents are, at least initially, 
moral equals, or as Kant put the point, “deserving of equal moral respect.”  No agent is, 
at least initially, morally superior to another agent.  As the proprietarian would put the 
point, all agents initially possess the same set of property rights.  Here, aside from the 
very strong intuitive appeal of the above theses we can ask, what conditions would, 
initially, render one agent morally superior to another?  Gender, no.  Race, no. Socio-
economic class, no.  Intelligence, no.  Past action, no (there aren’t any past actions to 
consider yet).  Of course we could keep listing, but I think the point is clear enough.  No 
good reasons exist to suspect that, at least initially, agents do not possess the same set of 
(property) rights.37 
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 Some might suspect that the denial of a moral equity thesis is a straw-man.  Who would deny such a 
thesis?  Well, actually many laypersons and philosophers seem to deny the thesis.  For an influential 
philosopher who denies the thesis we need only look so far as Nietzsche and for a large group of people 
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Now, let us move along to consider the possibility that common resources were 
initially jointly-controlled by everyone.38  The central idea behind joint-control 
alternatives to equal common use is that in the case of joint-control some form of 
collective approval (either unanimous or majority) is required for any of those with joint-
control to use that which is jointly-controlled.  Unlike equal common use individuals 
within a scheme of joint-control have no liberty right to use common resources   
 As we work through the differing forms of joint-control I purpose the following 
simple case to provide illustration.  Imagine a world, much like our own in terms of a 
common resource base with three normally functioning agents, Sarah, Mark, and Bill, 
who, jointly-control a cave shelter.  They are the only agents in the world.   
According to the unanimous-consent-joint-control variant of joint-control, all 
individuals must have the permission of every other joint-controller to use an object 
which is jointly-controlled.39  For example, Mark must get the permission of Sarah and 
Bill in order to use the cave shelter which they all jointly-control.  If either Sarah or Bill 
fails to give Mark permission to use the shelter, then he may not justly use the shelter. 
The unanimous-consent-joint-control model has the important disadvantage that 
in order for any joint-controller to even use an object that she jointly controls she must 
first receive the permission of every other joint-controller.  This permission-receiving 
                                                                                                                                                 
(and contemporary) unfair treatment of women (specifically for our purposes here the unequal property 
rights of women) in many cultural traditions around the world.   
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 G.A Cohen assumes, for the sake of argumentation, a joint-control ownership view, see: Self-Ownership, 
Freedom, and Equality, pp. 94.  Also, Cohen discuss the view in “Self-Ownership, World Ownership, and 
Equality, Part II”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 3 (2) (1986), pp 77-96.  
 
39
 Earlier I made the assumption that the only agents in the world were joint-controllers.  But if this 
assumption were relaxed to allow for “outsiders” the same rule would apply to these outside individuals.  
They would need the permission of all the joint-controllers in order to use common resources within a 
unanimous-joint-control model. 
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process is both extremely burdensome and inefficient for a joint-controller.  Imagine, that 
Mark must obtain the permission of Sarah and Bill for every instance in which he wishes 
to use the cave shelter which he jointly-controls.  One promising way to deal with this 
inefficiency and continual burden would be to revise the unanimous-joint-control variant 
to be understood as unanimous-non-dissent-joint-control.40  In this variant, a joint-
controller would have the liberty right to use what he jointly-controls just as long as no 
other joint-controller dissented to his use.  Mark, for example, would have the liberty 
right to use the cave shelter unless another joint-controller dissented to his use of the 
cave. 
While unanimous-non-dissent joint-control is much more efficient and less 
burdensome for a joint-controller than unanimous-consent-joint-control both models still 
suffer from, at least two, severe weaknesses.  The first problem, with both variants, is that 
one mean-spirited or envious agent could simply unilaterally veto the other joint-
controllers from using the jointly-controlled object.  Of course, one could reply that 
typically no joint-controller will deny other joint-controllers permission to use joint-
controlled objects as this would almost certainly precipitate like action from the other 
joint-controllers and, in kind, prevent the original objector’s use.  This, tit-for-tat 
retaliation from other joint-controllers will generally, so the thought goes, serve as a 
check against the possibility of (envious or mean-spirited) veto. 
The problem with this reply is that we can easily imagine situations in which an 
envious joint-controller would rather have none of the joint-controllers use the object 
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 Another way in which the burdensome aspects of unanimous approval might be mitigated is by appealing 
to contracts which all joint-controls might agree to that would render permission to use things good over an 
extended period of time, thus removing the burden of every joint controller to continually receive 
unanimous approval before any using common resources. 
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(including herself) than see all the joint-controllers use the jointly-controlled object in 
some cooperative or shared fashion.  It is not plausible to suggest that one mean-spirited 
joint-controller can justly prevent, by either her failing to grant permission or active 
dissent, all other joint-controllers from using an object which is jointly-controlled.  Such 
a power by one joint-controller to deny all other joint-controllers access to use the jointly-
controlled object is a significant, and unacceptable, restriction on the autonomy and 
survivability of agents. 
The second problem with both variants is that registering dissent takes both an 
awareness of reason(s) to dissent and time to dissent.  An agent might be able to use 
common resources very quickly before anyone has reason, or time, to dissent to her use.  
This problem, however, is not nearly as troublesome for the joint-control variants under 
discussion that the first problem discussed above.  To help address this problem the non-
dissent model could be augmented with an “opportunity to dissent” condition that would 
give joint-controllers an adequate opportunity to dissent to another controller’s use. 
Another form of joint-control that might prove more promising than unanimous-
non-dissent-joint-control, is majority-joint-control.  In this majority model, an individual 
may use a common resource if and only if he first obtains the permission of a majority of 
the resource’s joint-controllers.  For instance, Mark may use the jointly-controlled cave 
shelter provided that he obtains the permission of either Sarah or Bill (thus giving him 
2/3 permission of all joint-controllers).  For the same reasons of inefficiency and over 
burdensomeness cited in response to unanimous-joint-control, a more plausible version of 
the majority-joint-control is a majority-non-dissent-joint-control model: where, for 
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instance, Mark may use the jointly-controlled cave shelter just so long as a majority (Bill 
and Sarah) do not dissent to his use of the cave shelter. 
How does the majority-non-dissent-joint-control model stand up to close 
scrutiny?  The model, problematically, allows a majority of joint-controllers to 
oppressively and unfairly restrict the ability of a minority of joint-controllers to use a 
common resource which the minority jointly-controls.  For instance, Sarah and Bill can 
dissent to Mark use of the cave on unfair grounds.  Sarah and Bill may simply dissent to 
Mark’s use of the cave shelter because of Mark’s skin color or any other reason which 
most would, and should, find morally unacceptable.   
But aside from morally nefarious practices of the majority to exclude a minority 
from using a jointly-controlled object there are also considerations of self-interest that 
speak against the moral plausibility of majority-non-dissent-joint-control.  We could 
easily imagine that Mark and Bill agree to a pact to exclude Sarah from using the cave 
shelter not because of any obvious morally nefarious reason, but because each are self-
interested and would simply rather share the cave with one other agent than with two 
other agents.  It is the prudential self-interest of her co-controllers, in this case, that 
prevents Sarah from using the cave shelter which she jointly-controls.  But this isn’t fair 
to Sarah, and the unfairness here is significant enough, I offer, to render the majority-
non-dissent-joint-control (at least when we assume the self-interest of the controllers) 
implausible. 
Further, the problem of prudential self-interest might well speak toward a 
systematic injustice of the majority-non-dissent-joint-control model.  If we assume that 
co-controllers are prudentially self-interested then why not suspect that they would try to 
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form majorities with other co-controllers to exclude as many other joint-controllers (in 
the minority) from using jointly-controlled objects?  But this result is morally 
unacceptable as it implies that if a joint-controller finds herself in the minority she, on the 
basis of this status alone (a status which is either morally arbitrary or one that joint-
controller may have no responsibility for bringing about), could be justly barred from 
using that which she jointly-controls.  Such an unearned and (potentially) arbitrary status 
could not justly bar an agent from using that which she jointly-controls, accordingly we 
have a reductio against majority-non-dissent-joint-control. 
Thus far we have considered a number of possible alternatives to equal common 
use including, no-property-rights-whatsoever, initial-special-status-private-owner, and 
various joint-control models.  This consideration of alternatives to equal common use has 
failed to provide a plausible rival alternative.  Thus, I offer that Locke was correct, in 
broad form, when he claimed that common resources initially belonged to everyone.  
That is, initially everyone had the liberty right to use, in some normal fashion, common 
resources. 
Now, after endorsing equal common use as the best, approximation, in which to 
understand the first-order normative status of common resources, we are in a better 
position to continue examining Locke’s puzzle: given the initial, first-order, equal 
common use rights of everyone to use common resources how could, if at all, any agent, 
or group, have a power to alter this first-order condition and appropriate a common 
resource from this original condition?    
The first possible answer to Locke’s question is that it is never permissible for any 
agent, or group of agents, to alter the normative situation of equal common use.  That is, 
41  
 
 
agents simply lack the (moral) power to alter the initial situation of equal common use.  
This position can be accurately described as perpetual-equal-common-use. 
The critical question to ask one who endorses perpetual-equal-common-use is: 
why would equal common use be unalterable?  What morally bars agents from altering 
the initial condition of equal common use in a fashion that allows for the appropriation of 
common resources?  Plausible answers to these questions are not forthcoming.  After all, 
it seems as if we can offer cases in which the initial condition of equal common use can 
be justly altered in a way that allows for the appropriation of common resources.   
For example, imagine that Mark and Sarah forfeit or waive their liberty right to 
use the cave shelter (and further agree not to use the cave shelter without Bill’s 
permission) in exchange for services that Bill agrees to provide.41  Such an alteration to 
the first-order normative situation of equal common use would render Bill as the only 
remaining just user of the cave shelter.  Mark and Sarah acquire a duty not to use the cave 
without Bill’s permission and Bill is at liberty to use the cave without the permission of 
others.  Bill, through the agreement he forms with others, has gained a claim right that 
everyone else (Sarah and Mark) not use the cave shelter without his permission.  Bill 
gains control ownership over the cave shelter because he has a liberty right to use the 
cave and he has the claim right that others must get his permission before they use the 
cave.  If we grant agents the ability to waive or forfeit their liberty right to use (certain) 
common resources, and as such the power to alter the first-order normative status of 
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accordingly why Bill has private ownership of the cave. 
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equal common use, then we should make room for the possibility that a common resource 
could come to be privately owned through consensual agreement. 
The rejection of perpetual-equal-common-use rules out the possibility that it is 
impossible to alter, in a fashion that allows for appropriation, the initial situation of equal 
common use. 
 The first possibility to address how agents may exercise the power to appropriate 
common resources is that such a power can occur only under the sanction or approval of 
some morally special agent or group of agents.  This view can be labeled special-second-
order-moral-status.  This possibility is similar to the idea, examined earlier, that a special 
group of agents initially have a greater claim to common resources.  The difference is that 
this position endorses first-order equal common use, but claims that this condition is 
justly altered to allow for appropriation, as a second-order matter, only under the 
approval or sanction from some morally special agent or group, e.g., the King.   
This possibility should be rejected for the same reasons as were given to reject the 
view that some agents have a moral status that affords them disproportionate, first-order, 
property rights to common resources.  We simply have no good reason to believe that 
anyone has a special status which affords them the moral power to be final arbiter as to 
when others are allowed to alter the initial situation of equal common use.  Agents don’t 
need to get permission from the “King,” before the alteration of equal common use may 
justly occur. 
 To this point, I have maintained that both perpetual-equal-common-use as well as 
special-status-second-order alteration to equal common use are implausible ways to 
understand how the initial state of equal common use may be justly altered to allow for 
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appropriation.  Now I shall consider whether joint-ownership is a plausible way of 
understanding how the initial state of equal common use may be justly altered to allow 
for appropriation. 
Joint-ownership shares certain similarities with joint-control considered earlier.  
The important difference between the two views is that joint-control is a way, which was 
rejected as implausible, of understanding first-order normative conditions whereas joint-
ownership is a way of understanding second-order normative powers to alter the first-
order initial situation of equal common use.42  Joint-ownership holds that the initial 
conditions of equal common use can be justly altered; in a fashion that allows for 
appropriation, only by the unanimous or majority consent of all joint-owners.43  This 
view has been endorsed as plausible assumption by Will Kymlica and as a plausible view 
by James Grunebaum.44 
A unanimous-joint-ownership model claims that every joint-owner of a common 
resource must consent in order for the common resource to be appropriated.  For instance, 
Mark, Sarah, and Bill (all joint-owners) must all consent in order for the cave shelter to 
become appropriated.  For reasons of efficiency and burdensomeness considered earlier I 
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take it unanimous-non-dissent-joint-ownership, with provisions that allow adequate 
opportunity for joint-owners to dissent, is more plausible than unanimous-joint-
ownership.45 
The plausibility of unanimous-non-dissent-joint-ownership suffers greatly from 
an objection concerning the lack of autonomy within such a scheme.  Unanimous-non-
dissent-joint-ownership, in effect, allows one joint-owner the moral power to prevent 
every other joint-owner, or group of joint-owners, from appropriating any common 
resources whatsoever.  The problem with this implication is that in order for an agent to 
be autonomous (in a morally meaningful fashion) it makes sense to think that, typically, 
he needs some common resources which he can call his own.  That is, some resources 
which he can, in a sense which excludes others, incorporate into his own plans and 
projects.  As Richard Arneson puts the point: 
A salient fact bearing on the justifiability of appropriation is that people want to 
carry out projects that require secure possessions of land for extended periods of 
time.  If A wishes to build and occupy a cabin, she needs assurances that the logs 
she chops on one day will lie where they fall until it is time to fashion them into 
cabin walls, and that once the cabin is completed, no one will occupy it without 
her consent.  A’s liberty to carry our such projects on a particular piece of land 
requires that B and all others not be at liberty to initiate their own projects on that 
piece of land which might interfere with A’s project.46 
 
Agents pursue plans and projects of their own and, as illustrated by Arneson’s example, 
common resources which agents incorporate into their personal and private plans and 
projects is often integral to pursuing autonomous aims.   
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Possessing merely the weak property right to use common resources offers little, 
if any, protection against others from interfering in our plans and projects.  Rendering the 
moral power to appropriate contingent on the unanimous approval or non-dissent of 
others is too great a bar on autonomous action.      
For example, consider that Bill plans to construct a log cabin and appropriate a 
small plot of land where he wishes to pursue a life of private seclusion and 
contemplation.  Bill isn’t happy to share the crowded cave shelter with Sarah and Mark.  
There are plenty (thousands) of easily accessible logs which everyone can use to 
construct their own cabins, and Bill only wishes to appropriate a small number of these 
logs to build a cabin of his own on a very small plot of land.  Bill’s appropriation does 
not reduce the well-being of the others, and further Bill leaves enough for the others to 
appropriate and improve their lives to the same degree as he did.  Bill does not 
disadvantage anyone by appropriating a few of the thousands of easily accessible logs 
and a small plot on which he builds a log cabin.  Nonetheless, Sarah, dissents to Bill’s 
(attempted) appropriation, appealing to her liberty right to use all the logs.   
 Can Sarah’s dissent justly prevent Bill from appropriating the logs and small plot?  
If Sarah’s liberty right to use everything were absolute, then her dissent could prevent 
Bill’s appropriation.  But is Sarah’s first-order liberty right to use all common resources 
absolute?  I offer that such a right is not absolute and may, under certain conditions, fail 
to hold.  The moral power to appropriate is important enough for the autonomy of agents 
that the liberty right of everyone to use all common resources may fail to hold when an 
appropriation does not, at a minimum, disadvantage others.  As the chapter proceeds I 
shall spend substantial time discussing the notion of what it means to disadvantage others 
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by an act of appropriation.  For now, however, I merely suggest that appropriating in a 
fashion that does not disadvantage others is necessary if one is to appropriate common 
resources.   
 Is majority-non-dissent-joint-ownership a more plausible alternative than 
unanimous-non-dissent-joint-ownership?  Majority-non-dissent-joint-ownership is the 
claim that appropriation can occur only if the majority of joint-owners do not dissent to 
the appropriation.47  That is, majority non-dissent is necessary for an appropriation to 
occur.  The obvious advantage to this model of majority-non-dissent-joint-ownership as 
compared with unanimous-non-dissent-joint-ownership is that the majority model does 
not allow one envious or nefarious agent from vetoing all instances of appropriation.  But 
the model allows a majority of envious or nefarious agents to veto agents from 
appropriating.  Appropriation can allow agents to better live the life of their choosing and 
provided they do not disadvantage others when they appropriate it is difficult to see why 
majority non-dissent would be necessary for appropriation.  If we grant that an agent 
engaging in an appropriation does not disadvantage others, then why think that a majority 
veto could justly prevent her appropriation?  Anticipating no good answer to this 
question, I reject majority permission (or non-dissent) as a necessary condition of 
appropriation. 
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Thus far we have considered, and found implausible: perpetual-equal-common-
use, special-second-order-moral-status, unanimous-non-dissent-joint-ownership and 
majority- non-dissent-joint-ownership, to explain how, if at all, agents have the moral 
power to appropriate a common resource.  Here, I maintain that some sort of 
unilateralism is true.  Unilateralism claims that an agent, or group of agents, may, under 
certain conditions, appropriate common resources without obtaining the permission of 
anyone.  I shall now proceed to examine various models of unilateralism in route to 
uncovering the most plausible version of the view. 
 Before explicating various unilateralist positions I shall consider whether 
laboring, improving, or claiming (or some combination thereof) a common resource serve 
as necessary condition(s) of appropriation.  After considering whether such conditions are 
necessary for appropriation, I will address whether these conditions are sufficient for 
appropriation. 
Is an agent’s mixing her labor with a common resource a necessary condition of 
her appropriating the resource?  Locke devoted much his influential chapter on property 
in the Second Treatise attempting to provide a positive answer to this question.  But many 
contemporary political philosophers have found good reasons to reject Locke’s labor-
mixing necessary condition for appropriation.  For instance, Robert Nozick, asks: 
If I own a can of tomato juice and spill it in the sea so that its molecules (made 
radioactive, so I can check this) mingle evenly throughout the sea, do I thereby 
come to own the sea, or have I foolishly dissipated my tomato soup?48             
 
Nozick’s example is helpful because it demonstrates that mixing one’s labor (if this is 
indeed what the soup-mixer does) with something can be a trivial and morally 
unimportant action.  Pouring a can of soup into the sea seems as morally relevant in 
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 Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 173. 
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respect to appropriating the sea as doing jumping jacks in a boat traveling the sea.  Why 
would merely mixing one’s labor with a common resource serve as a necessary condition 
of appropriating the resource?     
Imagine that Sarah is a quadriplegic who can alter nothing, or next to nothing, in 
the world.  Sarah cannot effectively mix her labor with anything.  Is Sarah’s inability to 
mix her labor a plausible bar to her being able to appropriate common resources?  It does 
not seem to be.  Why would it matter if Sarah could suddenly hang drapes in a cave 
shelter that she wishes to appropriate?  Sarah’s inability to mix her labor with the cave 
shelter doesn’t seem a bar to her appropriating the shelter.   
We could imagine that Sarah is normally functioning but simply doesn’t, for 
whatever reason, desire to mix her labor with the cave shelter.  She likes the cave just the 
way it is.  Demanding that Sarah mix her labor with the cave shelter in order to 
appropriate the shelter might well be little more than an unjustifiable restriction of her 
autonomy.     
Perhaps a more plausible thought behind those who endorse labor as a necessary 
(or even sufficient) condition of appropriation is this: when agents improve, through their 
labor, common resources, then they have some claim to benefit from the improvement 
(added value) that their labor brought about.49  This view has found support amongst 
some notable contemporary political philosophers, e.g., Baruch Broady and Hillel 
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 One could argue that improving a common resource gives the laborious improver a claim not only to the 
improved value but to the entire labored upon resource.  For example, when an agent grows an apple tree, 
the grower would have a claim not only to the value of the improvements that he brought about but the 
entire apple tree.  This view has been subject to the criticism that agents cannot gain a claim to the 
unimproved value of a resource by merely improving the resource.  An agent, does not, for example gain a 
claim over an entire private unowned beach merely because she improves the beach by picking up a piece 
of litter. 
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Steiner.50  But notice that this view, however plausible, does not speak toward 
appropriation.  Even if we grant the suggestion that an agent “owns her labor” and is, in 
some fashion, entitled to the value which she adds to common resources through her 
laborious activity, this tells us nothing about how labor is connected, if it is at all, with 
appropriating such resources.51  One can consistently hold the following two theses: 
(i) Mixing one’s labor with a common resource is not a necessary condition 
of appropriating the resource. 
(ii) An agent is entitled to the improvement or value which she adds to 
common resources when she justly improves the base resource. 
 
I remain open on (ii) although I find the view somewhat attractive.  I merely point out 
that (i) and (ii) may be consistently held. 
Further, it is implausible to hold that “laborious improvement,” (as opposed to 
labor per se) is a necessary condition of appropriating common resources.  Imagine that a 
group of agents come to exist at the same time in a world that is a beautiful and pristine 
island paradise.  As it turns out all laboring extended toward common resources would 
reduce the initial value of the common resources on the island.  That is, all artifactual 
creates will be of less value than unaltered common resources.  On the island there is no 
improvement brought about by the labor involved with artifactual creation.  If laborious 
improvement were necessary for appropriation, then this would imply that no one can 
appropriate anything (since no laborious improvement is possible).  But, as considered 
earlier, appropriation plausibly allows agents a greater degree of autonomy than 
arrangements not allowing for appropriation at all, and such a benefit should not be 
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 Brody endorses the view in, “Redistribution without Egalitarianism”, Social Philosophy and Policy, 1(1) 
(1983), pp.74-5. And Steiner endorses the view in, An Essay on Rights (1994), 244. 
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 For a similar discussion see Miller, David (1989) Market, State, and Community. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 55-6. 
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blocked merely because an agent lives in a place where common resources cannot be 
improved via labor. 
Now that we have rejected mixing one’s labor with and laboriously improving 
common resources as necessary for appropriating these resources, we can consider 
whether claiming ownership over a common resource is a necessary condition of 
appropriation.  Appropriation, recall, is coming to own, where this ownership comes 
about by the exercise of a moral power to alter the initial normative situation of equal 
common use.52  In order for an agent to appropriate she must, at least, take positive steps 
to exercise a moral power.  An agent cannot appropriate in her sleep.  Of course, an agent 
might have to fulfill other conditions before she appropriates, but she must, at least, take 
positive steps to exercise a moral power. 
It is plausible to suggest that claiming is one way, perhaps the only way, in which 
an agent may take a positive step to exercise the moral power of appropriation. 
Additionally, it is not obvious what, if anything, besides claiming ownership would count 
as exercising the moral power to appropriate.53  When an agent, for instance, is accused 
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 But what about the possibility of ‘coming to own’ a common resource in a fashion other than 
appropriation?  Could an agent come to own a common resource in a fashion that did not require her 
exercise of a moral power?  Here, I suspect that the answer is no.  Coming to own a common resource X 
requires the exercise of a moral power.  Before an agent comes to own X she stands in a certain moral 
relationship with respect to X, a non-owning relation.  X might be owned by another person or X could be 
within conditions of equal common use.  In order for an agent to come to own X an alteration in the 
previous moral relationship of non-owning is required.  I find it plausible that such an alternation to the 
previous moral relationship between the agent and X must include the exercise of a moral power by the 
agent who is coming to own.  Others cannot, absent our exercise of a moral power, alter our previous moral 
relationship to X.  This is something that other agents lack the moral authority to sanction.  And I suspect 
that ‘facts about the world’, absent the exercise of a moral power, likewise cannot alter an agent’s previous 
moral relationship to X.  What alters or transforms an agent’s previous moral relationship with X from a 
state of non-owning to a state of owning must include her exercise of a moral power.                    
53
 One could suggest that laboring on a common resource is one way to exercise the moral power to 
appropriate.  I doubt this suggestion is plausible because I fail to see the necessary connection between 
laboring on something and exercising a moral power to appropriate the thing.  For example, one might 
labor on something “for the fun of it” and have no intention of exercising the moral power to appropriate 
the thing.  A more promising suggestion; however is to maintain that under certain conditions laboring 
might somehow qualify as staking a claim to a common resource.  I am unsure as to plausibility of such a 
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of exercising a moral power to alter a first-order normative situation, e.g., appropriating a 
common resource, an appropriate denial of this charge seems to be the denial of ever 
claiming such a power.  Absent alternatives that would point to something other than 
claiming as a means to exercise the moral power of appropriation, I maintain that 
claiming is a necessary condition of appropriation.54 
But what does it mean to claim ownership over something?  This is a complex 
question that I cannot give full attention to in this project; however a few helpful 
observations can be made.  For instance, it seems that such a claim ought to have both a 
subjective and objective component.  An agent who makes an ownership claim should 
understand the conceptual content of the claim.  That is, the content of an ownership 
claim should be subjectively appreciated by the claimant.55  Uttering an ownership claim 
in a language that one does not understand, for example, won’t count as claiming in the 
relevant sense (even if others fully understand the content of the ownership claim). 
                                                                                                                                                 
suggestion but it is worth noting that even if correct this view would not hold that laboring qua laboring 
was necessary for appropriation.   
 
54
 Brian Kierland has suggested that claiming is not necessary to appropriate and that alternatively, “using 
with the intention of exclusively using” could be sufficient to appropriate common resources (when others 
conditions such as leaving enough and as good for others are satisfied).  For example, Kierland offers a 
case of slightly mentally impaired agent who builds and uses a log cabin with the intent of exclusively 
using this cabin, but never claims ownership rights over the cabin because he lacks the mental ability or 
imagination to do so.  If claiming is necessary for appropriation, then this agent cannot appropriate the 
cabin.  Kierland takes this interesting case to seriously challenge the view that claiming ownership rights 
over a common resource is necessary to appropriate a common resource.  I am less convinced that Kierland 
that this case poses serious challenge to the idea that claiming is necessary for appropriation.  The first 
thing to note about this case is that claiming can take many different forms.  It might be that by taking 
certain actions in respect to his construction of the log cabin the builder has actually claimed ownership 
rights.  For example, if this agent really did intend to exclusively use the cabin then he might have build a 
fence around the cabin or taken others steps to claim exclusive use (control private ownership) over the 
cabin.  But let us say such actions didn’t occur and consistent with Kierland’s example the agent who has 
the intent of exclusively using the cabin never makes an “outward expression” of this intention to 
exclusively use the cabin he plans to exclusively use.  If this is the case and no claiming at all has been 
made, then I am prepared to bite the bullet of Kierland’s case and maintain that the cabin user cannot 
appropriate the cabin.        
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 One implication of this is that the more complex the ownership claim, e.g., the more property rights 
being claimed; the more difficult it will be to understand the content of the ownership claim. 
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Further, a claim of ownership should be more than an internal monologue with 
one’s self.  A claim must outwardly express to the world that ownership has been 
claimed.  But what counts as an “outward expression to the world?”  In some cases a 
verbal declaration might satisfy this demand.  In other cases, it might be plausible that 
building a fence and enclosing a piece of land will satisfy the demand of making an 
outward expression to the world.  Often times the contingencies of the world in question, 
i.e., social norms and customs will mandate the proper objective conditions one must 
satisfy in order to stake an ownership.  In a very small world, for example, with few 
agents merely verberalizing a claim to everyone at the same time might suffice, but in a 
larger world where such a verbalization is unlikely to reach everyone it might be that one 
must label or somehow mark the object which they are claiming ownership over. 
Given that claiming is a necessary condition of appropriation we can ask what, if 
any, (moral) relevance is had by being a first-claimant of a common resource.  Does the 
status of being a first-claimant, as opposed to being a subsequent claimant, confer any 
greater moral advantage to appropriate?  Pufendorf, nearly four centuries ago, made the 
astute observation that a first-user or claimant of common resource is morally different 
than subsequent claimants because this first-claimant, unlike his subsequent counterparts, 
did not displace the ownership claims of others.     
When an agent stakes first-claim, as opposed to a later claim, to a privately 
unowned common resource, they are not making a claim which comes into the conflict or 
displaces the claim of any other agent.  When an agent claims a common resource she 
will often invest her time, plans, and desires (her life) into the claimed common resource.  
Subsequent claimers would then often times be displacing, or attempting to displace, 
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these investments made by the first claimer.56  Because first-claimants are not engaging 
in a displacement of a claim, and subsequent claims are, it is plausible to think that first-
claimants have some, at least weak, moral advantage to appropriate not had by late 
comers.57  I stress that the plausibility of assigning some moral importance to first-
claiming is, as we will soon assess, of very limited moral importance.  For instance, being 
a first-claimant plausibly won’t license an agent to appropriate in a fashion that 
disadvantages others.   
The upshot of the above discussion is that mixing one’s labor with, or laboriously 
improving, a common resource is not a necessary condition of appropriation, but 
claiming is necessary for its appropriation.  An agent cannot come to own what she does 
not claim to own.  Further, being the first to claim a common resource does hold some 
moral significance.  Now we will consider whether being the first to claim ownership of a 
common resource is sufficient for appropriation. 
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 Of course, not all acts of subsequent (displacing) ownership claims are on equal moral par.  For instance, 
we could imagine a case in which a subsequent claimer claimed a common resource three second after the 
first claimer and before the first claimer made any investments of time, plans, or desire in respect to the 
claimed common resource.  In such a case, admittedly, the morally troubling aspect of a “displacing claim” 
is either very minimal or non-existent.   
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 It is worth asking whether the moral advantage had by first-claimers implies that later-claimers may 
never come to own what first-claimers lay claim to and appropriate.  One point to make here is that if a 
first-claimer does exercise a moral power and appropriate a common resource then by the exercise of this 
power the common resource loses its status as a common resource and becomes privately owned property.  
Subsequent claimers, those later than the first-claimer, are simply not claiming rights over a “common 
resource” at all, at most they would be claiming rights over the private property of another.  As I noted 
earlier, however, abandoned property that was once privately owned by another reverts back to the 
commons and becomes (again) a common resource.  My own view is that when an agent dies she abandons 
her private property (I deny that agents have a right of bequest) and it reverts back to commons where it has 
the status (again) of a common resource and at such time others are free to claim and appropriate the 
common resource.    
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The most straightforward unilateralist position is advocated by the radical right-
proprietarian58 (e.g., Jan Narveson, Israel Kirzner, and Murray Rothbard).59  The radical 
right-proprietarian maintains that: 
Radical Right-Proprietarianism:  You can appropriate a common resource 
(unilaterally) if and only if you are the first to claim the resource.60 
 
One important shortcoming with the radical right-proprietarian’s above treatment of 
appropriation is that it renders an agent’s temporal proximity to claiming common 
resources all-important when considering whether an appropriation of common resources 
is just.  According to this position, claiming ownership of a common resource is not only 
a necessary condition of appropriating the resource but is necessary and sufficient.   
Consider the following example loosely borrowed from G.A. Cohen.  Sarah and 
Mark are the only agents in the world.  Sarah, for whatever reason, claims the entire 
world as her own before Mark claims anything.  If the radical right-proprietarian is 
correct, then Sarah’s act of first-claiming is both necessary and sufficient for 
appropriating the entire world.  According to the radical-right-proprietarian, Sarah, in 
virtue of her first-claiming, privately owns everything in the world and may exclude 
others from using everything without her permission.  Sarah may allow Mark, consistent 
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 Here it is worth noting that all the notable proprietarians that I will reference are, consistent with their 
endorsement of self-ownership, libertarians.  But as I explained in the previous chapter, libertarianism is a 
type of proprietarianism.  Thus, all libertarians are proprietarians, but not all proprietarians are libertarians.  
I will address the endorsement of self-ownership only where it becomes directly relevant to addressing the 
appropriation of common resources.      
 
59
 For Narveson’s treatment of appropriation see his, The Libertarian Idea, 1988, pp. 79-93.  Kirzner 
discusses his radical right-proprietarianism in “Entrepreneurship, Entitlement, and Economic Justice,” 
Eastern Economic Journal, 4 (1978), pp. 9-25.  Murray Rothbard discusses his radical right 
proprietarianism in his For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto (New York: Libertarian Review 
Foundation, 1978) pp. 23-37. 
 
60
 Some radical right-proprietarians would claim that the first to labor, improve, or use a common resource 
may, without fulfilling any other conditions, appropriate the resource.  But as I have argued such views are 
not even plausible necessary conditions of appropriation much less necessary and sufficient conditions.   
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with radical-right-proprietarianism, to use some of her common resources (her breathable 
air for instance) on the condition that Mark perform a life of slave labor for her.61  
The very serious problem with radical-right-proprietarianism is that it renders an 
agent’s temporal proximity to common resources all-important when considering 
whether an appropriation of these resources is just.  The view allows an agent the power 
to alter the first-order normative situation of equal common use very easily and with far 
too little ease (by merely first claiming) and with absolutely no consideration for others.  
An agent, that is, acquires no new moral obligations, whatsoever, to others when she 
engages in an appropriation of a common resources (which previously were within 
conditions of equal common use).   
But it is implausible to suggest that agents acquire no new moral obligations to 
others when they appropriate common resources.62  After all, the appropriation of a 
common resource confers on others (all who didn’t appropriate the resource) a duty to 
refrain from using the appropriated common resource without the new private owner’s 
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 Brian Kierland and Michael Otsuka have both suggested that radical right-proprietarianism is a more 
plausible view if instead of merely claiming a common resource agents must also labor, use, or improve the 
resource in some way in order to exercise the power to appropriate.  Adding something like the above to a 
radical right-proprietarian account would rule out someone appropriating the whole world by merely 
claiming it.  This point is well taken.  The difficulty with adding such conditions to the radical right-
proprietarian’s account is that labor and improvement (and indirectly use by considering labor) have 
already been excluded as necessary conditions of appropriation.  An agent doesn’t need to labor upon, 
improve, or use a common resource in order to appropriate it.  Could labor, improvement, or use serve as a 
jointly sufficient condition for appropriation along with claiming?  I’m skeptical of such a move because I 
don’t think that the laboring, improvement, or using a common resource plays a role, or helps play a role, in 
an agent’s ability to exercise the moral power of appropriation.              
 
62
 The exception to this would be a view proposed by Brian Kierland in which an appropriator may 
appropriate only a non-disadvantaging share of common resources.  If this view is endorsed then 
appropriators would not acquire new moral obligations because they are simply are never permitted to 
appropriate in a fashion which would bring about new moral obligations.    
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permission.63  This new duty on the part of non-appropriators will, often, serve to 
disadvantage them.  This duty-creation for others (non-appropriators) on the part of an 
agent who exercises the moral power to appropriate creates a plausible reason to think 
that exercising the moral power to appropriate must be done in a fashion which doesn’t 
disadvantaging others.  Clearly, radical-right-proprietarianism fails to adequately account 
for this condition on the moral power to appropriate common resources.64 
In order to better account for the plausible moral duty not to disadvantage others 
that accompany unilateral appropriation, John Locke (§27 of the Second Treatise), in 
what has been labeled the Lockean proviso, proposed that an appropriators must, leave 
enough and as good for others.65  When an agent appropriates in a fashion that leaves 
enough and as good for others, then the appropriation won’t disadvantage others in any 
morally important respect.  After all, others have been left enough and as good.  When an 
agent, however, attempts to appropriate and fails to leave enough and as good for others, 
then this (especially given the burden-creating aspects of exclusive use that arise via 
appropriation) will plausible serve as a morally objectionable disadvantage. 
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 As Nozick puts the point on pp. 175 of Anarchy, “For an object’s coming under one agent’s ownership 
changes the [moral] situation of all others.  Whereas previously they were at liberty (in Hohfeld’s sense) to 
use the object, they no longer are. 
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 In addition to its neglect of the duty-creation aspect of appropriation, radical right-proprietarianism also 
suffers from being an adequate view of appropriation.  For instance, what if there is no first appropriator, 
but instead many first-acts of appropriation which occur simultaneously?  That is, imagine a case in which 
everyone in the world claims the world at exactly the same time.  I won’t spend extended time developing 
the ways in which radical right-proprietarians might try to account for cases of “simultaneous first 
claiming.”  But it is worth noting that no radical right-proprietarian has considered such a challenge of 
adequacy to their view, and it is far from obvious that a radical right-proprietarian could offered a 
compelling response to the case which preserved her principle of first claiming as necessary and sufficient 
for unilateral appropriation. 
 
65
 For an account that denies the tradition view, endorsed above, that Locke invoked “leaving enough and 
as good” for others as a necessary condition of appropriation see Jeremy Waldron’s, “Enough and as Good 
for Others,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 29:117 (1979), pp. 319-328.  
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One reason why such disadvantage is morally objectionable can be seen by 
reviewing our commitment to the initial condition of equal common use.  As noted 
earlier, initially everyone, within conditions of equal common use, had equal property 
rights in respect to common resources.  No one, initially with respect to rights over 
common resources, is at disadvantage to another.  No moral justification exists for why 
initially any agent would have a greater share of rights with respect to common resources 
than another agent.   
This commitment to initial conditions of equal common use wherein agents hold 
equal moral rights in respect to common resources would be almost meaningless if agents 
were allowed to appropriate in ways that disadvantaged others.  To see why consider that 
earlier we found it widely implausible that a “King” is simply born with greater moral 
rights over common resources than others.  But is it any more plausible to maintain that 
an agent can anoint himself “King” by simply exercising a moral power to appropriate 
common resources in such a fashion that serves him great advantage while disadvantages 
others?  I doubt it.  Our self-made King is every bit as morally objectionable as our King 
who was born possessing a greater set of rights over common resources than others.  
Allowing an agent the power to appropriate in a fashion that disadvantages others 
(especially when this is done easily by, for example, staking a claim) is no less morally 
objectionable than the rejection of equal common use and the endorsement of the King 
who by birth-right possess greater property rights over common resources.  In order to 
take seriously the core idea of equal common use, that being all agents possess equal 
rights over common resources, agents are not allowed to exercise the moral power of 
appropriation unless their appropriation does not disadvantage others.        
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Agents lack the moral power to appropriate unless they do so in a fashion 
consistent with leaving enough and as good for others.  Locke’s thought of leaving 
enough and as good for others captures the spirit of appropriating in a fashion that does 
not disadvantage others.  Agents are not permitted to appropriate all the valuable 
common resources and leave others less valuable common resources to appropriate or 
use.  (And they clearly may not, as allowed by the radical-right-proprietarian, appropriate 
all common resources and leave others nothing at all.) 
I take it that some version of the Lockean proviso is correct and hence I shall be 
endorsing some form of Lockean proprietarianism.  Where I understand Lockean 
proprietarianism as endorsing claiming and, some version of, “leaving enough and as 
good” as necessary and sufficient for appropriating common resources.66   I shall now 
proceed to address different accounts of Lockean proprietarianism. 
 Our discussion of Lockean proprietarianism shall begin by noting a distinction 
between ‘payment Lockean proprietarianism’ and ‘no payment Lockean 
proprietarianism’.67  All Lockean proprietarian accounts demand that an appropriator 
leave enough and as good for others.  One way in which an appropriator may satisfy the 
Lockean proviso is by appropriating only a share of common resources which leaves 
others enough and as good.  For example, we might imagine a world with one hundred 
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 Brian Kierland suggests that the Lockean proviso can be challenged on the grounds that it allows, in 
principle, all things to be privately appropriated.  But it plausible that (given certain facts about 
psychology) some things should be left in a condition of common use.  After all, some people might want 
to live a life of using common resources within conditions of equal common use (perhaps some Marxists 
would wish to live in such conditions).  I agree with Kierland’s suggestion that plausibly people could get a 
benefit, perhaps great benefit, to some common resources remaining within conditions of equal common 
use.  However, I don’t think this speaks again Lockean proprietarianism.  The Lockean proprietarian should 
happily admit that under many scenarios the disadvantage caused by an appropriation is so great that it 
places an effective bar against certain instances of appropriation.  The Lockean proprietarian endorses the 
view that, in principle, every common resource could be appropriated, but only when this ‘total 
appropriation’ does not serve to disadvantage others.     
 
67
 I thank Brian Kierland for bringing this distinction to my attention. 
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qualitatively identical agents and one thousand acres of land.  In a very simplistic fashion 
we might say that an agent may appropriate ten acres of land for herself leaving everyone 
else ten acres to appropriate.  No payment is required of an agent who appropriates only 
ten acres because she takes no more than her ‘enough and as good share’.  One version of 
Lockean proprietarianism, who I shall label ‘no payment Lockean proprietarianism’, 
maintains that an agent may appropriate only her ‘enough and as good share’ and no 
more.  An implication from no payment Lockean proprietarianism is that, in our situation 
above, no agent is morally allowed to appropriate more than ten acres of land.   
 No payment Lockean proprietarianism can be contrasted with payment Lockean 
proprietarianism.  Payment Lockean proprietarian accounts maintain that an agent may, 
in principle, appropriate as many common resources as she pleases just so long as she 
makes a payment which leaves enough and as good for others.  Considering again our 
case with one hundred agents and one thousand acres of land, payment Lockean 
proprietarian accounts maintain that an agent is morally allowed to appropriate more than 
ten acres of land provided that she makes a payment which leaves enough and as good for 
others. 
 In the treatment of Lockean proprietarianism which follows I shall only be 
considering various versions of payment, as opposed to no-payment, Lockean 
proprietarianism.  The reason for this is because payment Lockean proprietarian accounts 
are more plausible than no payment Lockean proprietarian views.  An appropriator 
should be allowed to appropriate as many common resources as they desire so long as her 
appropriation leaves enough and as good for others.   
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To illustrate a case which makes this clear consider a scenario in which everyone 
‘initial enough and as good share’ is very slight and as such everyone lives a life barely 
worth living.  However, if one super-genius agent is allowed to appropriate most all 
common resources he can manage the land in ways which benefit everyone ten-fold as 
compared with their initial position.  A no-payment view holds that this agent is morally 
barred from making this appropriation and greatly improving everyone’s life.  A payment 
view, on the hand, maintains that our super-genius can appropriate most all the common 
resources so long as he leaves others enough and as good.  And presumably if our super-
genius improves the lives of others by ten-fold he will have left enough and as good for 
others.  Plausible payment Lockean proprietarianism in this, and many similar cases, 
gives us the right result that appropriators may appropriate as much as they desires 
provided that they leave enough and as good for others.  The Lockean proprietarian 
accounts to follow will all be various versions of payment Lockean proprietarianism. 
Arguably, the most influential contemporary Lockean proprietarian is Robert 
Nozick.  Nozick, in Anarchy, State, and Utopia, offers an account of appropriation that 
takes the Lockean proviso seriously but implies that the proviso is rather easy to satisfy.  
He argues that: 
Nozickian Proprietarianism: You can appropriate a common resource if and only 
if you leave enough and as good of the remaining common resources for others, 
where leaving enough and as good is understood as leaving others enough such 
that their overall condition is no worse off as it would have been under the 
baseline of equal common use arrangement of common resources.68   
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 This formulization was drawn from Anarchy, pp. 174-182.  I emphasize overall conditions in my 
formalization of Nozick’s proviso because some has incorrectly interpreted Nozick as focusing, more 
narrowly, as making others no worse off in respect to material conditions.  Will Kymlica, for instance, 
makes this mistake.  In his Property Rights and the Self-Ownership Argument” in Left-Libertarianism and 
Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, eds. Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner (Palgrave, 2000), p. 295-
321.  Kymlica develops an often referenced line of attack charging Nozick’s proviso with ignoring the 
overall condition of agents within an arrangement of equal common use and focusing more narrowly on the 
material condition of agents with such arrangements.  As was helpfully pointed out to me by Michael 
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Nozick assumes that the conditions within an equal common use arrangement are quite 
bad.  Thus, measured against these bad conditions, it is fairly easy to satisfy the Lockean 
proviso.  This is because satisfying the proviso, according to Nozick, merely mandates 
that one leave enough and as good such that the overall condition of others is no worse 
off than it would have been under conditions of equal common use.  The ease at which an 
appropriator can satisfy Nozick’s treatment of the Lockean proviso depends upon the 
condition of others within an arrangement of equal common use.  And with the baseline 
of equal common use taken by Nozick to offer very poor conditions, the proviso becomes 
easily satisfied.69  
The most pressing criticisms lodged against Nozick’s proviso, coming from G.A. 
Cohen and others; take aim at Nozick’s endorsement of the comparative baseline of equal 
common use to assess whether an agent’s appropriation has disadvantaged others (left 
others worse off than they would have been within conditions of equal common use).70  
Cohen, for instance, asks why we should use equal common use (the initial first-order 
condition Nozick endorses) as the baseline when assessing whether one has left enough 
and as good for others.  Cohen suggests, though never substantively argues, that other 
                                                                                                                                                 
Otsuka, Nozick never in Anarchy places any narrow emphasis on making other no worse off with respect to 
only their material conditions within conditions of equal common use.  And in fact Nozick explicitly 
mentions, in a footnote on pages 178-9 of Anarchy, considering an agent’s overall “net loss” when 
evaluating whether an appropriation disadvantages another.     
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 As an empirical matter I take a much more positive outlook toward conditions of equal common use 
arrangements than does Nozick and as such maintain that his proviso will be much more demanding than 
he takes it to be.    
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 For a well-developed critique of Nozick’s views on appropriation see G.A. Cohen’s “Self-Ownership, 
World-Ownership, and Equality Parts I and II” in Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary 
Debate, eds. Peter Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner (Palgrave, 2000), p. 247-289.  Additionally, Will Kymlica 
further discusses some themes developed by Cohen critiquing Nozick’s account in, Property Rights and the 
Self-Ownership Argument” in Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, eds. Peter 
Vallentyne and Hillel Steiner (Palgrave, 2000), p. 295-321.     
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possibilities such as joint-control or joint-ownership might serve as more plausible 
baselines to assess whether an agent’s appropriation disadvantages others than Nozick’s 
preferred baseline of equal common use.  There are two questions worth addressing here.  
First why use a baseline for assessment at all, and second what, if a baseline should be 
used, should be the baseline? 
 The reason why using a baseline to assess whether an agent has left enough and as 
good for others is a reasonable approach is because when we ask, “did X leave Y enough 
and as good, or “did X disadvantage Y,” these questions implicitly demand a comparison 
class.  That is, “did x leave enough and as good for Y, compared to what” or “did X 
disadvantage Y compared to what state of affairs”?  Thus, I do not, nor does Cohen, 
object in principle to Nozick’s use of some baseline to provide a comparison class. 
 The relevant question then becomes: which baseline should be used to assess 
whether an appropriator has disadvantaged another or left another worse off.  Cohen 
offers two alternative baselines that he argues are plausibly preferable to Nozick’s 
preferred baseline of one’s condition within an arrangement of equal common use.  I 
shall now consider these alternative baselines offered by Cohen in turn.  First, I will 
consider what I take to be his weaker alternative baseline suggestion and then continue to 
consider his more plausible alternative baseline suggestion.                   
Cohen suggests that we could employ a baseline of the initial normative situation 
other than equal common use, e.g. joint-ownership or joint-control.  Nozick, Cohen 
charges, assumes without defense that the initial normative situation is one of equal 
common use, but this need not be the case, common resources could have been initially 
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jointly owed or controlled by everyone.71  And, as Cohen rightly suggests, if common 
resources were initially jointly owed or controlled by everyone then Nozick’s equal 
common use baseline is flawed. 
 Cohen is correct to note Nozick’s almost non-existent defense of equal common 
use as the correct way to understand the initial normative situation of common resources.  
But if my defense of equal common use earlier in this chapter is correct, then Nozick did 
ala his Lockean assumptions (despite his slight treatment) correctly identify the initial 
normative situation of common resources.  Given earlier arguments in this chapter, I do 
not share Cohen’s optimism regarding joint-ownership or other alternatives as plausible 
ways to the initial normative situation of equal common use.  Nozick is correct to note 
that the initial first-order situation is one of equal common use and that others ways to 
understand this initial condition simply are not plausible.         
 The more plausible of Cohen’s alternative baseline suggestions utilizes, not 
surprisingly, the notion of equal common use.  Cohen asks us to imagine the following 
case where two agents (A and B) are the only agents in a world with arrangements of 
equal common use: 
To see that Nozick’s condition on appropriation is too weak, consider now a 
different counterfactual situation, not that in which common use persists but one 
in which B, perhaps concerned lest A do so, appropriates what A appropriates in 
the actual situation.  Suppose that B is also a good organizer, and that had he 
appropriated he could have gotten an additional q (product) and paid A only an 
additional p (some price for A’s labor).  Then although A’s appropriation in the 
actual situation satisfies Nozick’s proviso, it does not seem that A has what he 
does have on Nozick’s view, the right to force B to accept it.  For why should B 
be required to accept what amounts to a doctrine of “first come, first served.”?  
Perhaps B abstained from appropriating out of a regard for A.  Ought A to profit 
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 Cohen, 260-261 (Part I). 
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only because he is more ruthless than B.  It should be clear now that Nozick’s 
proviso is too weak.72 
 
Cohen’s core idea above and in other similar cases he develops is that when we consider 
the relevant baseline to assess the disadvantage caused by an appropriation we should not 
focus on the “actual conditions” of others remaining within conditions of equal common 
use.  This is the wrong counterfactual to focus upon.  We should, instead, utilize different 
counterfactuals to establish a baseline assessing disadvantage including, especially, 
counterfactuals regarding what the condition of others would be if common resources 
were appropriated by someone who did not appropriate the resource in the actual 
situation.  Should we utilize a different counterfactual situation (along the lines that 
Cohen suggests) than that offered by Nozick to assess the disadvantage to others brought 
about by an appropriation? 
Cohen never directly tells us what the relevant counterfactual establishing a 
comparative baseline ought to be.  He tells us, instead, that there seem to be cases (such 
as the case referenced on the last page) where Nozick’s counterfactual fails to correctly 
assess the disadvantage brought about by an appropriation.  This is because we could 
have situations in which disadvantage should we assessed not by the baseline of an agent 
remaining within an equal common use arrangement (Nozick’s suggestion) but instead by 
considering what the situation of an agent would be if an agent different from the actual 
appropriator had appropriated common resources from conditions of equal common use. 
 Cohen’s counterfactual, in order for his critique to succeed, must offer something 
stronger than Nozick’s counterfactual.  After all, Cohen thinks that Nozick’s baseline is 
too weak in that it under-estimates the disadvantage brought about by an appropriation. 
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 Cohen, 259 (Part I). 
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But what would this look like?  Cohen, might, at this juncture offering the following 
counterfactual to establish the baseline of disadvantage brought about by an 
appropriation. 
*the condition of A under some arrangement involving the appropriation of X 
that leaves him better off than he would be should he continue to live under 
conditions of equal common use. 
 Here I do not want to become entrenched in a debate concerning whether Nozick 
has the correct counterfactual or whether Cohen’s proposed counterfactual is superior.  I 
shall note, however, that Cohen has offered plausible reason for thinking that there do 
seem to be cases in which the Nozickian baseline is not stringent enough and hence fails 
to capture what it means for a person to appropriate in a fashion which leaves enough and 
as good for others (does not disadvantage others). 
Before offering my own concerns with Nozick’s account, I should say first what I 
find attractive about his account.  First, his appeal to considering the overall conditions of 
agents who could be disadvantaged by an appropriation seems right.  What we should be 
concerned about when assessing the disadvantage brought about by an appropriation is 
the negative impact on overall condition.  Nozick is also correct to maintain that this 
impact on overall condition brought about by an appropriation should be assessed in 
relation to some comparative baseline. 
Is Nozick’s comparative baseline to assess the disadvantage brought about by an 
appropriation correct or is it, as Cohen and others have suggested, not stringent enough to 
adequately capture what it means to leave enough and as good for others?  Nozick’s 
account is I maintain, in a crucial aspect, monumentally incomplete.  My core challenge 
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to Nozick’s account of appropriation (which serves as the foundation for my account of 
left-proprietarianism defended in the next chapter) is that he fails to properly consider the 
ramification that very often the ownership rights over common resources will have a 
(substantial) competitive, market, value.  That is ownership rights over, common 
resources, will often be worth a great deal of competitive value.  The right of control-
ownership over a stretch of beach-front, for example, would normally have a substantial 
competitive value.  Nozick ignores the possibility, which I will consider at greater length 
in the next chapter and endorse, that all agents have an initial property right, against 
appropriators, to be left a share of the competitive value of the rights that appropriators 
claim and come to have over common resources.      
Nozick’s account of appropriation has the implication that the first to claim a 
common resource can reap all the competitive value from the common resource(s) she 
appropriate just so long as she does not disadvantage others consistent with his proposed 
baseline.  Nozick’s account would allow someone to reap a huge benefit from her 
appropriation (gain millions of dollars in competitive value) and leave others very little 
(no competitive value at all).  Such an implication helps show us that Nozick’s account of 
appropriation offers us a far too lax a treatment of what it means for an appropriator to 
leave enough and as good for others.  I have suggested that first-claimers have a moral 
advantage to appropriate common resources, but this is a far cry from suggesting, as 
Nozick’s view implies, that an appropriator may unproblematically gain (potentially) vast 
amounts of competitive value from common resources while leaving none of this value 
for others.   
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We can treat Nozick’s proposed baseline as offering us a minimum of what an 
appropriator must pay to ensure that her appropriation does not disadvantage others.  I 
shall refer to this minimum that an appropriator must pay, consistent with Nozick’s 
proposed baseline, as a minimum appropriation payment.  When, however, an agent’s 
appropriation affords her competitive value in excess of this minimum appropriation 
payment she must pay others, in a fashion to be specified in the next chapter, the 
competitive value (given that this amount is greater that the minimum appropriation 
payment) of the rights she claims over the common resources she appropriates.         
In the next chapter I shall develop a left-proprietarian account of appropriation 
that offers greater specificity to and defense of the idea, sketched above, that in order to 
leave enough and as good for others an appropriator must pay73 either the greater of the 
minimum appropriation payment or the competitive value of the ownership rights they 
claim over common resources. 74 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
73
 Note that if an agent appropriates only her ‘initial enough and as good’ share she need not pay anything 
other than merely leaving others their ‘initial enough and as good’ shares.     
 
74
 It is important to note here that the left-proprietarians, whose views I shall now consider, all tend to 
endorse the self-ownership of agents and are such endorse some variant of left-libertarianism.  But as I 
noted earlier libertarianism is a sub-species of proprietarianism and as such these left-libertarian thinks are, 
in a broader sense, left-proprietarians. 
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CHPATER FOUR: APPROPRIATION PART II: IN DEFENSE OF GEORGIST 
EQUAL INITIAL OPPORTUNITY FOR WELFARE LEFT-
PROPRIETARIANISM 
 
 
 
Arguably the most influential left-proprietarian has been Henry George.75  An influential 
nineteenth-century American economist and social reformer, he argued in Progress and 
Poverty that the existent system of private property was the primary reason for poverty 
and social inequality.76  Private property in, for instance, land allows the private owner of 
the land to exclusively benefit from the rental value of land as well as the unearned 
increase in the land’s value.  The rental value of land is simply the amount of money one 
can gain from renting her land to others and the unearned increase in the value of land is 
the increasing competitive value of land that results from market conditions as opposed to 
contributions by the land owner.   This leaves non-private-owners of land and other 
common resources out in the cold (sometimes literally).   
George argued that those who appropriate privately unowned land and other 
common resources are obligated to pay a rent (of 100%) on the competitive rent values of 
the property rights over the resources that they claim and appropriate.  Competitive rent 
is the market clearing price of the rights, where that is the price at which there is no left 
supply and no unmet demand.  George further argued that agents could appropriate up to 
                                                 
75
 George, despite having been raised in poverty and receiving only a seventh grade formal education, 
became one of the most recognized and celebrated American intellectuals of the nineteenth century.  His 
most famous work, Progress and Poverty sold millions of copies throughout the world.  Further, George’s 
left-proprietarianism has influenced the tax code in Australia, parts of Canada, the United States, and 
numerous other countries.      
 
76
 As an interesting historical point, George was not influenced, at all, by Marx.  George’s only fluent 
language was English and the works of Marx had not been translated into English at the time of George’s 
writing.  It would be inaccurate to consider George a Marxist.  Where Marx found an intrinsic evil in the 
notion of private property, George did not.  George did think private property owners were obligated to pay 
a 100% tax on the competitive rents on the rights claimed over common resources, but he did not think, 
unlike Marx, that private property was intrinsically bad.  
69  
 
 
an equal share of common resources without, effectively, owing others competitive rent.  
This is because George took the view, as we will see later defended by Hillel Steiner, that 
all agents have an initial right to an equal share of the competitive value of all common 
resources.  If an agent, “over-appropriated,” more than her equal share of the competitive 
value afforded by common resources, only then did she effectively owe rent to others. 
George’s own preference toward a type of equal-share model noted above aside 
we can formalize the general Georgist proprietarian view toward appropriation as 
follows.  Note that the below formalization (and further treatments of various Georgist 
accounts I shall consider) will utilize the idea of the minimum appropriation payment 
presented at the end of the last chapter in relation to Nozick’s account of appropriation.  
Shortly, I will speak toward the issue of why a plausible Georgist account would utilize 
the notion of a minimum appropriation payment (be it Nozickan inspired or otherwise). 
Georgism (general model):  You can appropriate a common resource X if and 
only if you are the first to claim the ownership rights over X and leave others the 
greater of (a) the full competitive rent value of the property rights you claim over 
X to the appropriate agent(s) or (b) the minimum appropriation payment. 
 
Note that the competitive rent (value) that an agent must pay when she appropriates a 
common resource is over the set of property rights that she claims.  Common resources 
per se do not have a competitive rent value, strictly speaking only a set of ownership 
rights in respect to common resources have a competitive value.  Thus, whenever paying 
the full competitive rent value of common resources is referred to this reference will 
always be in respect to a set of property rights an appropriator claims over a common 
resource.        
As discussed earlier, at a minimum the relevant right(s) that an agent claims when 
she appropriates common resources is the claim right that others must get her permission 
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or not act against her interests in order to use the object which she comes to privately 
own.77  Of course, an appropriator might claim more ownership rights over a common 
resource than the above right conferring control-ownership, e.g., the right to transfer a 
common resource via sell or gift.  An appropriator must pay the full competitive rent on 
all the rights they claim over common resources irrespective of whether this is the 
minimal ownership right of control-ownership or a more robust set of ownership rights.  
 Georgist proponents have traditionally held that agents need not pay any rents on 
common resources which they merely use and do not appropriate.  Later, in the next 
chapter, we will see that this traditional treatment of use, or lack thereof, from the 
Georgist, is highly problematic.  But in this chapter we shall not pay attention to this 
deficiency.       
The idea motivating George’s proposed rent is simple, yet quite powerful.  
Appropriators should leave others the full competitive value of the rights over common 
resources which (through their appropriation) they have removed from conditions of 
equal common use.  Everyone, after all, has the same set of property rights in respect to 
common resources and if an agent removes a common resource from this condition and 
claims ownership rights (appropriates), then she must leave others the full competitive 
value of the rights she claims in order to leave others enough and as good.      
Accordingly, I maintain that agents have an initial right to be left, a share (to be 
specified later), of the full competitive value of the rights over common resources that 
appropriators of such resources claim.  And, consistent with my earlier treatment of 
                                                 
77
 Notice, however, that a more expansive set of ownership rights can also be incorporated into a Georgist 
model.  An agent must pay the competitive value of the “bundle of property rights” she claims over 
privately unowned common resources.  This could, of course, be extended to account for a greater set of 
property rights that I consider in this project.      
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rights, appropriators have a duty to leave others, a share (to be specified later) of the full 
competitive value of the rights over common resources that they claim ownership over.  
An agent cannot exercise the moral power to appropriate a common resource unless she 
fulfills her duty to leave others the full competitive value of the rights she claims over the 
resource. 
Clearly, competitive rent value plays a central role in our general Georgist 
account.  Hence, it is worth evaluating how the Georgist proposes that we should 
determine the competitive value of rights over common resources.  There are many 
different ways in which competitive value might be determined.78  One particularly 
promising way, which I favor, to determine competitive value is by utilizing the model of 
a hypothetical Vickrey auction.  This model maintains that the parties to the hypothetical 
auction seal the highest bid which they are willing to pay for the item (in our case 
ownership rights over a common resource) and the highest bidder pays the second highest 
price for the auctioned item.79  The second highest bid for the item represents the item’s 
competitive value.  A Vickrey auction gives agents an incentitive to bid their true 
preferences because they know they will either be outbid for the item or (if they are the 
highest bidder) or pay a price less than the bid expressing their true preferences.  For 
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 Two different ways of assessing how competitive value should be determined popular in the economic 
literature are by utilizing an assuming of either perfectly competitive markets or various auction models.  
The more plausible strategy, I suggest, for assessing how competitive value is determined is by employing 
some type of auction model. Employing an auction model allows us to ask what something (a common 
resource) would fetch at an auction in the specific cases we are examining (as opposed to replying on 
highly abstract constraints of “perfect markets,” and as such seems like a better test of what the competitive 
value is of something in any particular scenario.   
 
79
 A Vickrey auction has the advantage over a traditional auction (where the highest bidder pays there 
actual bid for the item) because it encourages agents to bid their true preferences.  In a traditional auction 
one has no good reason to bid the full value of what the item is worth to them.  If having an item is worth 
exactly ten units of value to an agent then that agent is indifferent to having the item or ten dollars and as 
such has no good reason to bid ten units.  But if the agent knows that they will get the item at the second 
highest price bid then they do have good reason to bid the full price they are willing to pay for the item.       
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example, assume that an auction has two agents bidding on one item X, the first agent 
seals a bid of fifteen dollars for X and the second agent seals a bid of ten dollars for X.  
The competitive value of X is now set at ten dollars. 
I should point out here that there are very complicated questions concerning the 
relation between a hypothetical auction model and real world agents.  For instance, how 
is the hypothetical auction, which determines competitive value, related to the actual 
world with real world actors?  Here, I maintain that the hypothetical auction should be 
thought to closely approximate real world conditions and agents.  The agents bidding in 
the hypothetical Vickery auction, for instance, should be thought to be much like agents 
in the actual world we are concerned with.  The hypothetical nature of the auction simply 
brings these agents together in an auction (which might not be possible in the actual 
world given distance and other pragmatic considerations) and addresses certain epistemic 
limitations of real world agents.                        
It is important to be clear about what it is that the Georgist demands appropriators 
leave the full competitive value of.  The Georgist only demands that appropriators leave 
the full competitive value on the rights claimed over common resources which they 
appropriate.  Appropriators are not obligated to pay rents on the labor or ingenuity which 
they opt to add to common resources once they appropriate such resources.80  A payment 
is not required on what an agent adds to the world.  A payment is only required when an 
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 In Real Libertarianism (1995) Philippe Van Parijs argues that in addition to Georgist rents paid over the  
property rights that an agent claims over privately unowned common resources, agents should also pay 
rents (to up to 100% of the value) over all assets that were “given” to an agent.  Thus, Van Parijs would 
have no objection to agents having to pay the full value of the competitive rents over the labor which they 
add to common resources.  An interesting proposal, which I won’t develop here, in the spirit of Van Parijs, 
is a version of quasi-Georgism which holds an agent must pay the competitive value over everything she 
claims ownership over which she is not morally responsible for bringing about.  This view would likely 
imply that agents owe competitive rent on their bodies (at least in the case where an agent claims 
ownership of her body).           
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agent exercises the moral power to appropriate and removes a common resource from its 
initial condition of equal common use thereby depriving others of the moral liberty to use 
the appropriated common resource without the appropriator’s permission. 
Additionally, it is worth noting that the competitive value of common resources 
will be contingent upon technology and the preferences of agents.  If, for example, more 
agents prefer to live on the beachfront rather than a barren desert (and claim, for instance, 
the right to exclude others from the beachfront when the other’s use of the beachfront 
occurs without their permission or against their interest), then it will, given supply and 
demand pressures, cost an agent more to appropriate parts of the beachfront, than it will 
cost her to appropriate parts of the barren desert.  The right to exclude others from a 
parcel of beachfront land will be worth more than the right to exclude others from a 
parcel of land in the barren desert.  But if, for whatever reason, the preferences of agents 
flip-flop, then the competitive value of ocean fronts and barren deserts will also change.  
Technological abilities, moreover, could also influence the competitive value of rights 
claimed over common resources.  For example, a remote desert island that can receive a 
satellite internet connection will be in higher demand, and hence have a higher 
competitive value, than a remote desert island that cannot receive a satellite connection.81 
 Here it is worth saying a bit to explain why the general Georgist account under 
consideration utilizes the idea of a minimum appropriation payment.  What work is the 
minimum appropriation payment doing in our general Georgist account of appropriation?  
To see why a Georgist account should be supplemented with a minimum appropriation 
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 Given the (strong) potential for changing competitive rents over time a Georgist model is likely to 
endorse a scheme of leasing, where agents pay for the competitive rent value over property rights 
contingent upon rent changing.  The rent over one’s private property could go up or down given changes in 
empirical conditions.  Thus the competitive value that one must pay is not static over time.   
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payment consider the following case where A and B exist within conditions of equal 
common use.  It means a great deal to A that common resource X remain within 
conditions of equal common use (If X were to remain within conditions of equal common 
use, then A will have 1000 units of well-being).  A doesn’t want to appropriate X (A 
wouldn’t pay anything to appropriate X because if she were to appropriate X her well-
being would be reduced from 1000 units to 500 units).  Indeed, A would pay a great deal 
for others not to appropriate X.  B, on the other hand, has a slight preference to 
appropriate X and would pay only ten units for the ownership rights he would like to 
claim in respect to X (B’s well-being will increase from 1000 to 1010 if he appropriates 
X).  B stakes his claim to X and leaves A, being the good Georgist he is, the competitive 
rent value of the rights he claims over X (for simplicity, let’s say that the competitive rent 
value of the rights claimed over X is ten units).  The ten units, however, which B leaves 
A does not being to compensate A’s loss in well-being. 
 The above case suggests I maintain that an appropriator’s leaving others the 
competitive value of the rights claimed over common resources will not always ensure 
that others are left enough and as good.  This is because there could be cases in which an 
agent would pay a great deal (not to have ownership rights over a common resource) but 
instead to keep a common resource within conditions of equal common use.  As 
discussed at the conclusion of the last chapter, an appropriator must ensure, consistent 
with the idea of a minimum appropriation payment, that his appropriation makes others 
no worse off that they would have been within conditions of equal common use.  Of 
course, if agents have a right, as I maintain they do, to be left a share of the full 
competitive value of common resources, then the minimum appropriation will not 
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(typically) exhaust what an appropriator must leave others.  For these reasons I maintain 
that a plausible Georgism must have a provision ensuring that an appropriate leave the 
greater of either the competitive rent value of the rights they claim in respect to common 
resources or the minimum appropriation payment.       
The general Georgist view, specified above, is silent (although it was noted that 
George himself was not silent) as to who an appropriator must pay the full competitive 
value of the rights that she claims over common resources, it merely mentions making 
this payment to the appropriate agent(s).  Providing an answer to the question: who are 
the appropriate agents to whom Georgist rent is owed, will distinguish, and be used to 
assess the plausibility of, the various Georgist accounts we shall consider in this chapter.  
Further, all extant developed Georgist views are left-proprietarian in character.82  Thus 
the question of: who are the appropriate agents to whom Georgist rent is owed, will be of 
important significance as we proceed to uncover the most plausible version of a left-
proprietarian account of appropriation.  Of course, there are other non-Georgist left-
proprietarian accounts of appropriation, for example Michael Otsuka’s account of 
appropriation that I will address later in this chapter, but at this juncture I maintain that 
some Georgist, or closely related account of appropriation, is good place to uncover our 
most plausible version of left-proprietarianism.     
The Georgist says that appropriators have a duty to leave the competitive value of 
the rights over the common resources which they appropriate, but what should be done 
with these rents?  Who are the appropriate agents to whom Georgist rent is owed?  
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 It is possible to imagine Georgist accounts of appropriation that are not left-proprietarian in character, but 
I will only be considering Georgist accounts of appropriation that are consistent with left-proprietarianism.  
I won’t, for example, be considering Georgist models in which the rent on competitive value paid by 
appropriators is distributed, in full, to “the King”.  
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Traditionally Georgists, e.g., George, Steiner, Tideman, Arthur, endorse an equal share 
model in which rents are split in an equal fashion amongst all agents.  Other Georgists, 
such as, Vallentyne, endorse a distribution of Georgists rents that is, “divided so as to 
promote effective equality for a good life.”83  I shall now proceed to discuss both of these 
proposed methods of distributing Georgist rent. 
The Georgist equal share model maintains that everyone has a right to their share 
of an equal distribution of the full competitive rent value on the rights claimed over 
common resources.  Hillel Steiner, an influential contemporary Georgist, is a proponent 
of the equal share model.  Steiner argues that initially all agents possess a just claim 
(property right) to be left an equal share of the full competitive rent value on the rights 
claimed over common resources.84  The duty to leave others a per capita share of the 
competitive rent value of common resources correlates with the right of all agents to be 
left an equal share of the competitive rent value of common resources. 
  Here we can formalize the equal share Georgist model, focusing on the 
appropriation of a single common resource, as follows: 
Equal Share Georgism:  You can appropriate a common resource X if and only if 
you are the first to claim the ownership rights over X and leave others the greater 
of (a) their per capita share of the competitive rent value of X or (b) the minimum 
appropriation payment. 
 
To illustrate this model consider a world, housing only Able and Unable, in which 
the full competitive rent value of X (where X is the only common resource) is 1000 units 
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 Nic Tideman and Peter Vallentyne, “Left-Libertarianism and Global Justice,” in Human Rights in 
Philosophy and Practice edited by Bruton M. Leiser and Tom Campbell (Ashgate, 2001) 451. 
 
84
 Steiner argues that when common resources are unowned agents have an initial right to an equal share of 
these resources, but that, “in a fully appropriated world, “each agent’s original right to an equal portion of 
initially unowned things amounts to a right to an equal share of their total value.”  Steiner understands this 
value to be measured by Georgist competitive rent.  For reasons of simplicity, I am treating Steiner as 
generally suggesting that agents have a right to an equal share of the value of common resources and not 
some equal share of common resources per se. 
77  
 
 
of competitive value.  (In this case and in future cases where these labels are used, Able 
is a normally functioning human and Unable is a quadriplegic.)  The equal share model 
maintains that the first to claim X may appropriate X provided that they leave the other 
500 units of competitive value (assuming this leaving is greater than the minimum 
appropriation payment).  Each is entitled to be left 500 units of competitive value by the 
other assuming that an appropriation of X occurs. 
Consider the modification to our above case in which there are two common 
resources in our world housing Able and Unable, one common resource worth 900 units 
of competitive value and another common resource worth 100 units of competitive value.  
Here again, the competitive value of common resources is 1000 units of competitive 
value.  Able opts to appropriate common resources worth 900 units of competitive value, 
leaving Unable common resources worth only 100 units of competitive value.  Is this 
allowable according to the equal share model?   
Steiner’s answer is that Able’s “over-appropriation” is allowable as long as he 
“redresses” Unable with a “total leaving” no less than her per capita equal share of the 
competitive value of common resources.85  Unable has a right to be left 500 units of 
competitive value (her equal division of the competitive value of common resources) and 
if Able were to leave her only 100 units of competitive value then he would be infringing 
a property right she holds.  But so long as Able finds some way, e.g., laboring, or 
transferring artifacts he owns to Unable, of leaving her a total of 500 units of competitive 
value, then his appropriation of the common resource that has a competitive value of 900 
units is allowable. 
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 An Essay on Rights, 268. 
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One can, nonetheless, object to an equal share Georgist model on the grounds that 
it is problematically insensitive to egalitarian considerations.86  The equal share model 
rendered the implication that the full competitive rent value of common resources should 
be distributed to leave each Able and Unable with an equal 500 units of competitive 
value.  But imagine that these 500 units of value afford Able a truly fantastic life, but 
Unable, who is a quadriplegic, perishes with the 500 units she is left (she will perish 
unless she gets 600 units of value).  The 500 units of value that Able leaves Unable are 
not enough to sustain her life.  Further (and importantly), the differences in the enjoyment 
of the units of value are not the fault of (or result of choices made by) either Able or 
Unable.  It isn’t Unable’s fault that 500 units of competitive value are not enough to 
sustain her life.   
The equal division of the competitive value of common resources, mandated by 
the equal share model, is unfair to Unable because, through no fault of her own, her share 
affords her much less opportunity for well-being than Able’s share affords him.  Equal 
share Georgism endorses a distribution of competitive rent value that affords Able a 
wonderful life and Unable no life at all.  The primary problem with equal share Georgism 
is its insensitivity to the well-being, or opportunity of well-being, of agents.  The equal 
division of competitive rent value of common resources advocated by the equal share 
model, as we saw in our last case, has the very strong potential to ignore the unchosen 
special needs or disadvantages of agents. 
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 Steiner seems to be aware of this shortcoming and attempts to resolve, at least some of, this difficulty by 
endorsing the thought that genetic germ-line material is a common resource and that the parents of children 
must pay the competitive value of their offspring’s genetic germ-line material.  The result of this line of 
thought is highly controversial and I restrict my discussion of it to this note.   
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A minimal treatment of how Lockean proprietarianism can be sensitive to the 
survivability and well-being of agents is found in a suggestion offered by John Simmons, 
in his Lockean Theory of Rights.87  Simmons puts forward the suggestion, although he 
doesn’t endorse it, that an agent who appropriates common resource(s) has the moral 
obligation to leave enough so that other agents can, at least, enjoy subsistence.88  We can 
label this position subsistence-proprietarianism.  Put formally: 
Subsistence-Proprietarianism:  You can appropriate common resource X if and 
only if you are the first to claim ownership rights over X and leave others the 
greater of (a) enough common resources or competitive value of common 
resources for others such that each may subsist (or, if there is not enough for 
everyone to subsist, one takes no more than a subsistence share) or (b) the 
minimum appropriation payment. 
 
Subsistence-proprietarianism claims that an appropriator has a duty, if more than a 
subsistence share for others remains after he has appropriated a subsistence share, to 
leave a subsistence share for others.  Unlike radical-right proprietarianism, Nozickian 
proprietarianism, and equal share Georgism, subsistence proprietarianism maintains that 
appropriators have a duty to leave others (assuming there is enough to do so) a 
subsistence share. 
 This view, at least in the earlier case of Able and Unable, is an improvement 
because Able, according to subsistence-proprietarianism, has the obligation to leave 
Unable, at least, enough to subsist when she appropriates at least a subsistence share of 
common resources.  Subsistence-proprietarianism better accounts than equal share 
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 A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992) pp. 291. 
 
88
 Note that the appeal to subsistence here can be altered to account for more robust version of the general 
idea.  For example, we could also invoke versions of minimally-decent-life proprietarianism, or decent-life 
proprietarianism.   
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Georgism for the duty that Able has to leave Unable enough and as good.89  Unable dies 
under a scheme of equal share Georgism, but she, at least, enjoys subsistence within a 
scheme of subsistence-proprietariansim. 
 But noting that, in some cases, subsistence-proprietarianism is an improvement 
over equal share Georgism should not lead us to endorse subsistence-proprietarianism.  
Subsistence-proprietarianism is not morally demanding enough of appropriators.  
Consider, again our two agent world housing Sarah and Bill (two normal human agents).  
Sarah attempts to appropriate all common resources in a world flush with resources 
except a small subsistence plot that she leaves Bill.  Sarah, very plausibly, hasn’t fulfilled 
her moral duty to leave enough and as good for others (Bill).  She gains a tremendous 
degree of well-being from her appropriation, and she leaves Mark only enough to subsist.  
Grant also, that the minimum appropriation payment would not afford Mark any greater 
leaving than a subsistence-share.  We should reject subsistence-proprietarianism.  We 
can, nonetheless, learn a lesson from the way in which the view does take into account, 
albeit minimally, how a leaving of common resources (or their competitive value) should 
take into account how this impacts the life-prospects of others.    
 To make equal share Georgism more plausible we can take a lead from 
subsistence-proprietariansim and augment equal share Georgism with a subsistence 
condition.  Here let subsistence adjusted equal share be a share which affords everyone, 
where possible, a subsistence-share and where any remaining competitive value of 
common resources is divided so as to give agents as close to an equal share as possible.  
                                                 
89
 I stress that generally equal share Georgism will better account for the duty to leave others enough and as 
good than subsistence-proprietariansim.  But a proponent of equal share Georgism should be very 
concerned that we can easily imagine cases, such as the present Able and Unable example, in which 
subsistence-proprietarianism seems quite plausible to better account for the duty of appropriators than equal 
share Georgism.   
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Consistent with this view we could say that agents have a right that appropriators leave 
them a subsistence-share of common resources and where the competitive value of 
common resources affords more than a subsistence-share for everyone they have a right 
to be left a share of the competitive value of common resources which best approximates 
an equal share.  We can spell out a subsistence sensitive version of equal share Georgism 
in the following way: 
Subsistence Equal Share Georgism: You can appropriate a common resource X if 
and only if you are the first to claim ownership rights over X and leave others the 
greater of (a) their subsistence adjusted equal share (or, if there is not enough for 
everyone to subsist, one takes no more than a subsistence share) or (b) the 
minimum appropriation payment. 
 
To illustrate Subsistence Equal Share Georgism consider a world housing only Able and 
Unable which contains common resources worth 1000 units of competitive value.  
Unable needs 600 units of competitive value to subsist and Able needs only one unit to 
subsist.  Subsistence equal share Georgism informs us that Unable has a right to be left 
600 units of the competitive value of common resources (if Able appropriates), while 
Able has a right to be left 400 units of competitive value (if Unable appropriates).  Able 
has a right to be left the entire 399 units of competitive value in excess of subsistence-
shares for himself and Unable as this leaving best approximates an equal share for 
everyone. 
 This new subsistence-sensitive version of equal share Georgism is an 
improvement to both subsistence-proprietarianism and traditional equal share Georgism.  
This hybrid view, however, is still problematic.  For instance, let’s add to our above 
example and consider what the units of competitive value actually signify in terms of life 
prospects for Able and Unable.  Able lives a fantastic life with the 400 units of 
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competitive value from common resources that he has a right to be left, while Unable 
lives a life barely worth living with the 600 units of competitive value he has a right to be 
left.  Able gains vast opportunities to live a good life from his appropriation but leaves 
Unable just enough to have opportunities to scrounge by.90  Able, even though he has met 
the demands of subsistence equal share Georgism, has not left enough and as good for 
others.      
The problem with subsistence equal share Georgism, like traditional equal share 
Georgism, is that the view is still squarely focused on appropriators leaving others some 
equal share of the competitive value of common resources without taking into account, 
beyond the notion of subsistence, how these resources actually impact the lives of agents.  
A resourcist approach toward understanding the duties of appropriators is flawed.  When 
considering whether an agent has left enough and as good for others we should be 
primarily concerned with how her leaving impacts the opportunities and life prospects of 
others and not with the material amount of resources per se that an appropriator leaves 
others.    
The question, when assessing whether an appropriator has satisfied her duty 
toward others, should not primarily be, “how much, in terms of material amount, did the 
appropriator leave others,” but instead, “how does the amount that the appropriator has 
left affect the life prospects of others or the opportunities of others.”  The reason why the 
emphasis should be placed upon the condition of agents as opposed to a specific material 
amount of resources left is because, at base, what we should care about is how the leaving 
actually impacts the life of others.  We shouldn’t become fetishistic about the amount of 
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  Or alternatively, if Unable appropriators he may only appropriate what amount to a subsistence-share of 
common resources and leave Able an amount of competitive value that affords Able a fantastic life. 
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resources that are left by an appropriator.  Our emphasis should be on agents (how a 
leaving by an appropriator impacts them) and not ultimately concerned with the material 
amount of resources per se that an appropriator leaves others.   
One reason in favor of adopting an approach that favors paying much closer 
attention to the impacts on agents of an appropriator’s leaving as opposed to the amount 
of resources that an appropriator’s leave others is to ask: why, at base, would an agent 
appropriate common resources?  Ultimately, the reason(s) (in normal cases, maybe in all 
cases) will have to do with the positive impact that appropriation provides the agent, e.g., 
increased autonomy, increased well-being, and so forth. The bottom line is that agents 
appropriate, or would want to appropriate, common resources because appropriation 
provides a positive impact in their life (an increase in life prospects, autonomy, well-
being, and so forth).  It would be a gross disconnect if the duty of appropriators to leave 
others enough and as good focused primarily on something other than how an 
appropriator’s leaving impacted the lives of others.  The thought here is simply that when 
we assess what it means for an appropriator to leave others enough and as good we 
shouldn’t stray far from the very reasons that motivate agents to appropriate common 
resources in the first place and these reasons will have, primarily, to do with impacts on 
life prospects and the such and not on a concern with amounts of resources per se. 
Can the Georgist say anything to better address, than the Georgist accounts we 
have considered thus far, how the duty of appropriators to leave enough and as good 
should be sensitive to how such leaving impacts the lives of others?  The answer here is, 
fortunately for the Georgist, yes.  For example, Peter Vallentyne argues for a Georgist 
model in which, “the rent payments should be divided so as to promote effective equality 
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of opportunity for a good life.”91  Here I understand an equal opportunity for a good life 
to have no important differences with an equal opportunity for welfare.  This is to say the 
greater an agent’s opportunities for a good life the greater her opportunities for welfare.  
Before developing a Georgist account of appropriation which is sensitive, in the fashion 
Vallentyne’s suggests, to agent’s being left a share of the competitive value of common 
resources which best promotes an equal opportunity for welfare a few cursory notes in 
respect to equal opportunity for welfare are in order. 
Equality is a goal worth promoting and that the correct treatment of effective 
equality is focused toward the equalization of agents’ initial opportunities for welfare.  
But noting that equality is a goal worth promoting does not tell yet address the question: 
equality of what is worth promoting.  When considering an answer to the question, 
equality of what: initial opportunity for welfare is a plausible reply.92  Focusing our 
attention toward the equalization of agents’ initial opportunity for welfare is not 
unwarranted.  Earlier we considered an equal share Georgist model, and noted that the 
problem with this model was its narrow focus on equalizing the distribution of the 
competitive value of common resources (without any sensitivity for how this equal 
distribution affected agents’ lives).  One move to avoid this problem, not considered 
explicitly here, is to move to equality of resources more generally, where this includes 
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 Nic Tideman and Peter Vallentyne, “Left-Libertarianism and Global Justice,” in Human Rights in 
Philosophy and Practice edited by Bruton M. Leiser and Tom Campbell (Ashgate, 2001) 451.  Vallentyne 
does provide the caveats that his model does not allow leveling down and it assumes Pareto optimal 
arrangements.  I think these caveats are highly plausible. 
 
92
 We find many different well-developed answers the question: equality of what?  For instance, a few of 
the highly debated answers we find include: - equality of social primary goods, e.g., Rawls; - equality of 
resources, e.g., Steiner, Dworkin; - equality of well-being, e.g., Temkin; - equality of opportunity of 
welfare, e.g., Arneson, Cohen.  For defenses of equal opportunity for welfare (or well-being) as the correct 
metric of material equality see Richard Arneson, “Equality and Equality of Opportunity of Welfare”, 
Philosophical Studies, 56 (1989): 77-93.  and G.A Cohen, “On the Currency of Egalitarian Justice”, Ethics, 
99 (1989): 906-44. 
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both external and internal resources.93  Although this is a controversial topic, I shall 
assume that equality of something related to well-being (welfare) is the relevant 
conception of effective equality.       
Furthermore, we can distinguish between views that maintain that welfare per se 
should be equalized from views which maintain that initial opportunities for welfare 
should be equalized.  The latter views are more plausible than the former.  (Earlier, there 
were a number of occasions in which I spoke of an agent’s welfare or her opportunities 
for welfare.  I spoke in this fashion loosely to avoid being entangled in the broader debate 
that I now speak toward.)  This is because, plausibly, the free choices that agents make 
should, for better or worse, influence their well-being.94  It is only fair that agents should 
be held accountable (in terms of how well their life goes) for the choices that they can be 
held morally responsible for making.  Placing an emphasis on equality of initial 
opportunity for welfare allows us to take the free choices of agents into account.95 
Equality of initial opportunity for welfare should be distinguished from brute luck 
egalitarianism.  Brute luck is generally understood as luck the agent had no ability, in the 
relevant sense, to control.  It is plausible to think that an agent should not be 
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 In his 1981, “What is Equality? Part II Equality of Resources,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 10: 185-
245, Ronald Dworkin argues for an equality of resources model in which a hypothetical insurance scheme 
is used to compensate for unequal personal endowments.  In additional Hillel’s Steiner’s endorsement of a 
tax on genetic germ-line information can be seen as a move to consider both the equalization of both 
external and internal resources.  
 
94
 If, for instance, one has been given a competitive rent that equalized her initial opportunities for well-
being and then she freely chooses to gamble her payment away, then she should have to live with the 
choices she has freely made.  Her right is plausibly to a rent payment which affords her initial equal 
opportunities for well-being, not a rent payment which guarantees her equal opportunities for well-being 
regardless of what she freely chooses. 
 
95
 I remain open on the question of whether, or how often, agents make choices for which they can be held 
morally responsible.  For instance, it might be the case (although I doubt it) that no one ever makes a 
choice for which they are morally responsible, and in such cases there will be no good reason to prefer 
equalizing opportunity for welfare or welfare per se.  
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disadvantaged by bad brute luck.  An agent, for example, shouldn’t suffer a horrible life 
merely because she was born with a genetic disability.  Equality of initial opportunity 
welfare require equalization of initial brute luck (initial opportunities) but does not 
always require compensation for later bad outcome brute luck.96  By contrast, brute luck 
egalitarianism maintains that brute luck disadvantages should always be compensated 
irrespective of whether they occur initially or later in life.  Adjudicating between equality 
of initial opportunity for welfare and outcome brute luck egalitarianism is a hotly debated 
issue and I will not attempt to adjudicate the matter here.  Consistent with Vallentyne’s 
suggestion of what we can deem equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism, 
however, I shall limit my discussion to initial equal opportunity for welfare.97 
Now after having made a few cursory points to address the notion of equal 
opportunity for welfare, I shall now discuss, and ultimately endorse, a Georgist account 
of appropriation, equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism, which is sensitive, in the 
fashion Vallentyne’s suggests, to agent’s being left a share of the full competitive rent 
value from common resources which best promotes an equal initial opportunity for 
welfare.  Equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism maintains that: initially all 
agents possess a right, against appropriators, to be left a share of the full competitive 
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 In “Brute Luck, Option Luck, and Equal of Initial Opportunities,” Ethics 112 (2002): 529-557, Peter 
Vallentyne argues that equality of initial opportunity for advantage (welfare) is more plausible than 
outcome brute luck egalitarianism.  He argues that justice does not always demand compensation for bad 
brute luck (after the initial conditions) because, “the net result of the administrative costs, incentive effects, 
and all other relevant factors may be that the initial opportunities for advantage are less valuable under the 
brute outcome luck compensation scheme that without it.  If that is so, then justice, I claim, forbids 
equalizing for brute outcome luck.”  Vallentyne’s point nicely illustrates that outcome brute luck schemes 
are, at least some of the times, implausible.  This doesn’t settle the debate between those who endorse 
equality of opportunity for welfare and those who opt for a brute outcome luck model, but it does add 
plausibility to the preference of an equal opportunity for welfare model.  
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 One variant of Georgism which I won’t consider here is outcome brute luck Georgism, where the 
competitive value of common resources is used to compensate bad brute luck.  If one finds outcome brute 
luck egalitarianism more plausible than (initial) equal opportunity for welfare then outcome brute luck 
Georgism would represent an option worth considering at further length.      
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rent value of common resources that best promotes an equal initial opportunity for 
welfare.   
Notice, (as will become important later) this proposed right, against an 
appropriator, is to be left a share of the full competitive value of common resources that 
best promotes equal initial opportunity for welfare; it is not a right against appropriators 
that they leave others enough to ensure an equal opportunity for welfare simplicitor.  The 
duty of an appropriator, according to the Georgist, is limited to leaving others, in some 
fashion, the full competitive value of the common resources which they chose to 
appropriate, and this leaving might not always be enough to ensure equal initial 
opportunity for welfare.  Equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism simply fills in 
the above in some fashion to be in the fashion which best promotes equal initial 
opportunity for welfare.  As we will examine much closer as this chapter proceeds, there 
could be cases in which leaving others the full competitive value of common resources 
can only promote, but not ensure, equal initial opportunity for welfare.  This is because 
we can imagine cases, consistent with the above proposed right, where an agent could 
have a right to be left the full competitive rent value of all common resources and still 
not, after this leaving, have equal initial opportunities for welfare.  I will discuss such 
cases later, for now I merely wish to flag the importance of the issue. 
We can specify equal initial opportunity for welfare sensitive Georgism in the 
following way concerning the appropriation of a common resource X: 
Equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism: You can appropriate a common 
resource X if and only if you are the first to claim ownership rights over X and 
leave others the greater of (a) the share of the full competitive value of X that best 
promotes an equal initial opportunity for welfare or (b) the minimum 
appropriation payment.          
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Equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism can be described as a type of constrained 
egalitarian position.  The view is clearly sensitive to appropriator’s leaving others enough 
in the fashion which best promotes equal initial opportunity for welfare.  But when 
addressing the question: enough of what, the view limits the means of the equalization of 
initial opportunity for welfare to the full competitive value of common resources. 
Let us now evaluate, and in turn get a better sense of, equal initial opportunity for 
welfare Georgism.  To illustrate how equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism 
operates consider again a world with Able, Unable, and one common resource X worth 
1000 units of competitive value.  We can imagine that, because of unchosen initial 
differences, Able and Unable will have an equal initial opportunity for welfare if Able is 
left 100 units of competitive value and Unable is left 900 units of competitive value.  
Unable has a right against Able that he not appropriate in a fashion that fails to leave her 
900 units of competitive value, and likewise Able has a right against Unable that she not 
appropriate in a fashion that fails to leave him 100 units of competitive value.  Able may 
appropriate X on the condition that he is the first-claimer of X and leaves no less than 
900 units of the competitive value for Unable, and Unable may appropriate X on the 
condition that that she is the first-claimer of X leaves no less than 100 units of the 
competitive value for Able.  We are assuming here that such leavings are greater than the 
minimum appropriation payment of X.     
   One attractive feature of equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism is that 
neither Able nor Unable (in the scenario just described), should be any happier than the 
other with their respective initial power to alter the first-order moral status of equal 
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common use.98  Neither appropriator, it seems, has any unfair advantage, in respect to the 
other, to alter the conditions of equal common use and appropriate common resources.  
Each appropriator, after all, is obligated to leave other(s) with enough of the competitive 
value derived from common resources to promote (and in the above case ensure) equal 
initial opportunity for welfare.  It is plausible to think that when an appropriator leaves 
this much for others she has satisfied her duty to leave others enough and as good. 
 At this juncture I shall address a general issue confronting Georgism that, as it 
will turn out, has significant ramifications for the account of equal initial opportunity for 
welfare Georgism presently on the table.  Who, we should ask, ought to pay any 
associated fees with delivering the full competitive value owed by those who appropriate 
common resources?  An appropriator could, for instance, live a far distance from others 
and delivering what he owes (the full competitive rent value payment of what he 
appropriates) might be very expensive.  Here there seem to be two clear options.  First, 
we could maintain that it is the appropriator’s duty to pay any delivery fees associated 
with delivering his competitive rent value payment to others.  Second, we could maintain 
that it is the duty of the recipients of the competitive value payment to pay any fees 
associated with delivering the payment.   
 It appears at first glance that how we address the question of who is to pay for the 
delivery of the competitive value payment will have wide-spread implications for equal 
initial opportunity for welfare Georgism (or any Georgist account for that matter).  But 
this is deceptive.  On average, it won’t actually matter if the fees for delivery are paid by 
the appropriator or the recipients of competitive value payments.  This is because the 
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 Of course, Able would have been happier with an equal share Georgist distribution and likewise Unable 
would have been happier if the distribution was 1000 for him and 0 for Able.  But as things stand neither 
agent is on any better footing than the other, they both enjoy an equal initial opportunity for welfare.  
90  
 
 
bidders in the Vickery auction, determining the competitive value of the ownership rights 
in respect to a common resource, will lower their bids by the amount the delivery fee. 
 Consider the following two cases to illustrate why it won’t typically matter who 
pays for delivering the competitive value payment.  Jon and Sally and bidding for 
ownership rights over common resource X and both of them know that delivery costs are 
20 units and will be paid by the recipients of the payment.  Jon Bids 60 units and Sally 
bids 50 units.  The competitive rent value of X is now set at 50 units.  Jon appropriates X 
and has a duty to leave (pay) 50 units of competitive value in the fashion which best 
promotes equal initial opportunity for welfare, but he need not pay delivery.  The 20 units 
of delivery are paid by the recipients of Jon’s competitive value payment.  They receive a 
total of 30 units (after net of delivery costs).   
 Now consider a variation in which Jon and Sally know that it will take 20 units to 
deliver the second highest competitive value bid to others in the fashion which best 
promotes equal initial opportunity for welfare and that these costs will be borne by the 
appropriator.  Given this information Jon and Sally adjust their bids downward, Jon bids 
40 units and Sally bids 30 units.  After all, the ownership rights over X are less attractive 
to Sally and Jon (by 20 units) is such ownership saddles them with a duty to pay 20 units 
to deliver the competitive value which they owe to others.  Jon appropriates the resource 
and pays (leaves) 30 units of competitive value and delivery to others in the fashion 
which best promotes equal initial opportunity for welfare.  The recipients receive 30 units 
(after Jon pays for delivery). 
 The proceeding two cases show us that, typically, it will not, for the bottom-line 
of those owed payment, whether delivery of the competitive value payment owed to 
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others is paid by the appropriator or those owed payment.  But there will be specific cases 
in which it will matter to others who pays delivery fees.  For example, consider a case in 
which Jon and Sally have different costs for delivering a competitive value payment of 50 
units to others.  Instead of each having to pay 20 units to delivery the competitive value 
payment which they owe others, imagine that it costs Jon 10 units to deliver this payment 
and Sally 30 units to deliver this payment.  If this is the case then the recipients will care 
very much who ultimately appropriates and pays for delivery.  If the appropriator pays 
for delivery then they won’t care who appropriates X.  But if they must pay for delivery, 
then they would very much prefer Jon to appropriate and deliver payment because this 
will mean that they receive more (20 units more) than if Sally were to appropriate and 
make her competitive value payment.   
Sometimes having the appropriator pay for delivery will be better for recipient 
and sometimes worse.  Hence, there is no clear reason to worry about this in the 
aggregate.  Still, it is an issue that must be settled.  I shall now set this issue aside 
temporality to examine a second problem.  It will turn out that the solution to this second 
problem solves the issue about delivery fees mentioned above.   
The discussion of delivery fees highlights an important point concerning the 
actual impact of competitive value payments owed by appropriators.  That point, is that 
our focus should be squarely concerned with how the payment of competitive value 
actually impacts the bottom-line of equal initial opportunity for welfare.  With our focus 
on the actual impact that the payment of competitive value has toward equal initial 
opportunity for welfare we are in a better position to discuss the currency (what it is that 
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bidders are bidding with) of the auction determining the competitive value of rights over 
common resources. 
Most Georgist, and indeed most anyone who utilizes the idea of auction bidding, 
assume that the bidders in the auction are bidding with some public currency such as 
dollars or euros or some physical good such as bushels of apples.  An alternative, 
however, which I maintain is more plausible than the above traditional view, is to bid 
directly in terms of impact on the initial equal opportunity for welfare for the 
beneficiaries of the auction.  According to this alternative suggestion the currency which 
bidders would be using to bid would be directly in terms of impact on the initial equal 
opportunity for welfare of others.  I shall now consider, at greater length, this alternative 
account of bidding currency. 
Perhaps, it is best to broach the issue of bidding currency with a more familiar 
case and then extend our results to encompass the focus of this project.  Consider a case 
in which the private owner of a car wants to auction off his rights over the car to the 
highest bidder.  What the owner wants to gain from this auction is simple, the offer that 
will best increase his welfare.  Of course there are a lot of practical reasons to run the 
auction in terms of dollars or the like, but if we had full information, then it would be 
most natural to have the auction run (bids made) in terms of the owner’s prospects for 
welfare.  Bidders would commit to achieving a given welfare impact for the owner. 
In highly integrated modern economies agents could make this “offer of welfare” 
to the owner of the car in terms of some public currency such as dollars.  Here, the dollar, 
for example, is merely a placeholder for an “offer of welfare.”  Public currencies such as 
dollars, however, hold no special have no privileged status as placeholders for an “offer 
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of welfare.”  For instance, in our car auction someone might bid one million dollars for 
the ownership rights over the car and another might bid with the promise to give an 
exceptional hour long massage one a week for a year.  Both bidders are making the 
owner of the car an offer of welfare (if they weren’t doing this then they wouldn’t be 
serious bidders).  One bidder is offering some amount of public currency and the other is 
offering her labor services but each are employing the currency of an “offer of welfare”. 
Now let’s return to the auction determining the competitive value of rights over 
common resources.  Here it might help to imagine a hypothetical common resource 
auctioneer who manages the auction and is foremost concerned with how the bidding for 
ownership rights over these resources will, bottom-line, best promote an equal initial 
opportunity for welfare.  Just as the owner of the car was first and foremost interested in 
the bid which increased his prospects for welfare, our hypothetical common resource 
auctioneer is first and foremost concerned with bids that best promote and equal initial 
opportunity for welfare.  This concern seems most natural under the equal initial 
opportunity for welfare view under consideration.  What the auctioneer wants to know is: 
bottom-line how will your bid for common resource X actually impact equality of initial 
opportunity for welfare.  Nothing else matters to our common resource auctioneer.  The 
currency of bids will then be in the form of offers that promote equal initial opportunity 
for welfare.  For a useful shorthand we can call this currency, equal initial opportunity for 
welfare unit bidding.     
One promising way of thinking about the currency being used to bid in our 
common resource auction is to imagine that bids are essentially offers that commit the 
bidder to bring about a certain distribution of equal initial opportunities for welfare.  For 
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example, imagine that three agents in a common resource auction bid offerings of the 
following distributions of initial opportunity for welfare.   
(A): 2-2-2 
(B): 9-7-3 
(C): 9-6-8 
How should our auctioneer concerned with equal initial opportunities for welfare rank 
these bids in terms of most to least attractive (from highest to lowest bid)?  Our 
auctioneer, I maintain, should be concerned with both equality and efficiency.  If equality 
were the auctioneer’s only concern, then distribution (A) would be the best or highest bid.  
But this seems seriously flawed since both distributions (B) and (C) leave everyone better 
off than distribution (A).  For often, and aptly, referenced reasons of leveling down our 
auctioneer should employ standards of Pareto efficiency and prefer bids which were 
Pareto Superior.  Distribution (B), for instance, is Pareto Superior, to distribution (A) 
because everyone is better in (B) than in (A).  It would be, for lack of a better word crazy, 
to think that (A) should be preferred to (B).  But what should we say about comparing 
distributions (B) and (C).  Neither is Pareto superior to the other.  When neither option is 
Pareto superior I suggest that our auctioneer, again concerned with equal initial 
opportunities for welfare, should opt for the more egalitarian distribution which in our 
present case is distribution (C). 
 Consistent with the above analysis we can say that the bid pledging to bring about 
distribution (C) is the highest bid, the bid pledging to bring about distribution (B) the 
second-highest bid, and the bid pledging to bring about distribution (A) is the lowest bid.  
Incorporating the idea of a Vickery auction in which the second-highest bid determines 
95  
 
 
the competitive value, we can say that the competitive value of the ownership rights over 
the common resource up for bid is set at the commitment to bring about the equal initial 
opportunity for welfare distribution of 9-7-3.  The payment which an appropriator owes 
others is the leaving of a 9-7-3 distribution of equal initial opportunities for welfare. 
 Here, it is worth addressing the issue of opportunity costs to agents in an auction.  
The opportunity cost to a bidder in an auction is simply the cost of choosing one option 
rather than another.  When, for instance, an agent bids 100 units for an acre of land the 
opportunity cost to her might include not using the 100 units to invest in a corn flake 
factory.  It makes sense to think that an agent making informed bids in an auction should 
have a good idea of the opportunity costs she incurs.  If an agent bids with cash or some 
other public currency she will likely have a good idea of her opportunity costs.  She 
might well know what the cash could ‘get her’ if she used in some activity other than 
bidding for an item in an auction.  However, in an auction that utilizes ‘offers which 
promote equal opportunity for welfare’ it is less clear that the bidders will know the 
opportunity costs of their bids.  In response, I maintain that agents in the hypothetical 
Vickery auction will know the opportunity costs to them of having to pay certain equal 
opportunity for welfare distributions.  For example, the agent who bids the 9-7-3 
distribution, from our example above, will know facts about the world which allow her to 
appreciate the opportunity costs of her bid.  Just as a an agent appreciates what bidding 
50 dollars of public currency will know her opportunity costs so to, I envision, that a 
bidder of a 9-7-3 equal opportunity for welfare distribution will know her opportunity 
costs.      
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 The above stance concerning the proper currency to use in our auction 
determining the competitive value of rights over common resources also nicely address 
the issue of delivery fees.  The bid in the form of an offer that promotes equal initial 
opportunity for welfare will include how such an offer is impacted by associated delivery 
fees.  A bid understood as a commitment to bringing about a certain distribution of initial 
opportunities for welfare will take into account the bidders delivery of this commitment.  
After all, a bid is a commitment to bring about a certain distribution and this will include 
all costs to the bidder of bringing about the distribution. 
 The upshot of our recent discussion is that the version of equal initial opportunity 
for welfare Georgism currently under discussion renders the currency of the bidding on 
ownership rights common resources, which sets the competitive value of these rights, to 
be commitments to bring about a certain distribution of equal initial opportunity for 
welfare.  This view of the currency involved in an auction determining a common 
resources competitive value is non-standard, but I think aptly in the spirit of a concern for 
the equal initial opportunities for welfare of agents. 
 Before considering the most formidable challenge to equal initial opportunity of 
welfare Georgism, I shall now re-visit, with our focus toward equal initial opportunity for 
welfare, the issue of the minimum appropriation payment.  Up to this point, I have been 
treating the minimum appropriation payment essentially as an appropriator’s duty to 
leave others, at least, as much as Nozickian proprietarianism demands.  But consider the 
following, attractive, alteration to this treatment of the minimum appropriation payment.   
Revised Minimum Appropriation Payment:  You can appropriate a common 
resource X only if (≠ if and only) your appropriation leaves the distribution of 
equal initial opportunity for welfare no worse than the distribution would have 
been had X remained within conditions of equal common use. 
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To illustrate the revised minimum appropriation payment consider that the distribution of 
equal initial opportunity for welfare if X remains within conditions of equal common use 
is 10-10-10.  Now, consider that if X were appropriated the new distribution of equal 
initial opportunity for welfare would be 12-2-2.  This appropriation would fail to meet the 
demands of the minimum appropriation payment as the new distribution is neither Pareto 
superior or more equal than the distribution if X had remained within conditions of equal 
common use. 
 Here it is worth noting an important respect in which the proposed revised 
minimum appropriation payment deviates from Nozickian proprietarianism.  Consider a 
situation in a two person world in which the distribution of equal initial opportunity for 
welfare within conditions of equal common use was agent A one unit and agent B twenty 
units.  Now, let us imagine that agent A appropriates a common resource in a fashion 
which leaves a distribution of (15,15).  Nozick would rule this impermissible by 
maintaining that A engaged in an appropriation which lessened the condition of B below 
what B’s condition would have been within conditions of equal common use and as such 
failed to leave enough and as good for others.  The revised minimum appropriation 
payment, however, allows such an appropriation because a distribution of (15,15) is to be 
preferred over that of (1,20).  This is arguably one place in which a Nozickian could raise 
a challenge to the proposed minimum appropriation payment.               
 I should stress that the above new treatment of the minimum appropriation 
payment, is still just that, a minimum payment that appropriators owe others.  One helpful 
way to think of the minimum appropriation payment is as a minimum bid (or reserve) 
price that bidders in the auction determining the competitive value of the rights over a 
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common resource must first meet in order to offer legitimate bids.  A legitimate bid must 
be at least, no lower, than the minimum appropriation price.  And given that both the 
currency of the bids as well as the minimum appropriation price are cast in terms of a 
distribution of equal initial opportunity for welfare there should be no problem 
integrating both the minimum appropriation payment and the currency of bidding into our 
auction determining the competitive value of common resources.   
Equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism, plausibly, better accounts for the 
duty of appropriators to leave enough and as good for others than the alternatives we 
have considered thus far.  I shall now compare equal initial opportunity for welfare 
Georgism with another left-proprietarian alternative which is also keenly sensitive to 
appropriating in a fashion that leaves others enough and as good, where this leaving is 
focused toward the impact on other’s equal initial opportunities for welfare.  This 
alternative left-proprietarian proposal will, as we shall see, places pressure on the 
Georgist commitment to utilizing only the full competitive value of common resources to 
promote equal initial opportunity for welfare. 
Taking a lead from Michael Otsuka in his Libertarianism Without Inequality we 
can suggest that: initially all agents possess a right against appropriators, to be left (to 
the extent possible) enough to ensure equal initial opportunity for welfare.99  
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 Otsuka’s develops a view of appropriation in Libertarianism Without Inequality (Clarendon Press: 
Oxford, 2003), which maintains that In order to clarify what it means to appropriate privately unowned 
common resources in a fashion that does not disadvantage others, Otsuka proposes the following egalitarian 
proviso: 
Egalitarian Proviso: You may acquire previously unowned world resources if and only if you 
leave enough so that everyone else can acquire an equally advantageous share of unowned world 
(common) resources (pp. 24 emphasis mine). 
Otsuka argues that shares are equally advantageous, “if they are such that each is able to attain the same 
level of welfare as anybody else given the combination of her worldly and personal resources (25).”  
According to Otsuka’s interpretation of the Lockean proviso an appropriator leaves enough and as good for 
others only if she leaves others enough to acquire, at least, the same level of opportunity for welfare.      
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Appropriators, according to this newly proposed property right, have a duty to leave 
others enough to ensure (to the extent possible) initial equality of opportunity for welfare.  
The (to the extent possible clause) is meant to address cases where it is not possible to 
improve the initial opportunities for welfare of others.  For example, imagine that an 
appropriator has only two options, (i) appropriate common resources which afford him 50 
units of initial opportunity for welfare and leave others fifty units of initial opportunity 
for welfare, or (ii) appropriate common resources which afford him 100 units of 
opportunity for welfare and leave others fifty units of initial opportunity for welfare.  In 
such a case the appropriator may justly pursue the second option.  In either case the 
appropriator is only able to leave others fifty units of initial opportunity for welfare and it 
is implausible to suggest that he is duty-bound to enjoy only fifty units of initial 
opportunity for welfare.        
Here we can specify an account of pure initial opportunity for welfare 
appropriation as follows: 
Pure equal opportunity for welfare appropriation: You can appropriate a common 
resource X if and only if you are the first to claim X and you leave others enough 
to ensure (to the extent possible) equal initial opportunities for welfare. 
 
According to pure initial opportunity for welfare appropriation if an agent’s appropriation 
affords her twenty-five units of initial opportunity for welfare, then she must leave others 
enough such that they also possess twenty-five units of initial opportunities for welfare.  
To put the point a slightly different way, the price an appropriator must pay for her 
appropriation is that she must take no greater opportunities for welfare than she leaves 
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others.100  (For an extended discussion of issues related to self-ownership and Otsuka’s 
treatment of pure equal opportunity for welfare appropriation see the first appendix.)  
Equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism and pure initial opportunity for 
welfare Georgism are quite similar.  For clarity sake here what the two views look like 
(side by side): 
Equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism: You can appropriate a common 
resource X if and only if you are the first to claim X and you leave others their 
equal initial opportunity for welfare share of the greater of (a) the competitive 
value of rights claimed over X or (b) the minimum appropriation payment.  
 
Pure equal opportunity for welfare appropriation:  You can appropriate a common 
resource X if and only if you are the first to claim X and you leave others enough 
to ensure (to the extent possible) equal initial opportunities for welfare. 
 
I shall now proceed to make some comparative points and in turn evaluate the relative 
strengths of these promising left-proprietarian proposals. 
 Before locating and assessing differences between the two proposals it is worth 
first pointing out an important implication shared by both views.  Notice that where the 
competitive value of common resources is enough to ensure equality of opportunity for 
welfare, then the two views won’t differ.101  In worlds, that is, where the competitive 
value of common resources is enough to ensure, as opposed to merely promote, equality 
of initial opportunity for welfare both views share the implication that an appropriator 
must leave a share that affords others an equal (initial) opportunity for welfare.      
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 Here it is important to note that Otsuka’s view is a form of payment Lockean proprietarianism but not 
Georgist in character.  The payment which Otsuka demands that an appropriator must pay is the amount 
which leaves others an equal opportunity for welfare.  Note that Otsuka’s view is not a Georgist approach.  
This is because Otsuka’s view does not suggest that an appropriator pay the competitive value of what she 
appropriates.    
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 It is worth noting that where an equal initial opportunity for welfare exists within conditions of equal 
common use an appropriator’s leaving the minimum appropriation payment would also yield the same 
result as pure equal opportunity for welfare appropriation.  
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In order to identify scenarios in which the two proposals yield different implications 
we must consider cases in which the competitive value of common resources is not 
enough to ensure equality of initial opportunity for welfare.  In such cases, the Georgist 
proposal, given that it limits the duty of appropriators to paying no more than the full 
competitive value of the rights over common resources they appropriate, implies that an 
appropriator’s duty will fall short of leaving enough to ensure that others have equal 
initial opportunities for welfare.  But the same is not true of pure initial opportunity for 
welfare appropriation.  Pure initial opportunity for welfare appropriation maintains that 
an appropriator has a general duty to leave enough to ensure equality of opportunity for 
welfare, and if the fulfillment of this duty means that an appropriator must leave more 
that the full competitive value of common resources then so be it.  The conflict, if we are 
to locate an area of disagreement with real consequence, is found in answering the 
question:  Is an appropriator ever duty bound to leave others more than the full 
competitive value of common resources?  Pure equal opportunity for welfare 
appropriation renders a positive answer and equal initial opportunity for welfare 
Georgism renders a negative answer to this central question. 
Here, I think a number of things can be said to support the Georgist contention than 
an appropriator’s duty to leave others enough and as good should not exceed leaving the 
full competitive value of the rights over common resources which he appropriates.  First, 
consider the feasibility point that typically an agent will not purchase a good that is 
priced above competitive value.  They will just walk away without buying the good.  I 
suspect the same consideration will generally be true of those appropriating common 
resources.  If the rights over common resources are “priced” about full competitive value, 
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the prospective appropriators will simply opt not to appropriate the common resource.  
The rights over a given common resource simply won’t be worth more than full 
competitive value to a prospective appropriator.  Notice that if a common resource goes 
unappropriated, then there won’t be any leaving by an appropriator of the common 
resource that can contribute to the equal initial opportunities of others (for either account 
of appropriation on table).  The point here is that agents can always opt not to appropriate 
common resources (when, for example, the price to appropriate –the mandated leaving- 
exceeds full competitive value).      
It would be a mistake to suspect that generally one could garner more than the full 
competitive value of common resources by prospective appropriators of such resources.  
This point is not to be overlooked because unless appropriators of common resources 
would leave (pay) more than full competitive value in order to appropriate common 
resources, then views, such as pure equal initial opportunity for appropriation, lack any 
real strength to bring about equal initial opportunity for welfare not already had by the 
equal initial opportunity for Georgist account of appropriation.  In other words, in order 
for the pure equal initial opportunity for welfare account of appropriation to distinguish 
itself as a feasibly stronger egalitarian account from the Georgist account under 
consideration we must imagine cases in which prospective appropriators would pay more 
than the full competitive value of common resources in order to appropriate.  As I have 
suggested these cases will be, at most, non-typical. 
But for the sake of argument let us grant that there will be cases in which a 
prospective appropriator of a common resource would pay more than full competitive 
value in order to appropriate a common resource.  What should we say about such cases?  
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First, we should note that in such cases appropriators of common resources are being 
subject to monopoly pricing.  The payment for common resources that appropriators must 
make is not competitive value instead it is whatever it takes to bring about equal initial 
opportunity of welfare.  Admittedly, the goal behind this monopoly pricing (to ensure 
equal initial opportunity for welfare) is much more noble than the typical picture of 
monopoly pricing involving a price gouger that prays on the desperation of agents for the 
sake of sheer selfish economic advantage.  But still something seems suspicious about 
monopoly pricing (even with the intent of using the proceeds to best ensure equal initial 
opportunity for welfare). 
Two concerns drive my suspicion toward the monopoly pricing which is needed to 
distinguish pure equal initial opportunity for welfare appropriation from its Georgist 
rival.  First, related to a recent concern, it is difficult for me to imagine anyone paying 
monopoly prices, those above competitive value, unless they were swindled into doing 
so.  Agents just don’t knowingly and voluntarily pay more than competitive value for 
things (rights over common resources included).  Second, it strikes me as unfair to make 
agents pay more than competitive value for something even if this payment in excess of 
competitive value is used to fund ensuring equal initial opportunity for welfare.  Again, 
this assumes (which I think is highly suspect) that an agent would even be willing to 
knowingly and voluntarily pay more than competitive value to appropriate a common 
resource.   
Even if, nonetheless, we put aside any concerns we might have with the feasibility of 
agent’s engaging in appropriation if this means paying more than the competitive value 
for the rights they claim over common resources and with monopoly pricing generally.  I 
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maintain that we would still have good reason to favor equal initial opportunity for 
welfare Georgism over pure equal initial opportunity for welfare appropriation.  For 
example, consider a case in which Able and Unable are bidding within a Vickery auction 
for a set of ownership rights over a small strip of land (the land is a common resource).  
Let us grant, importantly, that Able and Unable both have fair bidding power.  The issue 
is extremely important and deserves attention.  Here, I just assume that Able and Unable 
have fair bidding power. (See appendix #2 for a discussion of fair bidding power.)   
Able bids twenty units for the rights over the land, and Unable bids fifteen units for 
these same rights.  The competitive value of the land is now set at fifteen units, the 
second highest bid.  Able appropriates the land and pays the full competitive value of the 
rights she claimed (fifteen units) to others in a fashion which best promotes equality of 
initial opportunity for welfare.  In this case, equality of initial opportunity for welfare 
Georgism informs us that Able is to pay the entire competitive value of the rights she 
claims to Unable.102   
 Able has, when we allow competitive value to be determined by a Vickrey 
auction, made a payment (left) Unable for the entire amount that Unable bid for the 
land.103  How can Unable legitimately complain about Able’s appropriation of the land if 
he leaves her the entire amount that she bid for the land herself?  In such a case, Unable 
doesn’t have any legitimate complaint that Able’s appropriation disadvantaged her 
because Able has left her what she bid for the land.  It seems odd, to say the least, to 
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 Recall, that Unable is so badly disabled that he has a right, according to the Georgist proposal on the 
table, that others leave him the full competitive value of all common resources.  And Able has done this.  
 
103
 Here, issues arise when we introduce more than two agents into a Vickrey auction.  I will consider such 
issues in the last chapter, but here I utilize only two agents in order to keep things simple and more clear-
cut as a general account of appropriation is developed. 
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think that (within conditions of fair bidding power) Able could have a duty to leave 
Unable even more than what she bid for the land.  In fact, to maintain that Able is 
obligated to leave Unable even more than she bid would be tantamount to allowing 
Unable to engage in monopolistic price-making.  And this isn’t fair to Able.  Able, when 
he pays Unable what she bid for the land (the full competitive value of the land when we 
incorporate a Vickrey auction scheme) does not disadvantage Unable in any morally 
objectionable fashion. 
 Of course, it could be the case that Able derives twenty-five units of initial 
opportunities for welfare from his appropriation of the land and the competitive value 
which he leaves Unable only affords her twenty units of initial opportunity for welfare.  
But how troublesome is the implication that Able gains more initial opportunity for 
welfare from his appropriation of the land than Unable is able to garner from what she is 
left (the entire amount of the full competitive value of the land)?  The implication doesn’t 
seem very troubling (especially since Unable was paid exactly what the land was worth to 
her).  Able did, after all, pay Unable what she bid for the land.  It seems very plausible 
that an agent is left enough and as good by an appropriator when she is left the amount 
which she was willing to pay for the appropriated common resource (even when this 
payment doesn’t ensure equal initial opportunity for welfare).  And this is precisely, in 
our current case, the amount which the Georgist maintains ought to be left.     
Able doesn’t bear the burden of ensuring that everyone else (Unable) have the 
same opportunities for welfare as he derives from appropriating common resources.  Able 
doesn’t acquire the duty, in virtue of his appropriation, to ensure that Unable’s 
opportunities are as valuable as his.  Able’s duty, alternatively, is to pay for what he takes 
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away and deprives Unable of within, some understanding of, the conditions of equal 
common use.  Able took away, deprives Unable, of common resources worth, established 
by Unable’s own bid, fifteen units and he is obligated to pay this amount to Unable in a 
fashion which best promotes equal initial opportunity for welfare.  But he need not pay a 
price greater than this for his appropriation of the strip of land.  Able has no duty, contra 
pure equal initial opportunity for welfare appropriation, to leave Unable even more than 
she bid to appropriate the strip of land.   
After defending the general plausibility of equal initial opportunity for welfare 
Georgism against its best left-proprietarian rival, pure equal initial opportunity for 
welfare appropriation, I shall now consider a pressing objection against the view. 
 The best objection against equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism makes 
the challenge that according to the view the means to achieve effective equality is 
contingent upon the full competitive value of common resources, and this contingency 
can lead to very inegalitarian implications.  To see how such an objection would work, 
imagine a case in which the competitive value of common resources is very low (say five 
units).  And we have two familiar actors, Able and Unable.  If Able appropriates common 
resources worth just five unit of competitive value, then he will live a wonderful life 
(have 1000 units of initial opportunity for welfare), and even if Unable is left the full 
competitive value of common resources –five units- then she will live an awful life (have 
one unit of initial opportunity for welfare).   
Equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism does indeed allow for the 
extremely inegalitarian implication noted in the above example.  Should the view be 
rejected because of this implication?  Arguably not.  As considered above, the Georgist 
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demands that an appropriator pay for what she takes away and deprives others of by 
leaving others the full competitive value of the common resources she appropriates.  In 
the above potentially problematic case where Able leaves Unable the entire competitive 
value of his appropriation, he does just this.  Able leaves Unable the entire competitive 
value of all common resources, he has no duty to leave her more than this.  Able need not 
pay others for the benefits which he derives from his appropriation, her need only pay for 
what he takes away and deprives others of (and he does this when he leaves Unable the 
full competitive value of all common resources).  Further, again consider that Able might 
simply (and in all likelihood would) opt not to appropriate if the price of appropriation 
(what he must leave) is set above full competitive value.  Admittedly, the inegalitarian 
implications of equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism that might possibly arise 
are troubling, but they do not substantially threaten the plausibility of the view.                  
As I stressed, however, at the outset of comparing pure equal initial for welfare 
appropriation and equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism, both plausible left-
proprietarian accounts, are similar and will yield the same results in all cases in which the 
full competitive value of common resources is enough to ensure equal initial opportunity 
for welfare.  In scenarios where the two views differ, the infeasibility and unfairness of 
demanding that an appropriator leave another more than the competitive value of the 
appropriated resource to others is a reason to prefer the Georgist proposal. 
At this juncture I shall now transition from the comparative discussion of equal 
initial opportunity for welfare Georgism and pure equal opportunity for welfare 
appropriation to consider some general objection to the proprietarian account and 
approach I have endorsed thus far.   
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A proprietarian concerned with egalitarian considerations, might suggest that 
agents have a right against others (whether they appropriate or not) to bring about an 
equal initial opportunity for welfare.  The defended Lockean proprietarian account (equal 
initial opportunity for welfare Georgism) might be charged with being inconsistent with 
such a right against others that certain egalitarian conditions are brought about.  But this 
charge would prove false.   
It is true, as discussed earlier in this chapter, that equal initial opportunity for 
welfare Georgism will not serve as a guarantee that conditions of equal initial opportunity 
for welfare are brought about.  However, equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism 
is consistent with a general ‘whole-hog’ egalitarian right against others to bring about 
conditions of equal initial opportunity for welfare.  Recall that equal initial opportunity 
for welfare Georgism is open on the question of whether or not agents posses the right of 
self-ownership.  Accordingly, one could endorse equal initial opportunity for welfare 
Georgism as applied to the appropriation of common resources and maintain that the 
bodies or labor of persons should be used to address any inequities concerning the equal 
initial opportunity for welfare of agents.  For example, if agents have a right that others 
bring about conditions of equal initial opportunity for welfare generally it could be the 
case that sighted agents have a duty to give one of their eyes to blind agents.  Such a duty 
to transfer an eyeball is not inconsistent with equal initial opportunity for welfare 
Georgism.    This is a possible position to hold which my discussion of proprietarianism 
does not rule out.  Thus, given the open status which I have assigned the right of self-
ownership the suggestion that my views on appropriation are inconsistent with robust 
egalitarian rights are out of place. 
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Nonetheless, some people concerned with egalitarian considerations might still 
take aim at my general proprietarian approach in this project.  Consider the following 
example.104  Imagine that instead of being a pioneer for social justice Gandhi allowed 
himself to perish at a young age in a hunger strike.  Gandhi never becomes the prolific 
figure of social justice and the world is a worse place because of this.  Has Gandhi done 
anything wrong by allowing himself to die?  I am inclined to say no.  I think it is 
plausible that egalitarian considerations only attach to duties and that agents acquire these 
duties via their interaction with, e.g., appropriation of, common resources.   
The possible counter-intuitive result of my proprietarian approach is that it 
maintains that Gandhi, acting as he did for many decades was not any morally better than 
he would have been had he decided to starve himself.  This result does not strike me as 
counter-intuitive.  I am not convienced that we have duties owed to others to ‘make the 
world a better place’ or ‘help bring about egalitarian goals simplicitor’.  Alternatively, I 
maintain that the duties which we owe to others are generated from our appropriation 
(and in the next chapter I will maintain use) of common resources.  It is when an agent 
removes a common resource that she acquires egalitarian duties toward others (she has no 
such duty based upon any other reason such as the needs of agents).  All agents have a 
stake in the value of common resources and it is the removal of these resources that 
should raise a skeptical eyebrow from an egalitarian.  An agent ‘acquires’ an egalitarian 
duty to others based upon her removal of the common stock, she doesn’t simply ‘have’ 
such duties as a brute fact or comes to gain such a duty based upon the needs of other 
agents.  I am an egalitarian, but I am simply not swayed by the intuition that Gandhi 
would have done anything morally worse by letting himself die than by engaging in the 
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 I thank Brian Kierland for bringing this example to my attention. 
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life which he chose to lead.  This will likely desire some (perhaps most) egalitarians, but 
it is the curious position in which I find myself. 
My left-proprietarian treatment of the conditions under which an agent may 
appropriate common resources is now complete.  I began the last chapter with a Lockean 
puzzle concerning how any appropriation of common resources could be justified if the 
first-order normative status of such resources is that they “belong to all in some equal 
fashion.”  After defending the initial normative status of common resources as being in 
some initial condition of equal common use, I defended the unilateral moral power, under 
certain conditions, of agents to appropriate common resources.  The most plausible 
version of the conditions under which agents can appropriate common resources was 
found to be some version of left-proprietarianism.  After considering various left-
proprietarian accounts of appropriation I settled on a version of equal initial opportunity 
for welfare Georgism which specifies that: 
Equal initial opportunity of welfare Georgism: You can appropriate common 
resources if only if you leave others their equal initial opportunity for welfare 
share of the greater of (a) the competitive value of rights claimed over X or (b) the 
minimum appropriation payment. 
 
I shall continue in the next chapter to evaluate the conditions under which agents 
may justly use common resources.  As we are soon to see, while a neglected topic, the 
just use of common resources is every bit as formidable and important to a proprietarian 
theory of justice as the appropriation of such resources. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: JUSTLY USING COMMON RESOURCES 
 
 
 
This chapter addresses the question: According to the most plausible version of a 
propritarian theory of justice, under what conditions can an agent justly use a common 
resource?  Recall from the second chapter that use was defined, for the purposes of this 
project, as either taking on the form of a ‘physical impingement’ account or a ‘plans and 
projects’ account.  An agent, that is, uses a common resource either when she physically 
impinges on it or when she incorporates the resource into her plans and projects.  Thus, 
our question, more precisely specified, asks:  According to the most plausible 
proprietarian theory of justice, under what conditions can an agent justly physically 
impinge upon or a common resource or under what conditions can an agent justly 
incorporate a common resource into her plans and projects? 
 In the introductory chapter, I noted that political philosophers have traditionally 
ignored, or failed to systematically consider, the conditions under which an agent can 
justly use common resources.  They have, instead, focused their attention toward 
examining the conditions under which such resources can be appropriated.  The neglect 
that political philosophers have shown toward just use is, as I shall demonstrate in this 
chapter, an important mistake.  This is because, generally, the same reasons that led us to 
embrace the Lockean suggestion that appropriators have a duty to leave others enough 
and as good is a suggestion that also, plausibly, applies to users of common resources. 
I shall argue in this chapter that users of common resources have a duty, just as 
appropriators do, to leave others enough and as good.  If this observation is correct, then 
an important implication that follows is that our most plausible proprietarian theory of 
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justice should maintain that the Lockean proviso applies to both the use and appropriation 
of common resources.              
In the last chapter I defended the Lockean claim that the initial normative status of 
common resources was one of equal common use.  The simple treatment of equal 
common use, introduced there, maintained that initially, everyone has a liberty right to 
use common resources in some normal fashion.  This treatment of equal common use 
(while sufficient to ground a discussion of appropriation) is incomplete.  For example, 
consider the question: do agents have claim rights against others from using common 
resources in monopolistic or destructive ways?  A clear answer to this question is not 
provided by the simple account of equal common use.  I shall now, as promised in the 
last chapter, more carefully examine the initial normative status of common resources 
within conditions of equal common use. 
Perhaps the most unassuming place to begin carefully considering the normative 
status of common resources within conditions of equal common use is by considering the 
possible position that within such conditions all agents possess an unrestricted liberty 
right to use all common resources.  That is, within conditions of equal common use, 
everyone has an unrestricted liberty right to use all common resources.  Agents, 
according to this account, have no claim rights against others from “using as such” 
common resources.  An agent, that is, simply doesn’t have duties toward others 
concerning her use as such of common resources.  The language of “use as such” in the 
description of the unrestricted liberty account is important.  The unrestricted liberty 
account maintains that agents have no claim rights against others merely using common 
resources.  The account does not rule out the plausible possibility that agent’s have 
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certain claim rights against others which may have moral implications concerning 
particular uses of common resources.   
For example, it might be that agent’s posses the right of control self-ownership 
and as such others are not permitted to use the body of another without her permission or 
against her interests.  The unrestricted liberty account can maintain, if it also endorses the 
right of control self-ownership, that it is a breach of justice to use a rock to hit the body of 
another.  In such a case the ‘hitter’ has used a common resource in a fashion that uses the 
body of another and the unrestricted liberty account need not allow this.  The important 
idea here is that the unrestricted liberty account can place restrictions on use in virtue of 
other moral rights, for instance some variant of self-ownership, that agents might possess.  
Such an account would hold that one is permitted to use common resources in any way 
that one wants as long as such use violates no property rights in agents or other things 
held by others.  Is this unrestrictive liberty account of equal common use plausible? 
In order to test the plausibility of the unrestricted liberty account of equal 
common use, I shall offer five cases involving five different types of use: destructive use, 
degrading use, overuse, general access-restricting use, and specific access-restricting 
use.  These cases will demonstrate the implausibility of the unrestrictive liberty account 
of equal common use and begin to motivate the plausibility of applying the Lockean 
proviso toward the use of common resources.     
In each of the five cases below assume that the agents involved have not 
appropriated anything.  If it helps simply assume that, due to lack of imagination, none of 
the agents in the following examples ever claimed ownership rights over any common 
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resources.  And given that claiming ownership is necessary to appropriate then no 
appropriation has occurred. 
If agents have an unrestrictive liberty right to use common resources, then they 
are (barring the inclusion of additional moral constraints) at moral liberty to destroy 
common resources for the fun of it, even when this destruction places the very survival of 
others in jeopardy.  Consider the case of Toxic Jack and Sarah.  Both share a life-
sustaining spring of fresh water.  Toxic Jack decides, for the fun of it, to empty toxic 
sludge into the spring and thereby ruin the water source which is necessary to sustain 
both his and Sarah’s lives.  Does Toxic Jack act unjustly in such a case?  The answer 
seems to be yes.  It is highly plausible that Toxic Jack transgresses a duty he owes to 
Sarah when he uses the spring they share, within conditions of equal common use, in this 
destructive fashion.  Sarah, plausibly, has a claim right against Toxic Jack, that he not use 
the spring in this destructive fashion.  If this suggestion is correct, then agents have claim 
rights against others from using common resources in, at least certain, destructive ways, 
and hence the unrestricted liberty account of equal common use is flawed. 
 Destructive use need not be as dramatic as the above case to be morally 
problematic.  Imagine, for example, that Toxic Jack doesn’t want to completely destroy 
the entire spring but instead only wants to destroy half of the spring.  We would still, I 
maintain, rightly suspect that Toxic Jack violates a duty he owes to Sarah by partially 
destroying or depleting the spring.  Toxic Jack has not, in such a case, completely 
destroyed the water supply, but he has taken an action which depletes the spring which he 
and Sarah share.  Acts of morally problematic destructive use need not be completely 
destructive in order to invoke concerns of justice. 
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 Here it is worth noting that consuming common resources is a type of destructive 
use.  When, for example, Sarah consumes an apple by eating it, she engages in a type of 
destructive use.  She engages in an action which destroys the apple.  The consumption of 
common resources can be as morally problematic as other types of destructive use.  After 
all, it doesn’t matter to others if Sarah destroys a common resource by consuming it or by 
destroying it in some other fashion – in either event the common resource has been used 
in a fashion that deprives others from gaining (any) benefit from the use of the resource. 
Related, closely, with destructive use is degrading use.105  When an agent engages 
in the degrading use of a common resource she uses in a fashion that reduces the value of 
the resource without destroying it even partially.  Imagine, for example, that Toxic Jack 
doesn’t destroy the spring, but instead pollutes the spring with a chemical that ensures 
Sarah will become seriously ill whenever she drinks from the spring.  Toxic Jack’s 
polluting actions, while not sufficient to destroy the spring, degrade the value of the 
spring.  We would still, I maintain, rightly suspect that Toxic Jack violates a duty he 
owes to Sarah by dumping this less than lethal chemical into the spring.  Acts of morally 
problematic use need not destroy, or remove all the value from, a common resource in 
order to invoke concerns of justice. 
Cases of destructive and degrading use highlight the distinction between 
renewable and non-renewable common resources.  A renewable common resource is a 
resource which can be replaced on a scale comparative to its consumption in a relatively 
short amount of time, e.g., sun, wind, ocean tides.  Alternatively, a non-renewable 
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 I thank Peter Vallentyne for helping me see the clear distinction between degrading-value use and 
destructive use. 
116  
 
 
common resource is a resource which cannot be replaced a scale comparative to its 
consumption in a relatively short amount of time, e.g., petroleum and natural gas. 
If an agent destroys or depletes a renewable common resource that is quickly 
replenished or replaced by nature, then such consumption, depending on how quickly 
replenishment occurs, is not obviously morally problematic.  In such a case the removal 
of common resources has been replaced very quickly and hence others not deprived of 
the common resource (or value derived from common resources).  On the other hand this 
is not the case when we consider non-renewable resources.  When an agent destroys or 
depletes a non-renewable common resource they remove in a fashion that nature does not 
quickly replace and hence has the much stronger potential to disadvantage others through 
deprivation.  It is typically much more difficult for users of non-renewable resources to 
leave others enough and as good than it is for users of renewable common resources to 
leave others enough and as good. 
Aside from concerns of destructive use and degrading use, considerations of 
overuse also give us good reason to suspect that the unrestricted liberty account of equal 
common use is flawed.  The overuse of a common resource occurs, generally, when an 
agent disproportionately uses, to the exclusion of others, the resource in question.  If 
agents have an unrestricted liberty right to use common resources, then they are at moral 
liberty to overuse common resources for any reason, even when this places the survival 
of others in jeopardy.  Consider a scenario with Paranoid Bill and Mark.  Both must touch 
an energy stone once a day, for ten seconds, in order to survive.  Paranoid Bill is first to 
grab the stone, but he refuses to share the stone, for any length of time, with Mark.  Being 
stronger than Mark, Paranoid Bill, holds on to the stone and Mark perishes as he is unable 
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to touch the stone.  This case provides us with good reason to suspect that Paranoid Bill 
doesn’t have the right to use the energy stone in any monopolistic fashion he pleases.  
This is because Mark, plausibly, has a claim right against Paranoid Bill from overusing 
the stone which they share within conditions of equal common use.  Of course, the issue 
of what counts as overuse is complex, but it seems clear that there is some relevant sense 
in which an agent can overuse a common resource. 
To see the ramifications of overuse more clearly consider that an agent’s physical 
impingement (use) of a common resource often prevents others from physically 
impinging (using) the same common resource, and a fortiori from enjoying the benefits 
that using resource provides.  If, for example, an agent stands on the only spot of shaded 
land, then others cannot stand in the same spot unless the agent moves (or is moved by 
others).  The simultaneous use of this spot of land by multiple agents at the same time is 
not possible.106  In such a case the user of the spot of land (a common resource), gains a 
benefit from his use (a nice shaded spot to escape the sun), but, in virtue of his use, others 
are denied, for the duration of his use, the benefits afforded by using the spot of shaded 
land.  The agent using the shaded spot of land has effectively removed it, for the duration 
of his use, from others.  His action prevented others, deprived them, from using the 
shaded spot of land. 
In addition to concerns of destructive use, degrading use, and overuse, cases of 
restrictive use also lend good reason to suspect that the unrestricted liberty account of 
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 Here there is an important distinction to be made between instances of use that, because of physical 
limitation bar simultaneous use and instances of use that because of the specific instantiation of use 
employed bar simultaneous use.  It is, for example, possible for Paranoid Bill and Bob to both physically 
impinge on different parts of the energy stone at the same time, but it is not possible for both of them to 
stand in the same shared spot of land at the same time.  Accordingly, I am not making the general claim 
that the simultaneous use of a common resource is impossible or that more than one agent can, in many 
instances, use a common resource.   
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equal common use is flawed.  Restrictive use occurs, generally, when an agent takes an 
action which prevents others from using either a particular common resource or a broader 
set of such resources.  There are, at least, two different types of restrictive use, general 
access-restricting use and specific access-restricting use.  I shall now consider these 
types of restrictive use in turn. 
To illustrate general access-restricting use consider a scenario, borrowed from 
Eric Mack, with Wally Wall Builder and Jon.107  Wally Wall Builder enjoys, as a hobby, 
building impenetrable walls around others without their knowledge or permission.  While 
Jon is deeply sleeping, Wally Wall Builder builds, without touching Jon, a forty-foot tall 
six feet by six feet wall around him.  Jon awakes to find that he is trapped with no 
possible way to escape from the walled structure.  Wally’s wall-building (an instance of 
his using common resources) is morally problematic because his actions restrict Jon’s 
ability to generally use common resources which they share within conditions of equal 
common use.  Jon can use the bottom of the “trap” by banging his fists against it, but he 
is restricted, in virtue of Wally’s actions, from using almost all other common 
resources.108 
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 Eric Mack in his (1995) “The Self-Ownership Proviso: A New and Improved Lockean Proviso,” Social 
Philosophy and Policy 12: 186-218, offers this and similar cases of restrictive use.  Mack argues that 
restrictive use is unjust (a rights-violation) because such use violates self-ownership.  He argues that an 
agent’s self-ownership affords them what he labels world interactive powers, and that restrictive use is a 
violation of an agent’s effective world interactive powers.  While Mack and I agree that restrictive use 
constitutes a rights-violation, we disagree about what right is violated by such action.  Mack suggests the 
right of self-ownership is violated, alternatively I suggest that the relevant right being violated is the right 
against users from using in a fashion which fails to leave enough and as good.  Mack, I think, over-
estimates the moral work that self-ownership can do when he directly ties the rights-violation resulting 
from restrictive use to a violation of self-ownership.         
 
108
 Another case of general access-restricting use might involve an agent burning (a using) of a natural 
bridge, for example a log, that renders it impossible for others to cross over and use the desirable side of an 
island. 
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To illustrate specific access-restricting use consider a case involving Hiding 
Helen and Bob.  Hiding Helen doesn’t build impenetrable walls around Bob; instead she 
hides, in a very effective fashion, the most valuable common resources from him.  When 
Bob goes to sleep Hiding Helen uses the very valuable common resources and before 
Bob awakes she hides the resources before he has a chance to use them.109  Some might 
suspect that specific access-restricting use is less serious a concern than general access-
restricting use.  But this is not necessarily the case.  Hiding Helen could, for example, be 
restricting Bob’s use of a particular common resources by hiding an energy stone which 
he needs to touch once a day in order to survive.   
The above examples illustrating cases of destructive use, degrading use, overuse, 
general access-restricting use, and specific access-restricting use of common resources 
inform us that the unrestricted liberty account of the normative status of equal common 
use is implausible.110  Am agent’s use as such of a common resource within conditions of 
equal common use can invoke concerns of justice.  A plausible proprietarian theory of 
justice must address the use, and not merely the appropriation, of common resources.  
This is because agents, plausibly, have claim rights against others from using, in certain 
ways, common resources within conditions of equal common use.  This leads us to ask: 
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 Here I leave open whether Jon is aware that Hiding Helen is hiding the valuable common resources.  
Jon’s knowledge of Hiding Helen’s hiding might matter to the case but I doubt that it does.  I tend not to 
think, for the purposes of evaluating the justness of Hiding Helen’s actions, that it matters if Jon knows of 
her hiding.  Her action is depriving Jon of the resource irrespective of whether he is aware of this 
deprivation. 
 
110
 It is worth pointing out that in none of the above cases did anyone physically impinge on (use) the body 
of another agent.  Thus, we cannot explain the unjustness in the actions of Toxic Jack, Paranoid Bill, Wally 
Wall Builder, or Hiding Helen by appealing to how these actors used the bodies of others.  They simply did 
no such thing.  If unjust action took place in the cases presented above, as it plausibly has, then this 
unjustness must be explained by appealing to something other than the violation of a right to bodily non-
interference. 
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What claim rights do agents have against others using, in certain ways, common 
resources? 
One possible reply is to maintain, in Lockean spirit, that agent’s have a right 
against users of common resources to be left enough and as good of common resources 
generally.  For instance, we could maintain, as I will endorse and clarify later in the 
chapter, that users of common resources have a duty, similar to that of appropriators, to 
leave others a share of competitive value that best promotes equal initial opportunity for 
welfare.      
One note is in order before I turn toward assessing the plausibility of extending 
the Lockean proviso to encompass the use of common resources.  I shall leave, at this 
stage, the specific content of the Lockean proviso open.  Later in this chapter I will 
incorporate my already developed Georgist interpretation of the Lockean proviso into an 
account covering the just using common resources, but for now I leave the specific 
content of the Lockean proviso open.  Leaving the specific content of the Lockean 
proviso open will help demonstrate an important general claim.  That being, any account 
of Lockean proprietarianism must address how it is that users of common resources must 
leave enough and as good for others.  If it can be demonstrated that users of common 
resources have a duty to leave enough and as good (in a general sense) then this will have 
important implications for any proprietarian theory of justice which is sympathetic to 
some specific account of the Lockean proviso.     
I shall now proceed to defend the claim that agents, within conditions of equal 
common use, have a right against users of common resources to be left enough and as 
good.  An effective strategy to assess the plausibility of this claim is by asking if the 
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reasons offered earlier, in the last chapter, for thinking that appropriators of common 
resources have a duty to leave others enough and as good apply equally well to thinking 
that users of common resources have a similar duty. 
Consider the following argument from analogy: 
(1) Appropriators of common resources have a duty to leave others 
enough and as good.   
(2) The reasons for thinking that appropriators of common resources 
should leave others enough and as good are, in analogous fashion, 
equally as convincing for thinking that users of common resources 
should leave others enough and as good.   
(3) Therefore, users of common resources have a duty to leave others 
enough and as good. 
 
The strength of this argument rests in the idea that if a person was attracted to the reasons 
for applying the Lockean proviso to the appropriation of common resources, then she 
ought (by parity of reasoning) to be equally attracted to the reasons for applying the 
Lockean proviso to the use of common resources. 
In order to best assess this argument let us first reconsider the morally 
problematic aspect of appropriation which led us to endorse the view that appropriators 
of common resources have a duty to leave others enough and as good.  Initially, recall, no 
agent has any greater claim to common resources than any other agent.  No agent, that is, 
has any initially greater claim to benefit from common resources than another.  When an 
agent appropriates a common resource she, by claiming the rights of private (control) 
ownership, removes the resource in a manner that prevents others, deprives them, from 
using the resource without her permission or against her interests.  The appropriation of 
common resources, as we gleaned from considering the implausibility of radical-right 
proprietarianism, can place others at a (severe) disadvantage and is morally unallowable 
unless the appropriator leaves others enough and as good.     
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The morally problematic feature of appropriation was the removal of a common 
resource, or the removal of certain liberties to use common resources, from conditions of 
equal common use.  But notice that this same morally problematic feature of 
appropriation can be equally as problematic when we consider the use of common 
resources.  For example, Toxic Jack, Paranoid Bill, Wally Wall Builder and Hiding Helen 
all, via their use, removed common resources.  Their actions, like those of appropriators, 
deprived others from using common resources.  It doesn’t seem to matter, in respect to 
their duty to leave others enough and as good, that they did not appropriate, and instead 
used, common resources. 
If this is correct then it is the removal, in some sense, of common resources from 
conditions of equal common use, irrespective of whether this removal takes the form of 
an appropriation or a using, which places a moral demand on the remover to leave others 
enough and as good.  A plausible proprietarian account should maintain that any removal 
of common resources incur the remover with the duty to leave others enough and as 
good.  It doesn’t matter, for example, if the removal is done via an appropriation or a use 
of common resources.  An agent, for example, should not be able to morally evade his 
duty to leave others enough and as good by opting to use, as opposed to appropriate, 
common resources.  To maintain that only acts of appropriation require the satisfaction of 
the Lockean proviso is an implausible position to embrace. 
It would be quite odd to suggest that Toxic Jack owes Sarah a duty to leave her 
enough and as good if he appropriates the fresh water spring, but owes her no such duty if 
he merely uses the spring in a destructive or degrading fashion.  Toxic Jack’s destructive 
use of the spring disadvantages Sarah to, at least, the same degree as would have his 
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appropriation of the spring.  Sarah perishes either way (assuming that Toxic Jack does 
not grant her permission to use the spring in the case where he appropriates). 
Consider again the case of Paranoid Bill and Mark.  Let us imagine that Paranoid 
Bill decides that he would like to exercise a moral power and appropriate the energy 
stone which is necessary to sustain Mark’s life.  We would, rightly, demand that Paranoid 
Bill leave Mark enough and as good.  If the price of this leaving is more than he is willing 
or able to pay, then he is barred from appropriating the energy stone.  He simply cannot 
remove the energy stone unless he leaves Mark enough and as good.  Quite clearly, 
Paranoid Bill’s removal of the energy stone by means of his overuse is every bit as 
disadvantaging to Mark than would have been his appropriation of the energy stone.  The 
duty, to leave enough and as good, which Paranoid Bill owes Mark is not contingent on 
the means of removing common resources which he opts to pursue.  How it is that 
Paranoid Bill goes about removing common resources, by means of appropriation or use, 
is of no moral consequence to the duty he owes to leave Mark enough and as good. 
This same strategy of reasoning works, I maintain, equally well when we consider 
cases of either general access-restricting use or specific access-restricting use.  Wally 
Wall Builder and Hiding Helen each removed common resources from conditions of 
equal common use in a fashion that failed to leave Jon and Bob respectively enough and 
as good.  Again, there seems to be no good reason to maintain that leaving enough and as 
good for others is demanded by Wally Wall Builder and Hiding Helen only if they 
remove common resources by means of appropriation.  Wally and Helen acquire the 
moral duty to leave others enough and as good whenever they, regardless of the means 
they employ, remove common resources from conditions of equal common use. 
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  Here it is worth returning to a criticism lodged against the radical-right 
proprietarian.  The radical-right proprietarian, recall, was wrong to suggest that being a 
first-claimer was necessary and sufficient to appropriate common resources.  This was 
because such an account, without invoking the satisfaction of the Lockean proviso as a 
necessary condition of appropriation, allowed an agent to appropriate far too easily with 
far too little regard toward other agents.  But the same reasoning applies equally well 
toward first-users, or for that matter subsequent users, of common resources.  A user of 
common resources who fails to leave others enough and as good is, as we have seen from 
earlier examples, as open to the charge of far too easily disregarding others as the 
appropriator who fails to leave others enough and as good.  If a necessary condition of 
appropriating common resources is leaving others enough and as good, then such a 
condition is also necessary for the just use of common resources.      
Earlier I noted that political philosophers have, almost completely, ignored the 
just use of common resources and instead set their sights on the appropriation of such 
resources.111  But if my arguments in this chapter have been successful, this has been a 
glaring mistake (or at least a significant oversight).  What explains this?  It isn’t as if 
political philosophers are a slow or unimaginative lot.  The oversight can be explained by 
noting that appropriation is, often, a much more obvious and disadvantaging means of 
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 In his, “When is Original Appropriation Required,” Monist 73:4 (1990), pp. 504-519, David Schmitz 
argues that those who do appropriate natural resources are bound by a duty to future generations not to use 
their appropriated resources in certain ways.  He also maintains that given the overuse of natural resources 
in the commons (brought about by a ‘tragedy of the commons’) the appropriation and care of natural 
resources for future generations is, in certain cases, not merely permissible but obligatory.  Schmitz’s 
points are well taken, but his second point relies upon the standard assumption that only appropriators (and 
not users) of natural resources must leave others enough and as good.  If, however, users of natural 
resources have a duty to leave others enough and as good, then there is no reason to mandate appropriation 
as means of conserving natural resources for present and future generations.  Applying the Lockean proviso 
to the use of natural resources serves to conserve for present and future generations without maintaining 
that the appropriation of natural resources is morally obligatory.             
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removing common resources from conditions of equal common use than is using such 
resources. 
As a matter of contingent fact the use of common resources is less likely, than the 
appropriation of these resources, to remove in a disadvantaging fashion.  To offer a 
simple case, the appropriation of a trail in woods has the strong potential to disadvantage 
others, but using the trail by walking along it, typically, will not.  After all, if we assume 
a choice-protecting model of rights, the appropriator of the trail can exclude others, at her 
will, from using the trail.  The user of the trail has no right to do this.  By considering 
such cases, we can think of many instances of using a common resource, for instance 
when an agent uses a trail in a walking-fashion, where a user’s duty to leave others 
enough and as good is either non-existent or trivially satisfied. 
Appropriation is a type of removing common resources, or more specifically the 
liberties that others have to use common resources, which is typically more 
disadvantageous to others than removal by means of use.  This observation, nonetheless, 
doesn’t challenge the plausibility of the claim that both appropriators and users of 
common resources have a duty to leave others enough and as good.  The observation 
does, however, explain why the use of common resources has been a neglected concern.   
 Also, it is worth stressing the contingent nature of the empirical observation that 
appropriation is typically a more disadvantaging type of removal.  There is no reason why 
the appropriation of common resources has to be generally more disadvantaging to others 
than the use of common resources.  For example, what if an appropriator, simply granted 
permission, which the appropriator never revoked, to others to use the appropriated 
common resources to the degree “which was necessary to leave others enough and as 
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good,” while a user of common resources engaged in destructive use and failed to leave 
others enough and as good.  If this were the case then the appropriation of common 
resources wouldn’t be morally problematic (or not obviously problematic), but the use of 
such resources would be.  After all, the appropriator has granted others permission, which 
they never revoke, to use her resources to whatever degree is necessary for her to leave 
others enough and as good, while the use of common resources would be morally 
problematic because the user failed to leave others enough and as good. 
 The first section of this chapter is now complete.  I have argued for the claim that 
users of common resources, within conditions of equal common use, have a duty to leave 
others enough and as good.  This claim is general in scope and this generality is 
important as it has significant implications for any Lockean proprietarian theory of 
justice.  It is a claim that, if my arguments have been successful, should be dealt with and 
incorporated into any Lockean proprietarian theory of justice.  If one accepts the Lockean 
proviso as binding on an appropriator of common resources, then she should also offer an 
account of how the proviso is, likewise, binding on users of such resources.  This is an 
observation that applies to all Lockean proprietarian theories of justice irrespective of 
how they interpret the duty of agents to leave others enough and as good. 
 In the last chapter I offered an account of equal initial opportunity for welfare 
Georgism which I defended as the best interpretation of the Lockean proviso concerning 
the appropriation of common resources.  I shall assume that the Georgist account 
defended in the last chapter is the correct account of appropriation and that this account, 
properly understood, is also the correct account of how best to interpret the Lockean 
proviso concerning the just use of common resources.  The remainder of this chapter will, 
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hence, be focused on developing the best way in which the duty of users to leave others 
enough and as good can best be incorporated into the previously defended account of 
equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism. 
 Before considering the best way in which to incorporate the just use of common 
resources into an account of equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism, it will be 
worthwhile to reconsider the Georgist account defended in the last chapter.  Recall the 
following version of equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism defended, as applied 
to the appropriation of common resources, in the previous chapter. 
Equal Initial Opportunity For Welfare Georgism: You may appropriate a 
common resource X if and only if you leave others their equal initial opportunity 
for welfare share of the greater of (a) the competitive value of the ownership 
rights claimed over X or (b) the minimum appropriation payment of X.  
       
We can refer to the competitive value determined in an appropriation auction, 
where the competitive value of rights of ownership over a common resource is 
established, as ownership competitive value.  And, consistent with the defense of 
Georgism offered in the last chapter, it stands to reason that those claiming rights of 
ownership over a common resource should leave others the ownership competitive value, 
consistent with the rights of ownership they claim, in order to appropriate the resource.  
An agent should leave the competitive value of what she removes from conditions of 
equal common use.  And if, for instance, an agent appropriates a common resource and 
hence removes the durable moral liberty of others to use the resource (without the 
appropriator’s permission or against her interests), then the appropriator must pay the 
competitive value of this removal. 
The above summary analysis of the duty owed by appropriators to leave others 
enough and as good, however, won’t form an exact fit with the duty that users of 
128  
 
 
common resources have to leave others enough and as good.  Users, as opposed to 
appropriators, make no claim of ownership over common resources and hence do not 
come to have durable rights of ownership over these resources.  Accordingly, it seems 
wrong to suggest that users of common resources should pay, in the fulfillment of the 
Lockean proviso, ownership competitive value over common resources they use. 
Users of common resources generally remove the effective, as opposed to 
durable, moral liberties of others.  When, for instance, Hiding Helen hides common 
resources from Bob which he and Sarah share within conditions of equal common use, 
she removes Bob’s effective moral liberty to use the hidden resources.  Hiding Helen’s 
actions, however, do not remove any durable moral liberties that Bob might have to use 
the hidden resources.  He is, after all, morally free to use the hidden resources.  Bob 
would not, alternatively, be morally free to use the hidden resources had Hiding Helen 
appropriated the hidden resources and refused to grant him permission to use the hidden 
resources.  What users of common resources potentially remove, and accordingly what 
they should pay for removing from conditions of equal use, are the effective moral 
liberties of others to use common resources.112 
Recall the original appeal of Georgism discussed in the previous chapter.  Agents 
should pay the competitive value of rights over common resources which they remove, 
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 One could challenge whether the above appeal to users removing the effective liberties of others is 
correct in cases of degrading and destructive use.  In cases of overuse, general access-restricting use, and 
specific access-restricting use, the idea that a user has removed the effective liberty of others to use some, 
or a class of, common resources seems clear.  But the removal of an effective liberty to use is less clear in 
cases of destructive or degrading use.  After all, it is true that Sarah can use the spring which is polluted by 
the Toxic Jack’s polluting actions.  It is just that if she uses the spring she will die or get very sick.  But her 
liberty to use ‘the spring’ has not been removed.  In such cases the appeal to a user removing an effective 
liberty can still make sense if the common resource being removed is carefully specified. For instance, 
what Toxic Jack removes would be a ‘clean spring suitable for healthy drinking’ or the effective liberty of 
others to use a clean spring suitable for healthy drinking.  When the common resource or liberty to use the 
common resource is properly specified an appeal to the removal of effective liberties to use can be applied 
to all five types of morally problematic use.  
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resources which no one has any greater claim to than another.  Georgists have, 
traditionally, only considered paying the competitive value over claimed durable 
ownership rights over common resources.  And I have defended such a paying (in a 
fashion which best promotes equal initial opportunity for welfare).  But notice the same 
Georgist appeal to paying the competitive value for what is removed, and others deprived 
of, works equally well to account for the duty of users to leave others enough and as 
good.  We can, in Georgist spirit, employ the idea of competitive value to explain how it 
is that users of common resources can pay the price of removing the effective liberty of 
others to use common resources.  This is because just as ownership rights over common 
resources have a competitive value, so too does the effective moral liberty to use a 
common resource.  
To demonstrate that the effective moral liberty to use a common resource can 
have a competitive value consider that multiple agents would often be willing to pay for 
the effective moral liberty to use, as opposed to not using at all, a common resource.  
Using, as opposed to not using, a common resource is often worth something to an agent 
because using compared with the non-use of a common resource, allows for the 
fulfillment of one’s plans and projects.   
Both Paranoid Bill and Mark, for example, would likely be willing to bid, quite a 
bit, to have the effective liberty to use the energy stone for some specified ten second 
period during the course of a day.  Neither, notice, is bidding, in such a scenario, for 
rights of ownership over the stone, instead both are bidding for the effective liberty to use 
the stone during some designated time.  What such a case demonstrates is that the 
effective liberty to use a common resource can, when more than one agent is interested in 
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using the resource, have a competitive value.  The notion of competitive value should not 
be reserved solely for ownership rights over common resources, but can naturally be 
extended to encompass the effective liberty to use a common resource. 
 Given that the effective liberty to use a common resource can have a competitive 
value we are now prepared to extend our extant account of equal initial opportunity for 
welfare Georgism to encompass the just use of common resources.  I shall now offer and 
defend the best way in which to incorporate the duty that users of common resources 
have to leave others enough and as good into the extant account of equal initial 
opportunity for welfare Georgism.  Consider the following proviso governing the just use 
of common resources.  
Equal Initial Opportunity For Welfare Georgism Use Proviso:  You may 
justly use a common resource X if and only if you leave others their equal initial 
opportunity for welfare share of the greater of (a) the competitive value of the 
liberty right to use X (b) the minimum use payment of X. 
 
The above proviso governing just use is very similar in structure to the proviso governing 
appropriation.  Notice that the first clause again allows an agent to justly use a common 
resource if such use is the minimum necessary to ensure that the user has a life worth 
living.  I shall not say anything further to defend this clause than I have already said in 
defense of the idea within a plausible account of appropriation.  The second clause 
maintains that if the use of a common resource is consistent with the user having a life 
worth living then the user is obligated to leave others their equal initial opportunity for 
welfare share of the greater of either the competitive value of the maximal liberty right to 
use X or the minimum use payment of X. 
In order to clarify the proviso governing just use I shall first discuss how it is that 
the competitive value of the effective liberty to use a common resource is determined.  
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Then, I shall clarify and explain the role of the minimum use payment in the proviso 
governing just use.  As a foreshadowing, the minimum use payment for using a common 
resource X is the amount which leaves equal initial opportunity for welfare no worse than 
compared with a baseline of universal non-use of X.  The minimum use payment will 
serve a similar role in the proviso governing use as the minimum appropriation payment 
serves in the proviso governing appropriation.  But I shall reserve discussion of the 
minimum use payment until after the question of how to determine the competitive value 
of the effective liberty right to use a common resource. 
 How, then, is the competitive value of the effective liberty to use a common 
resource determined?  Here, we can return to the idea, considered in the previous chapter, 
that competitive value is determined by an auction.  Relying, again, on the idea of a 
Vickery auction, I suggest that the use competitive value of the effective liberty to use a 
common resource X is determined by the second highest bid on the effective liberty to 
use X.  The competitive value of the effective liberty to use a common resource is 
determined in the same auction format as is the competitive value of ownership rights 
over common resources, but what is being bid on is quite different.  As opposed to 
bidding on rights of ownership over common resources, bidders in a use auction bid on 
the effective liberty to use a common resource. 
 One problematic aspect of a use auction is clearly specifying what is being bid on 
in such a way that all bidders are bidding on the same effective liberty to use the common 
resource up for bid.  We can set the common resource X and time T across bidders fairly 
easily.  For example, all bidders could be bidding on the effective liberty to use a shaded 
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spot of land between noon and one on a specified day.  Setting the X and the T in such a 
way that all bidders are bidding on the same thing is not overly problematic.   
Problems arise, however, when we consider that bidders will, often, be bidding on 
different effective liberties the common resource up for bid.  Consider, for instance, the 
differing effective liberty that two agents might wish to have over a spot of shaded land.  
One agent, for instance, might wish to have the effective liberty to sit in the shaded spot 
and read a book, while another might desire to have the effective liberty to jog in place in 
the shaded spot.  Agents will, in many cases, want to use common resources in different 
ways.  Given the likely divergence of desired effective liberties to use the shaded spot of 
land between noon and one how should the effective liberty to use the common resource 
be specified so as to ensure that all bidders in the auction are bidding on the same thing? 
 The best answer to this question is to maintain that bidders in a use auction are 
bidding on the effective liberty as such to use a common resource.  Bidding on the 
effective liberty as such to use a common resource allows all the particular liberties to use 
that bidders might have in mind to count under the same description.  For instance, both 
the bidder who desires the effective liberty to use the shaded spot of land for jogging and 
the bidder who desires the effective liberty to use the shaded spot of land for sitting and 
reading are bidding for the same thing if they both are bidding for the effective liberty as 
such to use the spot of land.    
 In many instances it could be the case that effective liberty to use a common 
resource may have no competitive value at all.  For example, imagine a two agent world 
with two normal agents.  When bidding on what they would pay for the effective liberty 
to use as such a walking trail from noon until two during a specified day, one agent bids 
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one unit and the other agent bids nothing. Thus, the competitive value of the effective 
liberty to use the walking trail from noon until two, assuming a Vickery auction scheme, 
is 0.  Neither need pay any competitive value for using the path from noon until two since 
a fortiori the liberty to use the path has no competitive value.  It could well turn out as a 
matter of contingent fact that many cases of the effective liberty to use a common 
resource has little or no competitive value. 
 In the previous chapter I argued that appropriators of common resources have a 
duty to pay the competitive value of the ownership rights they claimed in a fashion which 
best promotes equal initial opportunity for welfare.  In like fashion, users of common 
resources must pay the competitive value of the effective liberty rights they remove in a 
fashion which best promotes equal initial opportunity for welfare.  It is worth noting that 
it could turn out (as we saw that it could turn out in the appropriation case concerning 
control-ownership competitive value) that the full payment of competitive value is owed 
to one individual.  Such a situation can occur, for instance, in a two agent world where 
one agent is normal and the other badly disabled.  I mention this case to highlight the 
tight parallel between the duty of both appropriators and users of common resources to 
leave the competitive value of what they remove in a fashion which best promotes equal 
initial opportunity for welfare. 
 My discussion of how to best determine use competitive value and other related 
issues is now complete, I shall now continue by discussing the role of the minimum use 
payment in the proposed proviso governing the just use of common resources. 
 Recall that the proposed proviso governing just use maintains that a user of a 
common resource X at time T, assuming this use leaves the user’s life worth living, must: 
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leave others their equal initial opportunity for welfare share of the greater of (a) 
the use competitive value of the maximal liberty right to use X at time T or (b) the 
minimum use payment of X at time T. 
 
But what is the minimum use payment?  The minimum use payment, taking a lead from 
the minimum appropriation payment, for using a common resource X is the amount 
which leaves equal initial opportunity for welfare no worse than compared with a 
baseline of universal non-use of X.  A user of a common resource X must pay for any 
reduction in equal initial opportunity for welfare that her use brings about as compared 
with the universal non-use of X.  Of course, the payment to use a common resource could 
be greater (and as an empirical matter often will be greater) than the minimum use 
payment if the competitive value of the liberty right to use the common resource exceeds 
the minimum use payment.   
Here it is worth pointing out that in all the morally problematic cases of using 
common resources discussed earlier, destructive use, degrading use, overuse, and 
restrictive use, an agent used a common resource in such a way as to make initial equal 
opportunity of welfare worse than a baseline of universal non-use of X.  Thus, 
irrespective of the competitive value of the effective liberty to use a common resource, 
the minimum use payment would be applied to destructive or monopolistic users of 
common resource X where the use in question reduced initial equal opportunity of 
welfare below of baseline of the universal non-use of X. 
 It is worth stressing that the minimum use payment is based on the effect that the 
actual use of a common resource X has toward initial equal opportunity for welfare as 
compared with the baseline of the universal non-use of X.  The minimum use payment 
cannot be ascertained without assessing the actual use of the common resource in 
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question.  For instance, the minimum use payment of Toxic Jack’s destructive use of the 
spring will be much greater than that of Sally Swimmer who uses the spring merely for a 
swim.  This is because Toxic Jack’s destructive use of the spring of the spring has a much 
greater potential to reduce equal initial opportunity for welfare, as measured against a 
baseline of universal non-use, than does Sally Swimmer’s use of the spring.  Here we see 
that just as the competitive value of the effective liberty to use the spring might have no 
competitive value, the actual use of the spring at time T might also incur no minimum use 
payment (or in the case of Toxic Jack a very high minimum use payment).   
 The minimum use payment provides users of common resources with an 
incentitive to use common resources in a non-destructive or non-monopolistic fashion.  
For example, consider that the competitive value of a liberty right to use a spring is very 
low.  Sally Swimmer, assuming that here actual use of the spring does not reduce equal 
initial welfare below of baseline of universal non-use of the spring, has the duty to pay 
only the very low competitive value of the effective liberty to use the spring in the 
fashion which best promotes equal initial opportunity for welfare.  Toxic Jack, on the 
other hand, would have to pay much more than the very low competitive value for the 
effective liberty to use the spring because his actual use of the spring significantly 
reduced equal initial opportunity for welfare as compared with a universal baseline of the 
non-use of the spring.         
 Here it is worth asking, why would the universal non-use of a common resource 
X be of any value at all to an agent’s welfare?  After all, universal non-use means that no 
one is using X (at the time T of use).  The universal non-use of X might contribute to the 
welfare of an agent for, at least, two reasons.  The first reason is because a common 
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resource can benefit an agent even when he doesn’t, nor does anyone else, use the 
resource in question.   
Consider a case involving a two agent world housing James and Eric which 
utilizes the physical impingement account of use.  James lives below a high canopy of 
tress (the canopy is one hundred feet from the ground).  James receives a benefit of shade 
from the canopy even though he is not using (physically impending on) the canopy.  
Having no physical access to the canopy and hence no access to use the canopy James 
would not pay anything, say within the confines of a Vickery use auction, for the 
effective liberty to use the canopy.  Eric, however, lives on a ledge overlooking the 
canopy.  Eric is tiered of looking down at the canopy everyday and would like to destroy 
it (by say burning the canopy).  In such a case the competitive value of the maximal 
effective liberty to use the canopy at time T would be nothing (since the second highest 
bid is 0).  Nonetheless, if Eric uses the canopy in a destructive fashion his minimum use 
payment could be very high consistent with how his “burning use” reduced James’s 
opportunities for welfare as compared with the universal non-use of the canopy of trees. 
Second, the particular way in which a common resource is used might be in 
conflict with the future plans one might have to use the resource.  For instance, Toxic 
Jack’s destructive or degrading use of the fresh water spring would likely be inconsistent 
with the future uses which Sarah plans to pursue with respect to the spring.  Thus, even 
though Sarah might not pay anything for the maximal effective liberty to use the spring 
from noon until one on a specified day, she would, however, pay a large sum for the 
spring to be in a condition of universal non-use rather than used in a destructive way by 
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Toxic Jack.  Toxic Jack’s use of the spring from noon until one makes thing much worse 
for equal initial opportunity for welfare than does the universal non-use of the spring.    
Two final points of clarification are worth noting before concluding our 
discussion of just use.  First, the duty of a user of a common resource X is to pay the 
greater of the competitive value of the effective liberty to use X or the minimum use 
payment of X.  In some cases the competitive value might be greater than the minimum 
use payment and in other cases vice versa.  Which is the greater of the two will simply be 
a question settled by the contingencies of the competitive demand to use X (in the case of 
assessing competitive value) and an assessment of how a particular use of X impacts 
initial equal opportunity for welfare as compared with a baseline of the universal non-use 
of X (in the case of assessing the minimum use payment).  Second, irrespective of 
whether a user of a common resource X has a duty to pay competitive value or the 
minimum use payment of X she must make this payment in a fashion which best 
promotes equal initial opportunity for welfare.      
 In this chapter I argued that the Lockean proviso should be applied to the use of 
common resources within conditions of equal common use.  I argued for this claim by 
maintaining that the same reasoning which led us to rightly apply the Lockean proviso to 
the appropriation of common resources works equally well for applying the proviso to the 
just use of common resources.  I then offered an account of how the just use of common 
resources could be incorporated into a model of equal initial opportunity for welfare 
Georgism.  The following proviso was offered to best account for the incorporation. 
Equal Initial Opportunity For Welfare Georgism Use Proviso:  You may use a 
common resource X if and only if you leave others their equal initial opportunity 
for welfare share of the greater of (a) the use competitive value of the liberty right 
to use X or (b) the minimum use payment of X. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This dissertation set out to accomplish two primary objectives.  First, it strove, within the 
confines of a proprietarian theory of justice, to give a better description and treatment of 
the Lockean proviso concerning the unilateral appropriation of common resources than 
can be found in the extant literature.  My left-proprietarian treatment of the Lockean 
proviso rendered the result that you may appropriate a common resource X if and only if: 
you leave others their equal initial opportunity for welfare share of the greater of 
(a) the competitive value of the rights claimed over X or (b) the minimum 
appropriation payment of X. 
 
I defended the plausibility of this left-proprietarian Georgist account of appropriation 
against right proprietarian accounts, e.g., radical-right proprietarianism and Nozickian 
proprietarianism, competing Georgist accounts, equal share Georgism, and other left-
proprietarian accounts, e.g., pure equal initial equal opportunity appropriation. 
 The second primary objective I sought to accomplish in this project was to 
impress and develop the curiously overlooked point that the Lockean proviso, also 
applies, in some fashion, to the use of common resources.  I argued that any plausible 
Lockean left-proprietarian account must find a way to incorporate considerations of justly 
using common resources into its theory of justice.  The specific account of just use which 
I offered built upon my treatment of appropriation and maintained that you may use a 
common resource X if and only if: 
you leave others their equal initial opportunity for welfare share of the greater of 
(a) the competitive value of the liberty right to use X (b) the minimum use 
payment of X.  
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It is no longer enough for any Lockean based theory of justice to merely discuss 
appropriation and neglect issues of use.  The just use of common resources should no 
longer remain the neglected red-headed step child of a Lockean left-proprietarian 
treatment of just property acquisition. 
 Where do we go from here, both theoretically and applied?  First, I shall address 
some of the more important applied ramifications involving time and space that are 
directly related with the conclusions I have drawn and then I will continue by discussing 
some theoretical issues surrounding the development of a full left-proprietarianism. 
 Concerning the issue of time, this project has implications concerning the duty to 
leave enough and as good that is plausibly owed to future generations of agents.  For 
instance, we can ask: would it be just for a presently existing generation of agents to fully 
consume (in a fashion which left all presently existing agents enough and as good) nearly 
all the common resources the world has to offer and leave future generations of agents no 
such resources and hence miserable life prospects?113  The issue of duties to future 
generations is very complex (how can, for example, a duty be owed to an agent who 
doesn’t exist), but I maintain that such a consumption of common resources would 
plausibly violate a duty owed to leave future generations of agents enough and as good. 
 One rough gesture toward an answer of what the duty to leave future generations 
enough and as good might amount to would be to maintain that future generations have a 
right to be left a world with the same prospects for well-being (equivalent value) as were 
                                                 
113
 For a recent contribution considering the relation between the Lockean proviso and duties owed to 
future generations see Clark Wolf’s, “Contemporary Property Rights, Lockean Provisos, and the Interests 
of Future Generations,” Ethics, 105:4 (1995), pp. 791-818. 
140  
 
 
had by the previously existing generation.114  The rough idea is that presently existing 
generations of agents have an obligation to leave the future generation a world of 
“equivalent value”.  This approach would allow an existing generation to use non-
renewable common resources so long as they left the next future generation, perhaps 
through technological development, a world with equivalent value.  For example, a 
presently existing generation could use petroleum if they left the next future generations a 
technology, perhaps advanced hydrogen fuel cells, which leaves the world that the future 
generation inherits no worse than the one had by the presently existing generation.  As I 
note this is a rough gesture toward a solution to a very difficult and complex problem.  
Nonetheless, something roughly like the above solution of “leaving equivalent value” is 
probably on the right track.            
 The duties owed to future generations of agents is an issue which has found its 
way into the applied political arena.  Norway, an oil rich country, has decided to take the 
duty owed to leave future generations enough and as good very seriously.  The 
Norwegian government has placed over 300 billion dollars gained by the sale of 
petroleum (a non-renewable common resource) in an investment account earmarked for 
future generations of Norwegians (even the interest and capital gains from the oil-fund is 
earmarked for future generations of Norwegians).  A minority in Norway have taken 
issue with this plan and asked that the government spend more oil-revenues on presently 
existing Norwegians.  The strong, and I suspect correct, response from the Norwegian 
                                                 
114
 Here there is a tough question concerning whether the leaving owed to future generations is a per capita 
leaving or an absolute leaving of the value of common resources.  Both views have problems and I merely 
wish to point out the difficulties of each in this footnote.  If the leaving is a per capita leaving then existent 
generations would suffer a tremendous burden if the future generations of agents were to increase by a 
great number.  However, if the leaving is an absolute leaving then if future generations of agents increase 
by a great number agents born to these later generations might suffer from a very small leaving.  My 
inclination is to side with the per capita approach and simply note that the burden to future generations 
might well be very demanding, but the issue is very complicated.   
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government has been to dismiss such appeals citing Norway’s already exceptional 
standard of living and responsibility to future Norwegians. 
 In addition to leaving future generations enough and as good this project also has 
ramifications for issues of space, and in particular global poverty.  I assume that an 
agent’s country of origin does not affect the right that she has to be left enough and as 
good.  This is important because presently 800 million agents live in conditions of 
desperate poverty where battling starvation is of constant concern and often this poverty 
is most prevalent in the world’s developing countries.  The situation is dire for many.  In 
India, to offer just one country for example, conditions of poverty are so horrendous that 
some have opted to cut off their arms or legs so that they appear more pitiful and are able 
to beg for a few extra coins.  Examples such as this demonstrate the desperate situation 
confronting many of the world’s poorest agents. 
 If my arguments have been successful agents, including the desperate poor, are 
owed a payment by those who appropriate and use common resources such as petroleum.  
In this spirit, Thomas Pogge, suggests a Global Resources Dividend tax that would be 
applied to sale of common resources (such as petroleum) and the revenue from such taxes 
could be used to alleviate global poverty.  According to this suggestion: 
States, while retaining full control over the natural resources in their territory, 
would be required to pay a dividend proportional to the value of any of these 
resources they decide to use or sell.  The word ‘dividend’ is meant to suggest that 
all human beings, including those now excluded, are viewed as owning an 
inalienable stake in all limited resources.115 
 
The core idea motivating the GRD is that all agents have some type of claim in natural 
(common) resources (or the value derived thereof), an idea that is very friendly to this 
                                                 
115
 Thomas Pogge “Migration and Poverty,” In Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, eds. 
Robert Goodin and Philip Pettit (Blackwell, 2006), p. 715.   
142  
 
 
project.  How much would such a tax or payment on common resources yield to help 
alleviate global poverty?  Pogge estimates that the money provided to the poor from oil 
revenues alone (in 1997, sure to be substantially more today) would be fifty billion (U.S.) 
dollars annually.116  And of course this amount would be much higher if we incorporated 
payments on the appropriation and use of all common resources.  That the world has 
common resources of so much value, while hundreds of millions of agents (who have 
some stake in these resources) die of starvation is, if my left-proprietarianism account is 
roughly correct, a horrific yet curable gross violation of rights on a mass scale.  
Moving along to some final theoretical considerations, I shall now briefly address 
how this project fits into the development of a full left-proprietarian account.  Even 
granting that this project has offered the most plausible proprietarian account of the 
appropriation and just use of common resources, much more would need to be said to 
develop a full proprietarian theory of justice.  One issue which I left unresolved is the 
status of self-ownership.  A full proprietarian theory of justice would have to invest 
substantial time sorting out the most plausible treatment of self-ownership.  If this most 
plausible treatment of self-ownership turns out to be full, or near full, then libertarianism 
would emerge as the most plausible form of proprietarianism.  If some lesser robust 
notion of self-ownership turns out to be more plausible than full self-ownership, then 
some variant of proprietarianism other than libertarianism would prove to be the best 
proprietarian account.  The proprietarian account of appropriation and just use of 
common resources I defended is consistent with a wide variety of treatment of self-
ownership.   
                                                 
116
 Pogge calculates this number assuming a 2$ per barrel GRD (and this was when 1993 oil was roughly 
18$ a barrel).  Presently oil is valued at roughly 100$ per barrel. 
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Further areas of future research in developing a full proprietarian account of 
justice would also involve saying much more about rights to transfer property and rights 
to compensation if one’s property rights are, in some fashion, infringed.  For example, 
what should be said about rights to transfer property from dead agents, bequest?  This 
issue was not addressed in this project, but it would have to be in a full defense of 
proprietarian theory of justice.  Circling back to a point astutely made by Robert Nozick 
at the start of this project, that being: a full proprietarian account of justice would have to 
speak to the appropriation, transfer, and rectification of private property.  I have written 
directly to only the first of these essential elements of a full proprietarian theory justice in 
this project but have, upon the way, added and addressed a new issue that a full 
proprietarian account must address, the just use of common resources.  There is much 
more to be done to develop the theoretical underpinnings of a full proprietarian theory of 
justice.  I leave it for a future time to do this additional and important work. 
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APPENDIX ONE: ROBUST SELF-OWNERSHIP 
 
 
 
Now I shall continue by considering a further condition on appropriation which Otsuka 
invokes in his treatment of appropriation.  Even though I have adjudicated the conflict 
between pure equal initial opportunity appropriation and equal initial opportunity for 
welfare Georgism in favor of the Georgist position this further condition on appropriation 
is both interesting and, as we will see, plausible leads to a result that is generally 
applicable to any plausible treatment of appropriation. 
Otsuka (by relying on a notion of self-ownership we won’t specifically consider 
here) proposes a robustness condition in which an appropriator should be morally 
permitted to appropriate a substance-share of common resources without having to leave 
enough and as good for others, where this leaving would require the appropriator to labor 
or transfer bodily resources.  An appropriator should never, according to Otsuka, be 
forced to sacrifice life, limb or labor in order to appropriate a subsistence-share of 
common resources.117  The robustness condition cancels out or overrides any duties 
which an appropriator might have to labor for, or leave bodily resources to, others.  We 
can specify the robustness condition as follows: 
                                                 
117
 Otsuka never clearly commits himself to idea that the robustness condition is to take priority over (or 
override) his egalitarian proviso, i.e., the right of agents to be left an equally advantageous share.   But such 
an overriding of his egalitarian proviso is the only way in which the robustness condition is more than 
merely trivial.  Either Otsuka’s robustness condition is trivial or it does the work of rendering the right of 
robust self-ownership to take moral priority over the rights of agents to be left an equally advantageous 
share.  This dilemma results because if the world has enough common resources for everyone to subsist and 
everyone is able to unilaterally convert common resources into subsistence, i.e., are able-bodied, then 
everyone will trivially leave others enough and as good (a subsistence share) when they appropriate only a 
subsistence share for themselves.  There is simply no need for Otsuka to add a robustness condition to self-
ownership if everyone is able-bodied and the world confers a subsistence-share of common resources for 
everyone.  The robustness condition only does, non-trivial, work to protect self-owners if it protects 
subsistence-share-appropriators from having to labor to satisfy the demands of pure equal initial 
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Robustness Condition: You can appropriate a subsistence-share of common 
resources in a fashion which does not demand you to labor for, or transfer bodily 
resources to, others.   
 
Considering Otsuka’s proposed robustness condition is important because neither 
equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism or, for that matter, pure equal initial 
opportunity for welfare appropriation rules out the possibility than an appropriator might 
have to labor for, or transfer bodily resources, e.g., fingers and toes, to others in order to 
appropriate even a subsistence-share of common resources.  In all the cases we have 
considered thus far an appropriator could fulfill her duty toward others in a manner which 
required leaving other a certain amount of resources or competitive value in a fashion 
which did not necessitate her to labor for, or transfer bodily resources to, others.  As I 
shall now illustrate, however, equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism can, in 
certain cases, place demands on appropriators that they labor for or transfer bodily 
resources to others. 
Imagine that Unable and Able simultaneously pop into existence in a world 
containing common resources that have a full competitive value of 1000 units.  Unable’s 
disability is so severe that, consistent with equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism, 
Unable has the right to be left to the entire competitive value of common resources.  The 
world, having never been previously occupied by agents, contains no artifacts and a 
fortiori has no artifactual value. 
Able opts to appropriate common resources worth 100 units of competitive value, 
his subsistence-share.  Able, according to equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism, 
must leave Unable the entire competitive value of common resources which will include 
the competitive value of the common resources he appropriated.  How can Able fulfill his 
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duty to Unable?  Able can, of course, leave Unable the remaining 900 units of 
competitive value to be found in common resources that he has not appropriated, but this 
leaving puts Able 100 units of competitive value shy of fulfilling his duty owed to 
Unable.  Able cannot leave Unable artifacts he has produced as a way to fulfill her duty 
because there are no artifacts yet.  It seems as if the only way in which Able can leave 
Unable the entire competitive value of common resources that she has a right to be left is 
if he provides labor or bodily resources to Unable.  Able has no other way of promptly 
satisfying the duty he owes Unable.118  Equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism 
renders the implication that in order for Able to leave enough and as good for others 
(Unable), consistent with the subsistence-share appropriation he has chosen to make, will 
demand that he labor for or transfer bodily resources to Unable.119    
The robustness condition would allow Able, to appropriate a subsistence-share of 
common resources without being bound by the duty to leave enough and as good, where 
such leaving would require labor or the transfer of bodily resources.  If a robustness 
condition is plausible then we should amend our previous specification of equal initial 
opportunity for welfare Georgism to allow agents (such as Able) to appropriate a 
                                                 
118
 The mentioning of Able’s promptly satisfying his duty to Unable is important.  If Able could simply 
write Unable an “I owe You” and leave Unable the 1000 units of competitive value that Unable has a right 
to be left, then Able could avoid laboring or transferring bodily resources to Unable at the time he 
appropriates because he could simply wait until that time which he could leave artifactual value that he 
could create from the common resources which he appropriated.  I think the most promising way to treat 
this suggestion is to maintain that Able must immediately, or in an extremely quick fashion, leave Unable 
the 1000 units of competitive value which she has a right to be left.  Thus, I am skeptical that Able can 
simply write Unable an “I owe you” and satisfy his duty in a non-prompt fashion.  
 
119
 Here, it worth distinguishing between a duty to leave others a certain amount of the competitive value of 
common resources where this necessitates laboring or transferring bodily resources to others, and having a 
duty to labor or transfer bodily resources to others per se.  Equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism 
can demand, in certain cases, the first of appropriators, but it does not demand the later.  The Georgist 
holds, as was noted earlier, that an agent need only pay the competitive value of the common resources that 
she chooses to appropriate, no payment (no duty owed to others) is required on the competitive value of 
one’s body or the competitive value of what one adds to the world, e.g., labor.  Equal initial opportunity for 
welfare Georgism does not stray from this important Georgist tenement.  
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subsistence-share without being bound by justice to labor for or transfer bodily resources 
to others. 
I shall now proceed to examine the plausibly of the robustness condition and in 
turn discuss what if any alterations should be made to the version of equal initial 
opportunity for welfare Georgism currently under consideration. 
One could try to defend the plausibility of the robustness condition on the grounds 
that demanding that Able labor for, or transfer bodily resources to, others, to any degree, 
in order to appropriate a mere subsistence-share of common resources is to grave a cost 
to Able’s.  Such a demand, one could argue, is too great a restriction of Able’s autonomy.  
He shouldn’t have to labor for another just so she can appropriate a subsistence-share of 
common resources.  Able’s just options have been restricted to either labor or death.  
Thus, equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism should be augmented with a 
robustness condition. 
This defense of the robustness condition is weak because certain types of labor or 
transfer of bodily resources from Able as a means to satisfy his duty toward Unable are 
simply not an unacceptable or unreasonable restriction of his autonomy.  Imagine, for 
instance, that in order for Able to satisfy his duty to Unable he must labor, on one 
occasion, for ten non-strenuous minutes.  We could also imagine instances of bodily 
transfers that also do not seem to represent an unacceptable restriction to Able’s 
autonomy, e.g., Able’s having to part with his toe-nail clippings in order to promptly 
satisfy his duty to leave Unable the full competitive value of common resources.  
Requiring such laboring by Able to satisfy a duty he owes Unable doesn’t seem as if it is 
an unreasonable restriction of his autonomy.  Able’s ten minutes of labor does not present 
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any serious threat to the plans and projects that he might have, nor does it seem to be an 
unacceptable interference to her life or body, it is simply a short and fairly trivial 
annoyance that is, plausible, necessary for him to fulfill a duty owed to another.120  Not 
all instances of requiring subsistence-share appropriators to labor for, or transferring 
bodily resources to, others in order to satisfy their duty to leave others enough and as 
good are morally objectionable. 
I should stress that autonomy or self-determination is, as is equality of initial 
opportunity for welfare, a moral consideration worth caring about.  In fact, recall that 
considerations of autonomy were invoked, earlier, as very strong reasons to allow the 
unilateral appropriation of common resources.  I would be remiss to discount the 
importance of autonomy at this juncture.  The point I wish to demonstrate in the above 
discussion is not that considerations of autonomy are unimportant but instead that not all 
instances of having to labor for another or parting with bodily resources for others will be 
unacceptable hindrances of an agent’s autonomy.  Put another way, it will not always be 
the case, contra the robustness condition, that an appropriator’s duty to leave others 
enough and as good will fail to hold if such a leaving demands that an appropriator labor 
for, or transfer bodily resources, to others.         
Further, the robustness condition has the troublesome implication that, when 
others are not concerned with appropriating more than a subsistence-share, it renders 
                                                 
120
 One could argue, Otsuka seems sympathetic to this view, that requiring Able to labor in this situation, 
even for ten minutes, is a violation of the Kantian prohibition against using another solely as a means.  
Without entrenching myself deep in Kantian interpretation, I suspect such an argument would fail.  This is 
because if equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism is accurate and as such Able has a duty owed to 
Unable which requires him to labor for only ten minutes then it seems that far from Able being used solely 
a means that he, if she failed to fulfill the duty where the fulfillment is of trivial cost to her, is using another 
solely as a means.  Thus, it is plausible that instead of Able being on the receiving end of the Kantian 
prohibition he could well be dishing out such prohibited treatment to others by failing to fulfill a duty he 
has (especially when the fulfillment of the duty is of little cost to her). 
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Unable’s survivability too dependent, nearly contingent, upon her temporal proximity to 
claiming common resources.  Unable could, according to equal opportunity for initial 
welfare Georgism (and pure equal initial opportunity for welfare appropriation for that 
matter), appropriate all the common resources in the world, e.g., all the breathable air and 
water in the world, and leave Able nothing at all.  Unable’s appropriation of all common 
resources would pass the test of leaving others (Able), consistent with either equal initial 
opportunity of welfare Georgism or pure equal initial opportunity for welfare 
appropriation, enough and as good.  In this case, where Unable is the first-claimer, Able 
would have to bargain (presumably by providing labor) in order to trade with Unable for 
a subsistence-share of her common resources. 
But now consider the scenario where Able is the first-claimer.  If we grant the 
robustness condition, he may appropriate a subsistence-share of common resources 
without contributing the labor which is necessary to leave enough and as good for 
Unable.  Here, if Able doesn’t want to bargain for common resources beyond 
subsistence-sustaining resources (and doesn’t assist Unable for other reasons), then 
Unable dies.  Unable lives if she appropriates first (and Able is interested in bargaining so 
that he may subsist) and perishes if Able appropriates first (and is not interested in 
appropriating more than a subsistence-share and is not interested in assisting Unable for 
other reasons).  Rendering the very survival of Unable dependent upon her temporal 
order of appropriation is morally unacceptable.  Unable’s survival shouldn’t depend on 
whether he is first to appropriate.  But this morally unacceptable implication, given 
certain empirical assumptions, is implied by the robustness condition.  Thus we have 
reason to reject the robustness condition. 
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Yet another criticism of the robustness condition involves a concern about the 
unfairness of the bargaining positions of Able and Unable that is brought about by the 
condition.  Here we can ask:  why maintain that a appropriator need not strictly fulfill her 
duty to others when she appropriates subsistence-sustaining common resources?  Why 
not, alternatively suggest, that agents be allowed to appropriate the common resources 
necessary for a minimally decent life (assumed to be above subsistence) before they must 
leave enough and as good for others?  The answer, motivated by Unable’s right against 
others from appropriating in a fashion that fails to leave him enough and as good, seems 
to be that such an ultra-robustness–condition would be unjust as it places agents like 
Unable (those who through no fault of their own cannot unilaterally subsist) in unfair and 
unequal bargaining position.  An ultra-robustness-condition is objectionable because it 
allows Able to far too easily escape her duty to leave enough and as good for Unable.   
But the same objection can be, aptly, applied to the chosen point that the 
robustness condition utilizes of subsistence-sustaining resources.  So long as Able is 
satisfied with appropriating only subsistence-sustaining resources, then Unable is at a 
severe and unfair disadvantage brought about by the infringement of her right to be left 
enough and as good.  If an ultra-robustness-condition concerns us because it affords Able 
too much moral power to appropriate common resources immune from having to leave 
enough and as good, then the robustness condition should worry us for exactly the same 
reason.  The difference between the robustness condition and an ultra-robustness-
condition is one of degree not of kind.  The robustness condition is problematic in fewer 
cases than is an ultra-robustness-condition, but the theoretically motivated core worry is 
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just as damning.  We have good reason to reject augmenting our most plausible version 
of the duty owed to others by appropriators with the robustness condition.    
Despite having good reasons to be skeptical of the robustness condition, Otsuka’s 
notion of offering appropriators some protection against having to strictly fulfill their 
duty to others is plausible.  Again, autonomy is an important moral consideration and, 
quite admittedly, there will be some conditions under which, because of an affront to her 
autonomy, an appropriator should not be duty bound to leave enough and as good.  For 
reasons already discussed it is too broad to cast this net to include any conditions under 
which an appropriator must, for the sake of appropriating a subsistence-share, labor for or 
transfer bodily resources to others in order to satisfy her duty to leave others enough and 
as good.  How then, if at all, should we construct a robustness condition that would allow 
one to appropriate without being duty bound to leave others enough and as good? 
 To address this question it is first worth pointing out that a mere subsistence 
living to be the worst life possible.  We might take a base subsistence living to represent 
zero welfare for an agent.  But an agent can live a life not worth living and have a level of 
welfare (or prospects of welfare) below this zero point of base subsistence.  For example 
an agent who lives at base subsistence has a better life than an agent who is horribly 
tortured for her entire existence.  There are worse fates than subsistence-living.   
On this score, I propose a revised robustness condition that allows an appropriator 
a life worth living before she is bound by the duty to leave enough and as good for others.   
Revised Robustness Condition:  An appropriator need not leave enough and as 
good for others if doing so renders his life not worth living. 
 
Consistent with the proposed robustness condition an appropriator could be duty bound to 
leave enough and as good for others in a fashion that necessitated her labor or transfer of 
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bodily resources and this would be allowable so long as this leaving did not render the 
appropriator’s life not worth living.  The newly proposed robustness condition does not, 
as the previous condition did, allow an appropriator to appropriate a subsistence-share 
and never have to labor for or transfer bodily resources to others if doing so is necessary 
to leave enough and as good for others.  Here, an incorporation of a life worth living 
condition with equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism can be specified as follows: 
Equal initial opportunity of welfare Georgism (with life worth living condition): 
You can appropriate common resources if only if (i) such resources are the 
minimum necessary to provide you with a life that is worth living, or (ii) you 
leave others their equal initial opportunity for welfare share of the greater of (a) 
the competitive value of rights claimed over X or (b) the minimum appropriation 
payment.   
 
Why think that a revision to equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism 
containing a life worth living clause is on any better footing than a revision incorporating 
the original robustness condition?  One reason is that plausibly no agent, at least no 
innocent agent, should be burdened with having to live a life not worth living.  Such a 
burden is too grave a restriction of autonomy.  No innocent agent should have a duty that 
implies that its satisfaction would leave the innocent a life not worth living.   
An appropriator of common resources should leave enough and as good for 
others, but when the fulfillment of this duty means that the appropriator must live a life 
not worth living it seems plausible that the duty, at least here, should be relaxed.  Agents 
do have a strong property right against appropriators that they leave enough and as good, 
but this right is not absolute.  And when this right against an appropriator would cause 
her to live a life not worth living then I suggest the right carries a moral force which fails 
to hold.   
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 On a more pragmatic, but theoretically important, point, consider that if a rational 
agent has a life not worth living, then they will commit suicide.  Rational agents kill 
themselves when their lives are no longer worth living.  Notice how this observation 
affects Able and Unable.  If Able is expected to abide by the demands of equal initial 
opportunity for welfare Georgism even when this renders his life not worth living then he 
will kill himself and Unable will die as there will be no one to assist her.  Thus forcing 
Able to abide by the duties implied by equal initial opportunity for welfare Georgism 
when this renders his life not worth living is of no material help to Unable.  All we 
achieve by forcing Able to strictly abide by the demands of equal initial opportunity for 
welfare Georgism when it renders his life not worth living is a world with two dead 
agents.  To require Able to abide by such a demand, even when it renders her suicide 
rational, would constitute leveling-down in its most vicious and objectionable form. 
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APPENDIX TWO: FAIR BIDDING POWER 
 
 
 
The defense of Georgism offered thus far maintains that the competitive value of rights in 
respect to a common resource is determined by the second highest bid in a hypothetical 
auction for a designated set of rights over a common resource.  One pressing question 
that this Georgist model must address is: how are we to set the initial bidding power of 
agents within our hypothetical auction?  Below I attempt to sketch out one way in which 
the Georgist can effectively address this pressing question. 
There are clearly arbitrary and very poor ways of setting the initial bidding power 
of agents within a Georgist auction.  For instance, people with blond hair could be given 
100 units of bidding power which red heads are given 20 units of bidding power.  But, of 
course, there is no good reason to suspect that color of hair should be the condition which 
sets an agent’s bidding power.  What we need is a non-arbitrary criterion by which to 
base an agent’s initial bidding power. 
Consider the suggestion that the initial bidding power of agents should be set at 
what an agent is able to pay for the item up for bid (again, in our case of interest, the item 
up for bid is a set of rights over a common resource).  If we focus on sources of payment 
independent of the resource being auction an agent could pay for common resources by 
committing her labor or body parts.  To see how such a suggestion would operate 
imagine a two person world with equally able agents, Rex and Mike.  Rex and Mike are 
both bidding for a small strip of land.  Rex is willing to bid a commitment of laboring to 
produce 30 bushels of apples. Mike is willing to bid a commitment of laboring to produce 
25 bushels of apples.  In such a case the initial bidding power is set by what each agent is 
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willing and able to produce and pay for the land.  Further, if we invoke the idea of a 
second highest bid auction the competitive value of the land is set at the equivalent of a 
commitment to produce, through labor, 25 bushels of apples.  An agent may appropriate 
the land only if they pay (leave) in a fashion which best promotes equal initial 
opportunity for welfare the equivalent of 25 bushels of apples.   
I reject the above account of bidding power because it relies upon an “ability to 
pay” that fails to take into the transferability of rights over common resources.  Consider 
a scenario in which the agents involved are not equally able.  Imagine that Rex is a 
normal agent, but Mike is very severely disabled and cannot feasibly make a commitment 
to pay for common resources based upon a contribution of his labor.  Does this mean that 
Mike has no bidding power since he cannot make a feasible commitment of his labor?  
Notice if Mike has no bidding power, then given a second bid auction the competitive 
value of common resources will always, in this two person world, be 0.  The troubling 
implication from this would be that competitive value payments owed by appropriators 
which are to be used to promote equal initial opportunity for welfare would be 0 and 
hence equal initial opportunity for welfare would be promoted by competitive value 
payments since common resources would have a competitive value of 0. 
Luckily, the amount that an agent is willing and able to pay for an item up for bid 
in our Georgist auction is not exhausted by her feasible commitment of labor.  This is 
because it is plausible that the rights over a common resource which an agent gains via 
her appropriation are transferable.121  If an agent may transfer her rights over common 
resources, then she can generate income from such a transfer and hence due to this 
income generation has a means to pay for the resource in question.  To illustrate the 
                                                 
121
 I thank Peter Vallentyne for bringing the importance of transferability squarely to my attention. 
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importance of granting transferability, consider again that Mike and Rex are bidding for a 
strip of land.  Each of them makes a bid for the land consistent with an initial bidding 
power that is equivalent to their respective willingness and ability to pay for the land.  
Mike bids 100 units for land (say this is a representation of his willingness and ability to 
produce 50 bushels of apples).  Rex bids 99 units for the land.  Here, Mike might protest 
saying, “Wait Rex, that is an illegitimate bid, given your disability how are you 
feasibility going to pay those 99 units?”  If we assume transferability of rights Rex has 
the following reply ready in hand, “Well Mike, I could pay the 99 units for the land by 
transferring the rights to you for a price of 99 units.  After all, Mike you were just willing 
to bid 100 units for the land surely you would buy the land from me for 99 units.”  Rex 
then has a bidding power just marginally less than 100 units because this is the amount 
(assuming transferability) that he is willing and able to pay for the land under auction.  
Initial bidding power need not be “payment in hand.”  After all, initially no one has any 
payments in hand to make.  Instead, bids can represent leans on commitments of labor or 
loans on the transfer value of rights.   Notice, that when we grant transferability of rights 
the second highest bid (Rex’s bid) in our auction is 99 units and this (the competitive 
value of the land) becomes the amount that an appropriator must pay in the fashion that 
best promotes equality of initial opportunity for welfare. 
The above picture of initial bidding power maintains that agents may make bids 
for rights over common resources on the condition that they can pay back the amount 
they bid.  If rights are not transferable such bids would be limited to an agent’s 
commitment of labor or body parts (after all she would have nothing else by which to pay 
the bid).  But if rights are transferable, as I maintain is plausible, then a person’s ability to 
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bid (based on an ability to pay) includes her ability to generate income from the transfer 
of rights over common resources which she appropriates.       
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